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Preface
It was around 9 p.m. in the evening of September 19, 2006. Like many 
Thais, my Mom and I were watching an evening soap opera on TV. Sud-
denly the TV show was interrupted. A group of military generals appeared. 
They sat calmly with portraits of the king and queen behind them. For a 
moment I thought it was a déjà vu. I’d seen this “image” before . . . when 
I was young. The generals announced that they had taken over from the 
government and that everything was going to be alright. But I knew this 
would not be alright.
The story of Thailand is personal to me. Not simply because it is my 
birth country, but because my life has been directly affected by its demo-
cratic collapses. In 1991, at the age of nine, I experienced firsthand a col-
lapse of democracy when a group of military generals dislodged a demo-
cratically elected government. I remember the vivid scenes I witnessed as a 
child, of army tanks rolling down the streets of Bangkok, and the hundreds 
of armed soldiers occupying key areas of the city. My father was a high- 
ranking army officer at the time, and the simple thought that “men in uni-
form” dressed just like him were responsible for such chaos and the killing 
that ensued was entirely confusing to me. My siblings and I grew up in a 
military household. We were thankful to the institution that had provided 
my father a good career that allowed us to have a good life. Were these men 
in uniform the very same that did those evil things? As I grew up and lived 
through several coups d’état, I became even more baffled and haunted by 
this question. It often perplexes me how a country that had become more 
prosperous over the decades could subsequently have been drawn into a 
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descending spiral of sometimes weak, sometimes overbearing, civilian gov-
ernments that alternated with periods of authoritarian rule.
Just a year prior to the coup of 2006, I was working at the Government 
House of Thailand during the prime ministership of Thaksin Shinawa-
tra. The antigovernment protests were becoming frequent and serious. I 
remember the many occasions that I was unable to reach my workplace 
via the main entrance since it was blocked by the protesters. One day, as I 
squeezed myself through the back entrance along the canal, trying to make 
an exit, it occurred to me that I had no idea why they were protesting. 
Maybe I should listen in. And so I did. That was the day my interest was 
sparked in what would later become the “Yellow Shirts.”
The People’s Alliance for Democracy (PAD)— more locally known as 
the “Yellow Shirts”— is one of the most contentious and sustained political 
movements in contemporary Thai history. Its title notwithstanding, this 
antidemocratic movement centers around a powerful monarchy and army, 
a distinct conception of “democratic politics,” and a weakly institutional-
ized party system. This study analyzes the relationships among these three 
components and situates them in the overall development of the modern 
Thai polity. It argues that blockage in formal and informal democratic 
institutions drove the PAD movement to appeal to nondemocratic institu-
tions, which contributed to the collapse of Thailand’s democracy in 2006. 
By exploring the forces and conditions that promoted this antidemocratic 
movement, and by showing how its emergence and decline has shaped 
Thailand’s experience with democracy, the study seeks more generally to 
elucidate factors that undermine democratic political regimes.
The PAD eventually evolved into another political movement— the 
People’s Democratic Reform Committee (PDRC). The PDRC was even 
more antidemocratic than the PAD and it was a truly digitally networked 
movement. Some of the PDRC leaders became social media influencers 
with millions of followers online. The fact that this popular movement 
opposing democracy could thrive online challenged our conventional wis-
dom that social media is a democratizing tool.
Three convictions underpin this book. The first is that there is no such 
thing as overthrowing democracy for the sake of democracy. A coup d’état 
is irreversible. Democracy cannot be “taken away” from the people and 
“returned” to the people in its same shape and form. Rolling back demo-
cratic rights, no matter how small and seemingly insignificant, can take a 
nation down a dangerous path. Democracy is difficult and messy, and pub-
lics can have many reasons to be disillusioned. But one must not give in to 
the urge for “order” in the face of temporary chaos and inconvenience by 
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allowing democratic rights to be curbed. Second, procedural democracy— 
fair elections, real power for elected officials, and basic human and civil 
rights— is worth pursuing. By deterring the abuse of power, by allowing 
the exercise of popular sovereignty, and by making it easier for the dis-
advantaged to influence and benefit from public policy, democracy pro-
motes the free development of human capabilities. The third conviction is 
that social structures, historical legacies, and political arrangements can be 
changed by acts of human will. Political choices matter, and they will mat-
ter even more if those who make them understand the opportunities and 
constraints their predecessors have faced. A grasp of these opportunities 
and constraints can help such actors identify, and thus more easily over-
come, obstacles that otherwise overwhelm them.
While this book examines the emergence and development of the PAD 
and the PDRC movements between 2005 to 2014, its implications remain 
relevant to understanding the future of democratic politics in this South-
east Asian country. The contribution of this empirical work will not only 
help us to understand why democracy collapses, but it also lends insights 
into the flaws of democratic regimes more generally.
The failure of democracy in Thailand, despite decades of trial and error, 
provides some key lessons to newly democratizing states and warns us that 
institutionalizing procedural forms of democracy provides no guarantee 
for democratic survival. Extraconstitutional institutions ought not to be 
strong enough that they compete for political legitimacy with democratic 
institutions. In the Thai case, both the military and the monarchy have 
been institutionalized as powerful sources of authority and legitimacy both 
in politics and society to remain crucial power brokers in Thai politics. It is 
not that democracy cannot thrive as long as the monarchy and the military 
remain on stage. More problematic is that their authority is able to con-
tend with that of democratic institutions. In the digital age of politics, we 
also cannot expect tools like social media to democratize us if we do not 







How and why do people in democracies oppose democracy? Does social 
media facilitate democratic collapse? Since the mid- 2000s, democratic 
breakdowns and recessions have occurred around the world alongside an 
explosion of social media adoption. While the phenomena of antidemo-
cratic movements that induce democratic collapse are perennial ques-
tions for scholars of democratization, these are further complicated by the 
arrival of new media. Earlier optimism that social media would be a boon 
for democracy has been seriously questioned by recent revelations of its 
central role in facilitating foreign electoral interference; electing radical, 
right- wing candidates; and fueling ethnic and religious conflicts around 
the world. Yet much of the current scholarship on regime transition has left 
an important gap in our understanding of how social media may contribute 
to democracy’s downfall.
This book is about understanding in the first place why and how peo-
ple in middle- income democracies mobilize against democracy. The main 
argument of this book is that people strategically mobilize against democ-
racy when they feel permanently excluded from democratic institutions. 
Disenchanted with their inability to gain access to power through demo-
cratic bodies such as parliament, ordinary people in young democracies 
where democratic values and experiences remain immature are inclined to 
embrace an authoritarian turn. Emerging democracies tend to be plagued 
by the perennial problems of weak institutions, political instability, polar-
ization, frequent executive changes, and low levels of civil and political 
liberties. After years of intense struggles and difficult reforms, these new 
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democracies suddenly reach the promised land: democracy is finally work-
ing! Its people enjoy greater freedoms and political participation more 
than ever, while its executives also have improved power and capacity to 
govern. This, unfortunately, in turn leads to a clash of two incompatible 
visions of democracy: power- sharing versus majoritarianism. On the one 
hand, there is greater inclusion: citizens are not only afforded regular and 
routinized elections where they can exercise their voice and vote; they also 
feel empowered by greater rights and freedoms. Yet, on the other hand, 
their executives are becoming too powerful and prone to abusing their 
power with little constraint from below.
Despite the ideological contentions that may prompt the masses to turn 
against their elected governments, the decision to oppose democracy is 
often strategic. This means that the movement decides to oppose democ-
racy. Becoming an antidemocratic movement is a choice, not an inevita-
bility. New democracies are trapped in this dilemma: wanting both more 
inclusion and more constraint on the executive (Schedler, Andreas, and 
Plattner 1999). Elites are also confronted by the fact that they may have 
to finally redistribute resources and power in order to maintain power and 
prevent widespread unrest (Acemoglu and Robinson 2006). While elites 
squabble over who will redistribute, and over how and how much, ordinary 
people, in contrast, fight over what kind of democracy they want to live 
in. Invariably, this means the majoritarian version of democracy in which 
the wishes of the majority matter most, or the power- sharing democracy 
where its people are included in political decision- making and its execu-
tives restrained. Disputes arise not just between elites and the masses, but 
also within each group itself. As the costs of staying with the current demo-
cratic regime rise above the anticipated benefits of a new regime, demo-
cratic breakdown becomes likely.
But the story of how today’s democracy dies is incomplete without tak-
ing seriously the role of social media. Social media is a tool for antidemo-
cratic mobilization and the expansion of antidemocratic voices. Social 
media can make coups cheaper. Popular mobilization increases and polar-
ization magnifies through social media; combined, these radically reduce 
the costs of mounting a coup. Ironically, by providing a new avenue for 
people to express their opinions and participate in politics, social media 
entrenches and sometimes worsens polarization— keeping societies divided 
rather than bringing them together. It gives the masses the very weapon 
most likely to deepen the conflict. Unlike other forms of mass communica-
tion tools like television or print, social media creates a “participatory cul-
ture” in which users are transformed into active participants and producers 
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of content (Jenkins 2006). Social media users can generate, share, edit, and 
produce whatever information and content they want— and they can do 
this at will. Social media is therefore an instrument in itself for empower-
ing antidemocratic voices and allowing them to galvanize popular support 
for dictatorship. If we agree that today democracy is under attack in more 
ways than one, then social media must be added to the list of factors that 
heighten its vulnerability.
Since the Third Wave of democratization in the mid- 1970s, little schol-
arly attention has been paid to popular mobilization against democratic 
governments, or against democracy more generally. Images of ordinary 
people rising up to challenge oppressive regimes and eventually toppling 
their dictators give us hope and optimism (Huntington 1993; Diamond 
2003; Schock 1999; Collier and Mahoney 1997; Kim 2003; Bernhard 1993; 
Bellin 2012). The fall of the Berlin Wall set in motion by protests across the 
Eastern bloc, prodemocracy movements against President Joseph Estrada 
in the Philippines, protests against dictatorial Indonesia and Burmese rul-
ers, and the 2011 Arab Spring all remind us of the “people’s power” in the 
collapse of authoritarian regimes.
Yet, on closer inspection, empirical evidence presents a rather mixed 
picture regarding the democratic orientations of mass political movements 
in contemporary times. Popular movements have been regarded as contrib-
uting factors to the loss of democracy in the past decade in countries such as 
Bangladesh, Fiji, the Philippines, Thailand, Honduras, and Egypt. As such, 
not all political movements are prodemocracy. We have made empirical 
observations of cases of opposition movements that advocate against some 
aspects of the democratic system. But not all antidemocratic movements 
contribute to a democratic collapse. Some democracies are able to survive 
despite popular movements that push for regime change.
Opposition movements in Egypt successfully called for a military inter-
vention that resulted in the removal of a democratically elected president, 
Mohamed Morsi, in 2013. Tamarod, one of the key anti- Morsi movements, 
rallied members to shore up support for the military- backed government 
of Adly Mansour, despite the autocratic nature of the regime. In Honduras, 
what started as an antigovernment movement led to the 2009 coup d’état 
when a group of soldiers broke into the presidential palace and forced 
President Manuel Zelaya to resign. The subsequent military- backed gov-
ernment reportedly enjoyed strong support from sections of Honduran 
society.1 Some 70,000 people marched in the streets of Tegucigalpa in sup-
port of this new authoritarian government.2
The phenomenon of antidemocratic mobilization is real and has been 
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witnessed more frequently in large, middle- income countries, such as 
Brazil, Egypt, Bangladesh, Turkey, and Thailand. Despite this increasing 
occurrence, existing literature cannot help us to make sense of how anti-
democratic movements develop in emerging democratic countries. This 
book thus outlines a concrete process in which a once prodemocratic move-
ment turns antidemocratic. I use Thailand as a showcase of the antidem-
ocratization process. Thailand is a focus of this book not only because it 
suffers from the highest number of democratic collapses in recent years, 
but most significantly because of the critical role played by social media 
in the antidemocratic mobilization. At a nearly 100 percent penetration 
rate of online population, and alongside other developing democracies like 
the Philippines and Indonesia, Thailand ranks among the world’s most 
social media active countries. More importantly, the origin and evolution 
of the “Yellow Shirts”— an antidemocratic mass movement that is the focus 
of this book— begins in the pre- social- media era and continues as social 
media becomes an integral part of the people behind the movement. Thai-
land thus provides an excellent case to examine how a mass movement 
comes to oppose democracy in a middle- income country and probes the 
role of social media in the process.
There is also a real gap in current studies on political transitions to dic-
tatorship that take social media seriously. Much of the existing literature on 
political regimes and media and communication either focus on the con-
tribution that digital media makes in political transitions to democracy or 
on the entrenchment of authoritarian regimes (Tufekci and Wilson 2012; 
Lim 2012; Pearce and Kendzior 2012). This book seeks to fill this empiri-
cal gap through the case of Thailand by providing rich and compelling 
research at the micro level on how democracy fails, and the contribution 
that social media plays in its downfall. Implications from this study are 
relevant to many developing countries around the world whose citizens 
are increasingly distressed and disenchanted by democracy and who take 
up their frustrations on social media. Some are dreaming of an alterna-
tive future in which life seems more orderly and secure, even if they must 
concede some of their hard- earned freedoms. Those having grown up in 
authoritarian times still have fond memories of the “good old days.” Such 
authoritarian nostalgia has already been on the rise in Asia, as preferences 
for strong unelected leaders and military intervention in politics grow.3
There are three important research questions that guide this study and 
the subject matter of this book. First, under what conditions do people 
have antidemocratic attitudes? Second, when does antidemocratic mobili-
zation occur? And third, when do antidemocratic movements succeed? In 
Introduction 7
the next sections of this chapter, I consider answers to these three research 
questions. Following this, I discuss the current literature on social media 
and democracy and outline how social media amplifies antidemocratic atti-
tudes, speeds up antidemocratic mobilization, and simultaneously brings 
down the costs of a military intervention— making coup possibilities 
greater and success more likely.
Opposing Democracy
Antidemocratic movements are but one type of opposition mobilization. 
I argue here that there are three ideal types of opposition movements in 
democracies: (1) proreform; (2) anti- incumbent; and (3) antidemocratic 
(table 1.1). What distinguishes these three types of movements is their 
goal. In general, an opposition movement forms to contest either a specific 
policy or the general direction of an incumbent government. Once formed, 
an opposition movement takes one of these three forms. This typology is 
an ideal type, thus in reality a movement can be a mixture of proreform and 
anti- incumbent. These ideal types, however, help to differentiate analyti-
cally and empirically the nature of opposition by distinguishing their goals. 
Proreform opposition movements look to propose policy alternatives, 
while anti- incumbent movements seek executive or government replace-
ment. Neither is intent on subverting the democratic system.
Antidemocratic mobilization, which is the main focus of this study, is 
a distinct type of movement whose characteristics differ from other forms 
of opposition mobilization. To be clear: for an antidemocratic movement, 
government change is not a desired outcome. Instead, its goal is to over-
haul the entire political system. Unlike other types of opposition mobili-
zation, antidemocratic mobilization carries the highest costs and is some-
times considered a “last resort” strategy for a movement. It is important to 
note that not all electoral democracies are conducive to the emergence of 
antidemocratic movements. The theory set forth in this book outlines the 
conditions under which an antidemocratic movement can arise to success-
fully overthrow an elected government.
TABLE 1.1. Typology of opposition movement in democracies
 Goals
1. Proreform Propose policy alternatives; voice grievances
2. Anti- incumbent Oppose incumbent government; voice grievances
3. Antidemocratic Subvert democratic system
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Does antidemocratic mobilization account for the recent collapse of 
Third Wave democracies? Indeed, while some 60 percent of states today 
are electoral democracies, the world has become less free.4 Serious signs 
of democratic rollback and incidences of breakdown have been on the rise 
within the Third Wave countries.5 The rise of antidemocratic mobilization 
is, by definition, part of the explanation for why we see an increasing inci-
dence of democratic reversal in some of these states. Understanding anti-
democratic mobilization in these postdemocratizing states is, therefore, not 
only empirically relevant but also has implications for our understanding 
of the overall state of democracy in the world. In particular, middle- income 
democracies are supposed to be well placed to sustain democracy, yet we 
continue to see their democratic collapses. Why such relatively well- off 
democracies face mass antidemocratic mobilization and breakdown is the 
very puzzle this book examines.
Having antidemocratic attitudes is not enough to get a movement 
going without the ability to organize it. Mobilizational capacity— the abil-
ity to organize and mobilize supporters— is thus an additional and neces-
sary factor for forming an antidemocratic movement. An antidemocratic 
movement with the potential to pose a credible threat to democracy is one 
that can galvanize sufficient popular support. As most mass movements are 
broad- based and eclectic, which is to say they are composed of a number of 
diametrically opposing groups and ideological bedfellows, the question is 
then one of which group will end up leading the overall movement. This is 
when mobilization capacity matters: success in the overall movement falls 
to those groups most skilled at rallying a majority of people behind their 
leaders and directing the movement agenda toward opposing democracy. 
Crafty and charismatic figures able to better leverage a variety of media 
channels to advance their agenda hold a distinct advantage over others. It is 
not who has the best idea but whose idea is heard by the greatest number of 
people. Media will play a critical part in understanding how antidemocratic 
attitudes spread and who is able to advance such ideas in a movement.
When opposition forces feel shut out from access to power, they rebel 
against such closures by appealing to nondemocratic actors to reverse or 
reopen democratic channels. Antidemocratic mobilization then serves as 
a vehicle for various opposition forces whose leverage has been reduced, 
or completely cut out, by an overpowering executive. If such mobiliza-
tion succeeds in garnering support from nondemocratic authorities, then 
we see a complete breakdown of democracy. The existence of viable non-
democratic institutions, such as a monarchy, military, or religious bodies, 
is necessary for the mobilization of an antidemocratic movement. These 
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institutions often historically played a critical role in the politics of their 
respective countries during authoritarian times. Following democratiza-
tion, such institutions continue to wield significant power despite their 
more limited role. These nondemocratic bodies will reassert themselves 
when (a) their interests are threatened and (b) they see a chance of success.
Antidemocratic mobilization is therefore more likely to succeed if it can 
appeal to nondemocratic actors, such as the military. A sudden democratic 
collapse usually happens via a military putsch; but coups état happen far less 
frequently than they once did. In the age of mass politics, mass support is 
crucial for the military to even consider staging a coup as the cost of coups 
is so high, especially if they fail (Svolik 2012). If antidemocratic movements 
can demonstrate their popularity and convince the military to take their 
side, this then contributes to the much stronger possibility of a successful 
coup. To demonstrate their popular appeal, antidemocratic groups tend to 
form extensive alliances with other opposition groups and persuade them 
or the opposition movement’s leaders to accept the antidemocratic agenda. 
How well antidemocratic movements can both demonstrate their popular-
ity and signal to the military their readiness to welcome its intervention is 
of great import to the overall likelihood and success of a coup d’état.
Not every new democracy witnesses a rise of antidemocratic mobiliza-
tion. Likewise, only some democratizing countries will experience regime 
breakdown. While the vast research in the study of democratic transition 
points to the fragility and sometimes fleeting nature of newly established 
democracies (O’Donnell et al. 1986; Loveman 1994; Jones 1998; Bratton 
1998; Bunce 2000), there is great variation in existing scholarship as to why 
some new democracies survive but others do not. I will canvas five key the-
oretical arguments that are advanced on democratic transition and stability. 
The most widely cited argument within the body of comparative literature 
on what explains the rise of an antidemocratic/antisystem mobilization is 
an economic one. When new democracies face severe economic crisis, the 
public reacts negatively toward the regime by supporting antidemocratic/
Figure 1.1. Antidemocratic mobilization and coup success
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antisystem movements or political parties (Kitschelt and McGann 1997; 
Brustein 1991; Olukoshi 1998; Allen 1973). It is not the economic crisis per 
se that drives people to overthrow their democratic governments. Rather, 
it is how the people react to severe economic downturns that are purported 
to have implications for democratic stability. Times of war or major eco-
nomic downturn in a democracy provide grounds for groups to organize in 
opposition to the political system in which they live. Much of this literature 
addresses more broadly the rise of “antisystem” movements, which include 
extreme right- wing, extreme left- wing, and fascist mobilization.
Second, the intraelite competition approach argues that the stability of 
democracy depends on elite unity. Democratic breakdown and democratic 
transition can occur as long as elites remain fragmented (Higley and Bur-
ton 1989; Lopez- Pintor 1987). An antidemocratic movement is thus largely 
reflective of the power struggle among rival elites (McCargo 2008; Ockey 
2008; Nelson 2007). Traditional elites, such as the military, can be threat-
ened by the rise of career politicians, for instance. The “men in uniform” 
then mobilize people to help them legitimize their seizure of power from 
a democratically elected government. Third, the class- conflict approach 
contends that what gives rise to an antidemocratic mobilization is the long- 
standing divide between the rural poor and the urban elites. Fearful of 
the rising political influence of the poor, the rich mobilize against them 
by seeking to subvert the democratic system that gives the former power 
in the first place. The antidemocratic movement is thus an upper- and 
middle- class reaction to the threat from below (Acemoglu and Robinson: 
2005; Phongpaichit and Baker 2008; Pongsudhirak 2008; Funston 2009; 
Hewison 2012). An implicit assumption in this class- based framework is 
that economic positions shape groups in society along class lines and moti-
vate their behavior. Unequal distribution of power across diverse groups in 
society also plays a key role in a class struggle.
Fourth, the extent to which a democratic regime survives depends on 
elite choices (Linz and Stepan 1978; O’Donnell, Schmitter, and Whitehead 
1986; Muller and Seligson 1994; Ake 1991). This elite- centric approach 
argues that decisions made by elites are crucial to regime change. While 
recognizing the importance of structural factors, elites decide when a 
regime change occurs. When elites are not committed to democratic ideas, 
democracy is always unstable. One interpretation of the importance of 
political leadership to regime change concerns explanations for the rise 
of antisystem parties and ethnic conflicts. Ake (1991, 34) argues that “bad 
leadership” explains ethnic conflicts in Africa as elites mobilize people 
against adversarial groups. Bermeo (2003) contends that extremist par-
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ties in interwar Europe and Latin America are driven by elites, not the 
masses. Fifth, the political institutionalization approach argues that anti-
democratic movements are most likely to thrive in places with weak politi-
cal institutionalization (Huntington 1968; Berman 1997; Fiorina 1997; 
Armony 2004). When social mobilization outpaces political institutional-
ization, chaos and crisis will ensue.6 When weak political institutions can-
not respond to the public demand for meaningful political participation in 
public life, the people look for other alternatives to voice their grievances. 
As such, where institutions fail to meet the demands of a mobilized society, 
we see the rise of an antisystem movement (Berman 1997).
These existing theories provide important explanations as to why Thai-
land witnessed two popular antidemocratic movements and subsequent 
successful military coups in 2006 and 2014. Weak political institutions, the 
heightening of intraelite conflicts, and deep- seated and growing polariza-
tion within the middle class about what democracy is and should look like 
are all contributing factors to the country’s recent political chaos. What 
this book offers in addition to existing analyses is the often- overlooked 
micro- level process of how antidemocratic mobilization emerged and 
evolved over time. It emphasizes the importance of understanding the stra-
tegic nature of the antidemocratic mobilization process that goes beyond 
considerations of structural factors. This book also takes seriously the role 
of media and communication, particularly social media, in understanding 
the emergence of digitally mediated antidemocratic movements.
Thailand
Thailand is among the oldest democracies in Southeast Asia, yet it has also 
witnessed the greatest number of coups. With the introduction of dem-
ocratic politics in the 1970s, Thailand became the second democracy in 
the region, following the Philippines.7 But Thailand has suffered multiple 
regime oscillations since military coups were frequent: a total of nineteen 
attempts from the time of its transition to a constitutional monarchy in 
1932. Important reforms beginning in the late 1980s set in motion a series 
of initiatives to liberalize Thailand’s polity. These reduced the political 
power of the military and instead expanded civil society and empowered 
ordinary people. Liberalizing reforms culminated in the first- ever “People’s 
Constitution” of 1997— a new, people- oriented constitution that would 
strengthen democratic institutions and further help Thailand’s democratic 
consolidation by focusing on the rights and freedoms of its people. Con-
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sequently, many held high hopes that Thailand of the 1990s would be the 
beacon of democracy in Southeast Asia following its longest spell without 
any threat of a coup, and its first constitution to be drafted by a power 
other than the military (Neher 1996; Bertrand 1998; Bunbongkarn 1999). 
If democracy were to survive in this previously coup- ridden nation, there 
was hope for neighboring states such as Cambodia, Malaysia, and Myan-
mar that a similar transition to democracy could be achieved.
Yet, paradoxically, by 2005, the very prodemocracy activists who fought 
tooth and nail for the 1997 People’s Constitution found themselves at the 
helm of the country’s largest antidemocratic movement. These activists, 
the so- called Yellow Shirts, spurred hundreds of thousands of supporters 
and demanded extraconstitutional interventions to dislodge a popularly 
elected prime minister, Thaksin Shinawatra, a billionaire cum politician 
who rose to power in 2001. He became the first Thai prime minister ever 
to win an absolute majority in parliament and to serve out a full four- year 
term. Thaksin was possibly Thailand’s most popular prime minister of all 
time. Supporters renamed their villages after him and planted flags with his 
face all across populous northeastern Thailand. His remarkable leadership 
was marked by sweeping reforms, welfare policies, and corruption scandals. 
These drew both affection and revulsion from the public. By 2004, dis-
solution and opposition to his rule among some sections of the public was 
growing and various protest groups were spilling into the streets. When 
Thaksin went on to win the 2005 election in yet another landslide victory, 
opposition forces rapidly escalated. The breaking point was reached when 
Thaksin sold his family’s Shin Corporation to Singapore- based Temasek 
Holdings for 73.3 billion baht ($2.4 billion) without paying any taxes— 
causing massive outcry among the opposition forces.
In 2005, sustained broad- based popular mobilization against the demo-
cratically elected government of Thaksin Shinawatra nearly brought the 
nation’s capital Bangkok to a complete standstill. In fact, some of the dem-
onstrators had been protesting since 2004, while more opposition groups 
steadily poured onto the streets to demand the resignation of Thak-
sin. By early 2006, oppositional forces to the Thaksin government had 
united under a loosely organized movement called the People’s Alliance 
for Democracy (PAD), which is to say the more popularly known “Yellow 
Shirts,” and began calling for the ouster of his government. As the situa-
tion intensified, leaders of the PAD movement appealed to the military and 
the much- revered monarchy to “step in” to resolve this political deadlock 
and draw Thailand out of this “tyrannical regime.” The first intervention 
came from the judiciary when the courts annulled the results of the April 
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2006 election, which all major political parties had boycotted. Despite this, 
the Thaksin government refused to back down. Eventually, the military 
staged a coup d’état in September 2006 and successfully ousted the Thak-
sin administration. The PAD hailed this as a crucial success for the move-
ment and moved to push for systematic reforms in the country’s polity that 
would do away with some key aspects of the democratic system.
The 2006 coup government promised an anxious nation a swift elec-
tion and a return to democratic politics soon after it took power. But the 
ousting of Thaksin in 2006 unwittingly, and unfortunately, gave birth to a 
countermovement to the Yellow Shirts: the “Red Shirts,” a largely prode-
mocracy movement loyal to Thaksin’s electoral base. The Red–Yellow con-
flict continued unabated in the intercoup period (between 2007 and 2014), 
with violence breaking out on both sides. After passing a new constitution 
to guarantee the military’s immunity and strengthen the military’s position 
in politics, Thailand returned to parliamentary rule with a general elec-
tion in 2007. The result was devastating to PAD supporters: the Thaksin- 
aligned party, the People’s Power Party, again won, which prompted a sus-
tained period of antidemocratic mobilization. By 2009, the judiciary staged 
its own coup by backing the PAD’s appeal to Thailand’s monarchy for an 
intervention and banned the People’s Power Party. The move prompted 
the takeover of the new government by the opposition party, the Demo-
crat Party. The Red Shirts were outraged and again took to the streets in a 
bloody showdown between their movement, on the one hand, and the Yel-
low Shirt– backed government and the military, on the other. Eventually, 
an election was held again in 2011 and Thaksin’s sister, Yingluck Shinawa-
tra, and her newly formed party, Pheu Thai, won another landslide elec-
tion. Thaksin and his successor parties had won four consecutive general 
elections in Thailand. Former groups within the defunct PAD movement 
reorganized themselves and officially partnered with the Democrat Party 
defections to form the People’s Democratic Reform Committee (PDRC). 
The PDRC launched a full- scale antidemocratic mobilization from the 
start; they demanded no less than a cessation of elections and military 
and monarchy interventions into politics. After the massive protests that 
ensued between 2013 and 2014, the military again staged a coup in May 
2014. Thailand remained under military rule until mid- 2019.
Thailand became the richest nation to have staged a successful coup 
d’état in recent decades.8 With its GNI per capita (purchasing power par-
ity) close to $14,850, this “upper middle income” country, according to 
the World Bank’s classification, should not have seen a day of army tanks 
rolling into its streets. Indeed, Przeworski et al. (1996, ) predicted in their 
14 Opposing Democracy in the Digital Age
influential article “What Makes Democracies Endure,” that “above $6,000, 
democracies are impregnable and can be expected to live forever: no dem-
ocratic system has ever fallen in a country where per capita income exceeds 
$6,055.” 9 The collapse of democracy in Thailand sent reverberations 
across the Pacific region: the Fijian coup leader, Commodore Voreque 
Bainimarama, cited Thailand as an “inspiration” for his successful coup in 
December 2006. As this research will show, the causes for the recent col-
lapse of the Thai democracy were political, not economic. Understanding 
what happened in this relatively affluent and seemingly stable, important 
Southeast Asian nation helps reveal much about the state of democracy in 
the developing world.
Current theoretical approaches that explain the emergence of anti-
democratic movements offer important but partial answers for the rise of 
the People’s Alliance for Democracy and the People’s Democratic Reform 
Committee. Known collectively as the Yellow Shirts, their emergence and 
evolution are clear symptoms of weak democratic institutions, deep- rooted 
intraelite conflicts, and class conflict. That Thailand has dealt with nineteen 
military coup attempts, frequent governmental and constitutional change, 
and the continued political power of nondemocratic actors like the mon-
archy and the military is indicative of a weakly institutionalized democratic 
system. To look at the party system alone, the majority of Thai political par-
ties lack organizational depth, ideological goals, and strong societal ties, and 
rarely rise above the personal leadership of a particular individual (Hicken 
and Kuhonta 2014). Ironically, the two most institutionalized parties— the 
Democrat Party and Thaksin’s Thai Rak Thai (TRT)— are at the center of 
the country’s political crisis since the former faced a challenge by the latter.
The heightened intraelite conflict was exemplified by the leadership 
of Thaksin and his parties and the main opposition party, the Democrats. 
But it likewise concerned new versus old elites. Thaksin was part of a new 
group of business elites who had turned to politics after the country nar-
rowly avoided bankruptcy in the aftermath of the 1997 global financial 
crisis. The group’s meteoric rise disrupted the status quo of traditional 
nonelected elites— the monarchy, the military, and the bureaucracy— on 
the one hand, and the established career politicians who had become accus-
tomed to working with this powerful trio, on the other. Not willing to play 
by the same rules, Thaksin both challenged and undermined the power 
and authority of powerful actors in the polity, riding on the back of his 
electoral popularity and growing nationwide fan base. The goal of both the 
2006 and 2014 coups was crystal clear to its plotters: to rid Thaksin and his 
nominees from Thai politics for good.
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Class- based analysis in part explains the conflict between the Yellow 
Shirts and their antagonists, the Red Shirts, the pro- Thaksin movement 
that emerged following his ousting after the coup. Unlike the widely 
accepted wisdom that Thailand’s political crisis is marked by the division 
between the rich and poor, it is more aptly described as a conflict between 
the older, more established middle class and the upwardly mobile newer 
sections of the middle class. Some key grievances of the Yellow Shirts are 
best understood through the class lens: their privileged position in soci-
ety— a secure and stable source(s) of income and voice in the democratic 
system— is being challenged by the rising lower middle class, which has 
been vying for the same economic and political benefits afforded to their 
upper middle- class counterparts. Thaksin empowered the lower section of 
the middle class through his redistribution programs and greater access 
to state coffers. Seeing the gains made by Thaksin’s supporters as their 
loss, the Yellow Shirts saw no other means to reset the clock back to the 
“good old days” but to appeal for extraconstitutional interventions. While 
this class- based explanation is useful to outline the underlying grievances 
driving the mobilization of the Yellow Shirts, more nuances are required. 
The Yellow Shirts are made up of highly dynamic and eclectic sections of 
society that cannot uniformly or solely be understood along class lines. 
This book therefore attempts to provide a more nuanced appreciation as 
to who constituted the Yellow Shirts movement, and how their antidemo-
cratic mobilization transpired.
The theoretical frameworks outlined above capture well why, but not 
how or when, a large- scale antidemocratic movement emerges in a democ-
racy. Structural explanations like class, economic, and institutional per-
spectives can be deterministic and unable to fully capture the dynamism 
of antidemocratic mobilization emergence. The concept of institutional 
blockage and the process of antidemocratic mobilization detailed in this 
book brings us closer to understanding how and when people turn against 
democracy. The PAD was composed of and driven by actors and groups 
in society that were not only made worse off because of Thaksin’s policies. 
Opposition channels that might have allowed these actors and groups to 
convey their grievances were closed off. This happened in both the formal 
and informal arenas. In the formal democratic institutions, opposition par-
ties in the legislature and certain sections of the Senate joined forces with 
the PAD movement due to their inability to oppose or advance alternatives 
to the Thaksin- led absolute majority in parliament. The same went for the 
courts and key figures of the bureaucracy, whose powers were severed by 
Thaksin’s rule. In the informal institutional channels, the nongovernmen-
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tal organization (NGO) sector, labor unions, and media all experienced not 
only the loss of their political space; possibilities for them to present alter-
natives to government positions were marginalized. This resentment did 
not culminate in the PAD movement until Thaksin and his Thai Rak Thai 
party won their consecutive landslide election victory in 2005. Following 
this, the opposition became convinced they were permanently excluded 
from power due to Thai Rak Thai’s electoral dominance and Thaksin’s 
growing abuse of executive power. At this point, the PAD came together as 
a movement not merely to oppose Thaksin collectively but also to appeal 
to the monarchy and the military to intervene.
The People’s Democratic Reform Committee— a successor movement 
to the PAD— was mobilized around similar grievances: feeling shunned 
from the formal democratic institutions as Thaksin’s successor parties con-
tinued their electoral dominance. The PDRC, however, was fundamentally 
different from the PAD in two key respects: it was far more antidemocratic, 
and it was largely mobilized on social media. The PDRC took a more hard-
line approach when it came to its core priorities: cessation of elections, a 
greater role for the monarchy and military in politics, and a return to a 
fully unelected house of review (the Senate) in the Thai National Assembly.
Why Social Media Matters
Social media is a game changer in understanding antidemocratic politics 
in democracies. I argue here that social media is a tool for antidemo-
cratic mobilization. Social media also makes coups cheaper. Social media 
amplifies antidemocratic voices to reach more people in a much shorter 
time than any other form of media today. The costs required to mobilize 
hundreds of thousands of people in the pre- social- media era are sharply 
reduced by leveraging social media affordances. By making antidemocratic 
mobilization faster and much cheaper, social media directly contributes to 
bringing down the overall cost of launching a military coup.
Up until recently, social media was heralded as the “liberation technol-
ogy”: it empowers activists and ordinary people the world over to fight 
against oppressive regimes, it keeps governments accountable to their 
actions, and helps to increase civic and political participation (Diamond 
and Plattner 2012). Successful uprisings from the Arab Spring to Hong 
Kong have fostered early optimism that platforms like Facebook and Fire-
Chat can expand the numbers of the politically engaged, particularly those 
previously disengaged from formal politics. Scholars who subscribe to this 
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view that social media can mobilize new sections of society into politics 
have been encouraged by the rise of political engagement among youths 
in North America and Europe, whose participation in formal politics had 
long been in a decline (Vromen et al. 2016).
Social media should also help improve the quality of democracy by 
providing new ways to engage with elected officials, wherein citizens can 
offer feedback or hold officials accountable to their actions and thus foster 
greater transparency. For many countries in Asia where media freedom is 
low, social media should also offer avenues for ordinary citizens to chal-
lenge the dominant state- led discourses of information and make it harder 
for governments to suppress information online. Moreover, by talking 
online to people of diverse viewpoints, social media should help neutralize 
radical voices by subjecting them to public exposure and greater engage-
ment with the mainstream.
Despite a long list of contributions that social media can make toward 
strengthening democracy, it also has a dark side. This book demonstrates 
empirically, through the rise of the People’s Democratic Reform Commit-
tee and its subsequent contribution to the 2014 coup d’état in Thailand, 
that social media did not counter antidemocratic attitudes online. Instead, 
it amplified these and, moreover, helped antidemocratic factions to gain 
control of the broader movement and dictate its antidemocratic agenda. 
Analysis of political engagement by both the PDRC and the Red Shirts 
also shows that social media perpetuates political polarization and societal 
divisions by further sowing the seed of discord. Facebook groups under 
study demonstrate strong echo chamber effects whereby like- minded indi-
viduals only talk to one another and rarely engage with those with oppos-
ing views— dampening any opportunities for neutralizing antidemocratic 
attitudes. The mobilization of nearly a quarter of a million protesters on 
the streets during the 2013– 14 Bangkok Shutdown was also largely facili-
tated online. All in all, social media did far more to strengthen the anti-
democratic attitudes and facilitate antidemocratic mobilization than it did 
to contain them.
The major contribution of this book is the explanation to the puzzle: 
why we observe a successful antidemocratic movement in a middle- income 
country where social media hastened democratic decline. The incorpora-
tion of social media in this book serves primarily to demonstrate the posi-
tive impact that it has had on both the antidemocratic mobilization and 
coup prospects for Thailand. While not advancing any causal claim here, 
this work provides an empirically rich analysis of the role that social media 
plays in advancing nondemocratic discourse and mobilizing mass move-
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ments that seek to overthrow an elected government. This serves to fill an 
empirical gap in the study of social media and political regimes insofar as it 
directly and comprehensively discusses the ways in which social media can 
contribute to democratic breakdown.
Methodology
This research is based on fieldwork conducted in Thailand from 2009 to 
2014, and it employs both qualitative and quantitative methodologies. Key 
qualitative research methodologies utilized in this work include participant 
observation, semistructured interviews, archival data research, statistical 
analysis, discursive analysis, and a public opinion survey. The majority of 
the interviews conducted for this book were drawn from fieldwork trips in 
2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, and 2014. Interviews were targeted at the follow-
ing groups: the PAD’s and PDRC’s top national and local leaders, activ-
ists, media, security forces, politicians, military officers, protesters, police, 
academics, and government officials. To obtain a balanced view on the 
political crisis in Thailand, interviews were also conducted with the Red 
Shirts, a pro- Thaksin movement that emerged following the 2006 coup. 
My interviews helped me gain a context- specific understanding of the rela-
tionships among the different forces that have contributed to the collapse 
of democracy in Thailand. Specifically, I have gained a nuanced under-
standing of the motivations and aspirations of ordinary people in joining 
this antidemocratic movement.
To test the argument on institutional blockage, I created a new database 
on protest activities across Thailand between 1991 and 2011. The statistical 
analysis based on this data allowed me to map the cycle of contention both 
before and after the democratic breakdown of 2006, categorized in types 
and modes of opposition. I was also able to identify “critical moments” in 
each period of the protest cycle as the movement ebbed and flowed over 
time. I also used a number of digital tools to map the PAD’s and PDRC’s 
membership and support base and predict their movement strategies. Fre-
quently, the research was conducted at the Yellow Shirts’ headquarters— 
Baan Pra Athit— and that of the New Politics Party, both in Bangkok. Over 
the span of a decade, I attended numerous PAD and PDRC rallies, which 
proved crucial to my analysis of their discourse. Given the dynamic and 
fluid nature of this political movement, it was imperative to be present at 
various activities of the movement to gain a nuanced understanding of the 
movement’s goals, strategies, and discourse. The PAD was arguably the 
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world’s first live movement: its entire activities during much of its existence 
were broadcast through its satellite channels. There were many elements 
of the “production” of mass media involved. As such, understanding the 
message that the PAD and PDRC sent out to their respective members 
both at the rallies and in the online, digital space helped to cement a more 
complete understanding of the movement.
Social media data on Facebook and Twitter was collected and analyzed 
using both quantitative and qualitative methods. For social media, the key 
time frame of interest is from 2013 to 2017, given that the PDRC emerged 
in 2013 and its major activities ranged from mid- 2013 until the coup in May 
2014. Following the coup, Facebook data of procoup support groups until 
May 2017 were also analyzed to provide insights on the procoup groups 
in the postcoup politics. Prior to 2013, social media was available but not 
popularly used by the masses nor any of the key movements under study 
here. By examining the PAD, which was in the pre- social- media era, and 
the social media fueled PDRC, I can investigate what impact, if any, social 
media has had on antidemocratic mobilization. To collect Facebook and 
Twitter data, I used multiple data extraction methods to gather millions of 
data points as a basis for analysis. I then employed social network analysis, 
profile analysis, topic modeling, natural language processing, and content 
analysis to discern the role that social media, particularly Facebook, played 
in both the antidemocratic discourse of the movement and its online mobi-
lization. I also analyzed the discourse and networks of the military dicta-
torship from May 2014 onward— namely, those who were mobilized for 
democratic breakdown— to see if and how such procoup sentiment might 
translate to military government support over time.
Plan of the Book
This book examines three critical periods: the emergence of the PAD move-
ment from 2005 to 2011, the emergence of the PDRC movement from 
2013 to 2014, and military dictatorship from May 2014 to May 2019. This 
time frame was chosen to reflect the four major periods of these yellow- 
shirted movements’ development: the first, the PAD’s emergence (2005– 
06); the second, the PAD’s resurgence (2008– 09); the third, the PAD’s 
decline (2010– 11); and the fourth, the PDRC’s emergence (2013– 14). The 
last chapter and its conclusion examine the post- 2014 coup authoritarian 
environment and discuss future prospects of antidemocratic remobiliza-
tion following a resurrection of electoral politics.
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Opposing Democracy in the Digital Age: The Yellow Shirts in Thailand is 
divided into eight chapters. Chapter 2, “Opposing Democracy,” provides a 
more detailed discussion of the concept of institutional blockage and how 
it operates within the antidemocratic mobilization framework. Given that 
my work is informed by the literature on civil society, political movements, 
and democratic breakdown, in this chapter the frameworks, arguments, 
and underlying theoretical assumptions will be spelled out in greater detail 
to allow for close examination. I will then show how these existing theories 
are important but incomplete to explain the emergence of antidemocratic 
movements in Thailand. I then briefly analyze recent examples of demo-
cratic breakdown in Venezuela to illustrate both its similarities and differ-
ences with the Thai case.
Chapter 3, “Crises and Coups,” introduces Thailand as the main case 
in this study. It argues that Thailand’s political and economic structures 
make its democracy conducive to a breakdown. Specifically, I discuss the 
importance of the military and the monarchy— key nondemocratic bodies 
in Thailand— to understand the trajectory of Thai politics. I then analyze 
other key factors that provide grounds for democratic collapse in Thailand: 
(1) frequent coups d’état; (2) support for nondemocratic figures and institu-
tions among the public; and (3) previous episodes of antidemocratic mobili-
zation. This chapter also charts the origin of the PAD movement as rooted 
in the contestation of democratic accountability visions. I argue that the ide-
ological foundations that underpin the PAD originate in the 1990s follow-
ing the 1992 Black May Uprising and its subsequent political and economic 
reforms. The tension among the reformists with regard to what type of 
accountability Thailand needed— horizontal, vertical, and moral— strained 
the reform process and gave grounds to the resurgent moral ideologists 
inside the PAD. Last, I outline how the conflicting notions of democracy 
and accountability so crucial to the foundational years of the PAD directly 
affected the development of its successor movement, the PDRC.
Chapter 4, “The Origins of the Yellow Shirts,” chronicles the foun-
dational years of the birth of the People’s Alliance for Democracy. Spe-
cifically, it focuses on the reformist years when, following the 1991 coup, 
future PAD leaders took up the fight for democracy in Thailand. This 
chapter argues that while the prodemocracy reforms were largely success-
ful, they nonetheless reflect tension between majoritarianism, on the one 
hand, and accountability, on the other. Such tension would sow the seeds 
for the eventual emergence of the PAD and its transformation from a pro- 
to an antidemocratic movement. Chapter 5, “Democratic Breakdown,” 
discusses the process of antidemocratization of the PAD movement. The 
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main argument is that the PAD movement resorted to nondemocratic 
sources of power and authority due to the failure of other strategies. I also 
advance the claim that the coup d’état in 2006 was a choice— that is, it was 
a product of numerous strategic interactions between opposition forces 
and the Thaksin government. It also addresses the postcoup PAD and its 
decline in 2010. This section employs the postcoup PAD mobilization as 
a within- case variation: an antidemocratic movement still remained, but 
democracy survived. The chapter’s main argument is that the conditions 
of institutional blockage were not present during this period. As such, the 
PAD’s opposition declined in both popularity and effectiveness. Opposi-
tion elites did not see the need to engage in extraconstitutional means.
Chapter 6 introduces social media in chronicling the emergence of the 
PAD’s successor movement— the People’s Democratic Reform Committee. 
In “Social Media and the New Antidemocrats,” I argue that social media 
helped to remobilize the antidemocrats by making coordination cheaper, 
faster, and easier. Facebook, in particular, represents an important platform 
for antidemocratic ideas to spread. Social media helped to entrench and 
prolong political divisions in Thailand, making compromise impossible. 
Through a series of mass mobilizations both online and off, the PDRC 
successfully created conditions for the subsequent military coup in 2014. 
Chapter 7, “Crowdsourcing Dictatorship,” maps support for the military 
government since the 2014 coup. I focus particularly on groups that were 
part of the broader PDRC movement and which demanded military inter-
vention. By examining three years of data pertaining to their postcoup con-
versations on Facebook and comparing it to the precoup period, I uncover 
the extent to which these coup supporters remained supportive of the very 
government they helped put in place. I find that the hardliners were few in 
number but very committed, whereas the majority of the PDRC support-
ers began to lose their support for the movement and its leader, Suthep 
Taugsuban, following a series of unfulfilled promises. Ironically, even the 
antidemocrats expected accountability from the authoritarian government, 
suggesting that their support for overthrowing democracy was temporary 
and conditional. In the concluding chapter, I outline the implications of 
the PDRC’s dwindling support for the junta government toward the pros-
pect of a return to both democratic and antidemocratic politics in Thai-
land. The conclusion in Chapter 8 outlines the implications of Thailand’s 





Since the publication of the seminal Transitions from Authoritarian Rule 
(O’Donnell et al. 1986), where scholars debated the possibility of and the 
way in which democratization occurs in authoritarian settings, the world 
has become much more democratic. Democracy has truly emerged as the 
dominant regime type, and sophisticated public opinion tools have shown 
greater popular support for democracy. In 1989, there were sixty- nine elec-
toral democracies, accounting for 40 percent of the regime types world-
wide. This figure jumped to 117 electoral democracies in 2012, accounting 
for 60 percent of the world.1 This period, broadly speaking, is considered 
as “democratic ascendency” (Gilley 2010, 160) whereby the number of 
democratic regimes far outstripped that of their authoritarian counter-
parts. This should be cause for optimism for scholars of democratization.2 
Samuel Huntington’s Third Wave of Democracy (1991) devoted significant 
space in its later chapters to warning scholars of the “reverse wave” that 
resulted from powerful militaries, authoritarian nostalgia, weak democratic 
values, and the breakdown of law and order. Francis Fukuyama’s The End of 
History and the Last Man (1992) also cautions that the world will continue 
to be vulnerable to antidemocratic movements as long as human beings 
have a desire to dominate. It remains inconclusive that democracy is a final 
form of government.
Recent democratic breakdowns have raised the question not only of 
their causes but what such collapses tell us about the state of democracy 
prior to the regime breakdown. Indeed, understanding authoritarian 
resurgence should tell us as much about the authoritarian tendencies as 
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the nature of the democratic regime prior to its collapse. This research 
seeks to contribute to a more nuanced understanding of conditions prior to 
democratic collapse. As O’Donnell, Cullell and Iazzetta (2004, xiii) argue, 
“The happy fact of the recent emergence of numerous democratic regimes 
cannot, and, should not, conceal the fact that the workings and impacts of 
the respective governments and states evince wide variations. Variations 
that run from acceptable to rather dismal performance have important 
consequences.” Among the democracies that collapsed in the last decade, 
their pattern of breakdown has been one of tremendous variation. Some 
states were extremely poor, while others were as well off as any developing 
democracy. About half of these states had a presidential system, while the 
others were parliamentary democracies prior to the breakdown. Given that 
the collapsed democracies are situated across different continents, conta-
gion does not seem to be driving these breakdowns. All in all, the variation 
that exists among the collapsed democracies is as great as among the ones 
still in existence (table 2.1).
Popular mobilization for democratic reversal has been crucial to the 
success of regime change in several countries in the last decade. After 
the Egyptian uprising that toppled the thirty- year- old regime of Hosni 
Mubarak, many of the Egyptian “revolutionaries” found themselves call-
ing for extraconstitutional powers to remove their newly elected leader, 
Mohamed Morsi. In the summer of 2013, the army ousted Morsi from 
power, much to the delight of many Egyptians. In Bangladesh, the mili-
tary intervention in January 2007 was “widely welcomed” by civil society 
and the international community.3 “The aspiring new middle class is quite 
happy to use the military and unfair political means . . . to pave the way for 
their own entry into leadership position,” explains Baladas Ghoshal of the 
middle class’s support of the coup.4
How do we explain these recent examples of popular support for non-
democratic rule? Under what conditions do people in a democracy call 
for military intervention to oust their elected leaders? To answer these 
puzzling questions, my book advances the following claims. I argue that 
antidemocratic mobilization occurs when mobilized societal groups feel 
“cornered” and are unable to channel their grievances through democratic 
institutions. They form opposition groups to regain their access to power 
in a democratic polity. If the opposition forces perceive their exclusion 
from power to be permanent in the foreseeable future, they rebel against 
the system by appealing to nondemocratic institutions. And they do so by 
undermining the democratic polity. If these nondemocratic bodies respond 
to the opposition groups, a democratic breakdown occurs.
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The choice made by nondemocratic institutions to ally with antidemo-
cratic movements and do away with the democratic systems depends largely 
on their “perceived” level of public support for the opposition movement. 
In other words, if nondemocratic bodies see that the antidemocratic move-
ment garners sufficient support to legitimize extraconstitutional acts, then 
democracy will likely collapse. As such, a mobilized, popular antidemo-
cratic movement creates the conditions for a democratic breakdown. I 
show in detail in the empirical chapters how nondemocratic institutions 
in Thailand were reactive to the growing opposition mobilization against 
the democratic government. It was not the case that nondemocratic insti-
tutions were going to stage a coup regardless of whether or not people 
were calling for it. It was the antidemocratic movement that made a coup 
possible. Although Thailand had a long history of military- initiated coups 
devoid of the need to elicit popular support, the disastrous aftermath of the 
1991 coup vastly increased the cost of future coups for the military. This is 









Nepal 2002 Successful Parliamentary $1,280 Upper caste, palace 
circle
2005 Successful $1,500
Venezuela 2002 Successful 
(short 
lived)
Presidential $10,460 Business class, 
middle class, state 
enterprise
Thailand 2006 Successful Parliamentary $10,630 Civil society, middle 
class, labor, royalist- 
conservative groups
2014 $14,850
Fiji 2006 Successful Parliamentary $6,630 Rival ethnic groups




Honduras 2009 Successful Presidential $3,610 Political elites, United 
States, evangelicals, 
Catholic Church
Mali 2012 Successful Presidential $1,760 Farmers, civil society 
workers
Egypt 2013 Successful Parliamentary $9,900 Secular groups, 
Christian groups, 
students
* World Bank, GNI PPP per capita (current International)
Note: “Successful coups” refers to ones that result in a regime change and transfer of power.
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due to the mass demonstrations and bloody confrontations that followed 
the 1991 coup, which eventually led to the military government stepping 
down. Since then, the military focused its efforts on staying well within 
their barracks (Bamrungsuk 2001).
This chapter proceeds as follows. The first section defines the main 
dependent variable— antidemocratic mobilization— and demonstrates a 
considerable variation in the makeup and orientation of antidemocratic 
movements in recent instances of democratic breakdown. I then provide 
a typology of opposition movements, categorizing these on the basis of 
mobilization goals. This typology will help to distinguish empirically and 
analytically the difference between anti- incumbent and antidemocratic 
movements.
In the second section I review the current literature on the determi-
nants of antidemocratic movements, explaining how the rise of the People’s 
Alliance for Democracy and the People’s Democratic Reform Committee 
both builds on and fills empirical gaps in our understanding of antisystem 
movements. I emphasize here that my theoretical claims are both in line 
with an institutional approach and benefit from the prominent structural- 
based frameworks, such as class and intraelite causes. While I recognize 
the utility of these approaches to pinpoint the structural foundations of 
the grievances that underlie the PAD’s and PDRC’s emergence, they can-
not account for why antidemocratic movements in Thailand arose when 
they did. More importantly, these approaches tend to be “structural” in 
nature and do not fully account for the “agency” of the movement. The 
emergence of this antidemocratic movement in Thailand is not a “natural 
progression” of the existing inequality or elite fragmentation in Thailand. 
Rather, it is contingent upon a number of strategic choices made by various 
societal groups.
The paradox of the Thai case, for the study of comparative politics, is 
not merely that the PAD and PDRC emerged and succeeded in overthrow-
ing a democratic regime in a middle- income country. It is also that both 
movements were largely supported by the middle class and civil society 
agents. While neither of the movements denotes an explicitly class- based 
mobilization, the major role played by the Thai middle class in the makeup 
of each movement has important implications for our understanding of the 
relationship between the middle class and democratic stability. Moreover, 
the emergence of the PAD was initiated and widely supported by civil soci-
ety actors. Again, why civil society agents would support antidemocratic 
mobilization presents an additional puzzling fact of the Thai case.
The third section discusses the evolution of the PDRC and how similar 
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conditions facing the PAD at the onset in early 2006 were experienced 
by PDRC supporters. It also notes the PDRC’s far greater antidemo-
cratic orientation in comparison to the PAD. While there was some initial 
ambivalence in propagating the antidemocratic agenda within the PAD, 
especially within the leadership, the PDRC was early and upfront about 
its antidemocratic proposals: not just to throw out the elected government 
through extraconstitutional intervention, but a cessation of electoral poli-
tics altogether. The last section briefly discusses the novel ways in which 
this research breaks new ground in the study of Thai politics, most notably 
as it relates to the current and ongoing political conflict and to the broader 
contributions it makes to the study of regime transition globally.
Typology of Opposition Movements
I adopt the minimalist definition of democracy advanced by Przeworski et 
al. (2000). This is a procedural definition that focuses on the issue of “con-
testation.” According to Przeworski (2000, 19– 20), democracy is defined as 
followed:
 1. Ex- ante, a possibility that an incumbent may lose an election;
 2. Ex- post irreversibility, an assurance that an election winner will 
take office;
 3. Elections must be repeated.
Democracy is thus “a regime that fills executive and legislative bodies 
through free and contested elections; has more than one party and the 
opposition has some chance of winning” (Przeworski et al. 2000, 19). Given 
that this is a minimalist definition of democracy that largely focuses on the 
mechanism of free and fair elections, it becomes an “easy” test to determine 
what would constitute an antidemocratic movement. If a movement forms 
that opposes the principle of holding elections and supports extracon-
stitutional interventions, then it is “antidemocratic.” I choose to use this 
procedural definition because it presents a clear- cut yardstick to measure 
against. For analytical purposes, it is more advantageous to use this basic 
definition than other more substantive, and ultimately complex, definitions 
of democracy that can encompass a multitude of factors to the extent that 
these become a slippery slope.
Antidemocratic mobilization refers to a movement of individuals and groups 
mobilized to subvert the political system’s holding competitive, free, and fair elec-
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tions. Movements that support extraconstitutional measures to undermine a 
democratic regime are also regarded as antidemocratic. These factors rep-
resent a minimum requirement for a movement to be considered as oppos-
ing the democratic system. There are other indicators that would qualify 
a movement as being antidemocratic as well. These indicators include (a) 
support for extraconstitutional intervention; (b) support for unelected 
political leadership; (c) support for strong involvement in politics from 
nondemocratic institutions/actors; and (d) support for an appointed leg-
islature. These indicators help to analytically and theoretically distinguish 
antidemocratic mobilization from anti- incumbent movements. Sometimes 
it is unclear to what extent a particular movement actually opposes the 
principles of democracy or merely opposes a particular elected govern-
ment. There are many reasons why ordinary people would protest against 
their elected government, but one needs to be able to discern whether they 
are against the democratic system per se or simply want to remove the 
incumbent.
The case of antidemocratic mobilization is far more dangerous to the 
stability of the democratic system than other types of antiestablishment 
or antigovernment movements because the former seeks to subvert the 
democratic regime. The anti- Morsi movements in Egypt were calling for 
the military to step in: they were unhappy with President Morsi, but at the 
same time also actively supported extraconstitutional intervention. As such, 
these movements are considered antidemocratic.
Opposition movements are neither monolithic nor unidirectional. In 
much of the literature and empirical work on opposition politics, opposi-
tion movements are often perceived positively as a collective action against 
something “bad”: be it a regime, a government, or a leader.5 I argue here 
that there are three key types of opposition movement— each with its own 
characteristics and raison d’être for mobilization. In general, an opposition 
movement forms to contest either a specific policy or the general direction 
of the government. Once formed, an opposition movement takes on one 
of these three forms: (1) proreform; (2) anti- incumbent, and (3) antidemo-
TABLE 2.2. Indicators for antidemocratic mobilization
Minimum Oppose competitive free and fair elections
Support for extraconstitutional intervention
Additional Indicators 1. Support for unelected political leadership
2. Support for strong involvement by nondemocratic institutions 
in politics
3. Support for an appointed legislature
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cratic. These typologies help to differentiate analytically and empirically 
the nature of opposition by distinguishing the goals, channels, and meth-
odologies of opposition mobilization. Proreform opposition movement 
seeks to propose policy alternatives, while anti- incumbent movements seek 
executive or government replacement. Neither is committed to subverting 
the democratic system.
Antidemocratic mobilization, which is the main focus of this book, is a 
distinct type of opposition movement whose characteristics differ largely 
from other forms of opposition mobilization. For an antidemocratic move-
ment, government change is not the desired outcome. Unlike other types 
of opposition mobilization, an antidemocratic movement carries the high-
est costs and is considered a “last resort” strategy. The theory set forth in 
this study outlines the conditions under which an antidemocratic move-
ment can form with the goal of overthrowing an elected government.
Opposition movements that are proreform seek to address their griev-
ances through proposing policy alternatives to those of the incumbent gov-
ernment. They channel their demands through formal institutional means 
in a democratic system, such as petitioning their members of parliament 
(MPs), holding demonstrations, lobbying relevant stakeholders, and cam-
paigning. It is imperative that proreform opposition movements offer pol-
icy alternatives. The option of proreform as a strategy for mobilization for 
opposition movement is most likely to occur in a democratic setting where 
public channels for voicing grievances are available. A more decentralized 
system provides greater numbers of access points for citizens than does its 
centralized counterpart.
An anti- incumbent movement is a more contentious form of opposition 
politics, whereby groups are mobilized to demand a change in leadership. 
The incumbent, for the opposition, has failed to deliver desired political 
outcomes and should no longer be in power. Contrary to the proreform 
opposition movement, its anti- incumbent counterpart does not necessar-
ily propose policy alternatives. In many cases, anti- incumbent movements 
demand leadership resignation or a new election. The movement would 
cite reasons for its opposition both in broad and specific terms, such as 
incumbent corruption, vote rigging, a poor economy, and bad policies.
There is no reason why proreform, anti- incumbent, or antidemocratic 
types of mobilization should logically follow each other. One can empiri-
cally observe opposition movements that have the characteristics of being 
both proreform and anti- incumbent. Alternatively, a particular opposition 
movement can first be one of proreform and then evolve into an anti- 
incumbent movement, or vice versa. Typically, however, an antidemocratic 
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movement should be the last option used as a result of the failures of the 
other two options precisely because it is the costliest option for an opposi-
tion movement. Subverting an entire political system requires a complete 
regime change, which means a politicized military must be willing and 
available to make it happen. Those with power, especially if elected, will 
not give up such coveted positions so easily. Moreover, appealing to power-
ful, nondemocratic sources of power is not always an available option for 
opposition movements and may entail serious risks.
Explaining Opposition to Democracy
Examining how democratic institutions give rise to a popular antidemo-
cratic movement is the key task that this research accomplishes. How do 
democratic institutions shape the behavior and strategic calculation of 
political actors in such ways that they may seek to overthrow the regime 
altogether? Why do ordinary people and civic groups join forces to subvert 
the democratic system? This research paints a complex, yet often over-
looked, picture of how the public plays an important part in its country’s 
democratic demise. Tracing the antidemocratic movement’s emergence 
and development lies at the heart of this work.
Existing scholarship highlights that there are three key factors that 
explain the rise of antidemocratic and antisystem movement in new 
democracies. The most widely cited argument is an economic one. When 
new democracies face a severe economic crisis, the public reacts negatively 
toward the regime by supporting antidemocratic/antisystem movements 
or political parties (Berg- Schlosser 1998; Kitschelt and McGann 1997; 
Brustein 1991; Olukoshi 1998; Allen 1973). It is not the economic cri-
sis per se that drives people to overthrow their democratic governments. 
Rather, it is how the people react to severe economic downturns that could 
have implications for democratic stability. Sartori (1976) argues that severe 
economic adversity prompts people to vacate the center and move toward 
the extreme left or right wings of the political spectrum. Sartori’s argu-
ment found traction in a number of later works, particularly those that seek 
to explain the rise of fascism, communism, and Nazism in Europe (Saich 
1990; Lewis 1997; Daalder 1984).
In The Nazi Seizure of Power (1973), William Allen concluded that the 
dire economic situation was a driving force behind the success of the Nazi 
movement: “There is no doubt that the progressive despair of the jobless, 
as reflected in the longer and longer periods of unemployment, weakened 
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the forces of democracy. . . . In the face of the mounting economic crisis, 
Thalburgers were willing to tolerate approaches that would have left them 
indignant or indifferent under other circumstances.”6 Similarly, Lyttleton 
(1973, 41) argues that the professional classes in Italy joined the fascist 
movement as they were “faced with a serious decline in living standards 
and with their social function denied by proletarian socialism.”7
A second approach, political leadership, argues that leadership failure 
accounts for the demise of democracy. Nancy Bermeo’s seminal work, 
Ordinary People in Extraordinary Times (2003), investigates seventeen cases 
of democratic collapse in Europe and Latin America to show that although 
people may throw democracy off course, they rarely do so through their 
vote. Political elites either misunderstand or manipulate public polarization 
(i.e., protests, strikes, opinion polls) for their own gain and act on their own 
convictions to the demise of democracy. Bermeo refers to this condition as 
“elite ignorance” (2003, 228). People in states like Weimar Germany, inter-
war Italy, or crisis- prone Argentina mobilized against democratic govern-
ments in the first place due to a multitude of factors that are located above 
and beyond economic crises. No matter how people become polarized, she 
argues, elites are the ones that bring down democratic regimes. The fascist 
movement in Italy, for example, despite Benito Mussolini’s efforts to appeal 
to the masses, did not come close to achieving a popular mandate. The real 
breakdown of democracy in Italy came as a result of miscalculations by the 
monarchy— and it is these that essentially empowered Mussolini.8
Bermeo’s approach fits well with broader arguments made by many 
scholars: democratic transitions and breakdowns are ultimately the prod-
uct of elite choices (O’Donnell et al. 1986; Lopez- Pintor 1987; Linz and 
Stepan 1978). Linz and Stepan’s (1978) oft- cited work, The Breakdown of 
Democratic Regimes, argues that structuralist approaches like the macro- 
social and economic conditions used to explain democratic breakdowns 
are too deterministic. These authors purport, rather, that poor leadership 
quality— particularly incumbent democratic leaders— contributes to the 
collapse of democratic regimes.9 Democratic rulers must believe in the 
persistence of democratic institutions for the regime to survive.10
A third alternative theory, from which this book extends, argues that 
antidemocratic movements are most likely to thrive in places with weak 
political institutionalization (Huntington 1968; Berman 1997; Fiorina 
1997; Armony 2004). When social mobilization outpaces political institu-
tionalization, chaos and crisis will ensue (Fukuyama 2006).11 When weak 
political institutions do not respond to the public demand for meaningful 
political participation in public life, citizens are driven to look for other 
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alternatives to voice their grievances. Haunted by the shadow of their 
authoritarian past, some countries begin their journey down the demo-
cratic road in having to bring with them powerful, entrenched nondemo-
cratic institutions that continue to undermine their democratization pros-
pects (Hicken and Kuhonta 2014).
One interpretation of this Huntingtonian argument on “political 
decay” is made by Sheri Berman (1997). She argues that democracy can 
break down when the regime cannot meet growing public needs in a highly 
mobilized society. Berman believes the poorly designed and weak political 
institutions in the Weimar Republic exacerbated social cleavages, which in 
turn prompted mobilized and organized Germans to devote their energies 
to associational life. Weimar collapsed because of the party system’s failure 
to channel the conflicting demands of a very vibrant civil society. The Nazi 
movement, in contrast, was able to appeal to German associational life and 
take over where political institutions had failed. The rapid mobilization 
of social forces and slow development of political institutions can create 
instability and disorder in several ways (Huntington 1968). First, tradi-
tional sources of power may intervene to restore “order” when faced with 
social instability. The military and the civilian bureaucracy, if more devel-
oped than political institutions, will be encouraged to “intervene” because 
of the incompetence of politicians and political institutions (Riggs 1964; 
Huntington 1968).
Many scholars agree that institutionalized party systems are a cor-
nerstone of strong democracies (Mainwaring 1999; Randall and Svasand 
2002). Low party institutionalization means that parties do not have deep 
anchors in society; electoral volatility is high; party organization is shal-
low; and voters do not have strong party identification or feel that parties 
are legitimate (Croissant and Volkel 2010). More institutionalized party 
systems produce better outcomes for their citizens in terms of public goods 
delivery and in providing meaningful ways to hold those in office account-
able. But the Third Wave democracies are particularly noted for their weak 
party roots in society as politicians prefer to deliver private goods (Main-
waring and Torcal 2006). The problem becomes even more acute when 
accountability problems are caused by both an abusive executive, on the 
one hand, and the lack of credible restraints on the executive, on the other 
(Diamond, Plattner, and Schedler 1999).
Two major case- specific explanations to the rise of this antidemocratic 
mobilization are worth noting. The most well- known arguments among 
observers of Thai politics are class- based ones. This approach is cen-
tered on socioeconomic structural arguments that contend that the long- 
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standing divide between the rural poor and the urban elites is what has 
given rise to the mass mobilization and the ongoing crisis in present- day 
Thailand (Phongpaichit and Baker 2008, 2012; Pongsudhirak 2008; Fun-
ston 2009; Hewison and Kittirianglarp 2009; Aeosriwong 2010; Monte-
sano et al. 2012; Hewison 2012). Phongpaichit and Baker (2012, 221– 25) 
convincingly argue that the middle class and the powerful oligarchic elites 
were threatened by Thaksin and the poor that he had empowered. While 
Hewison (2012, 145) does not claim a direct link between class and politi-
cal movements, he stresses the importance of class as a key structural factor 
to explain political activism in Thailand. The class- based explanation of 
the current Thai conflict is buttressed by the powerful concept of the “tale 
of two democracies” advanced by Anek Laothamtas (1996). He flags the 
existence of a division between how the Bangkok middle class and the rest 
of the country each understand democracy.
Alternatively, other scholars view the PAD and the PDRC as largely 
reflective of the power struggle between traditional versus new elites. Elite 
disunity can breed political instability and create a condition under which 
government executive power can be subject to seizure by force (Sanders 
and Handelman 1981; Higley and Burton 1989; Londregan and Poole 
1990). Coups d’état occur because military elites’ interests are under threat 
or neglected by political elites in the democratic system. Thus, the former 
overthrows the latter to regain its prominence (Nordlinger 1976; Li and 
Thompson 1975; Kennedy and Louscher 1991). The traditional power 
holders in Thailand, the monarchy- military- bureaucracy trio, came under 
threat following the emergence of business elites. This threat prompted 
them to mobilize an antidemocratic mass movement. The Thai business 
class pursued active political involvement in the wake of the Asian Finan-
cial Crisis of 1997, which further threatened the interests of the traditional 
power brokers. The latter conservative establishment perceived the new 
business elites as a threat to their own power, and so mounted a series 
of opposition actions to Thaksin’s regime, including mobilizing the PAD 
movement.
Additionally, democracies are more likely to break down in an envi-
ronment of severe polarization (Baldassarri and Gelman 2008; Hare and 
Poole 2014). Political polarization in this case extends beyond its narrow 
but widely adopted definition: the ideological differences between politi-
cal parties. Political polarization, in a widened conception, is “the process 
. . . whereby polarization is activated when major groups in society mobi-
lize politically to achieve fundamental changes in structures, institutions 
and power relations” (McCoy, Rahman, and Somer 2018, 16). While some 
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level of political polarization can be good for democracy for its tendancy 
to increase political participation and strengthen political parties (LeBas 
2011; Campbell 2016), severe polarization is threatening to democracies 
because it divides society into two camps with ideologically irreconcilable 
differences, undermining social cohesion and increasing political insta-
bility (Baldassarri and Gelman 2008). Such vicious polarization unites 
otherwise disparate groups of people under a single identity in order to 
construct and mobilize against “the other” (McCoy, Rahman, and Somer 
2018). In severely polarized societies, politics is seen as a zero- sum game 
where mutual benefits and compromise between the two camps become 
impossible. In a case where one side of the political divide becomes increas-
ingly authoritarian and hegemonic, democratic breakdown may emerge as 
a reaction to such severe polarization (Kongkirati 2018).
For the economic crisis approach to be correct, the PAD and the PDRC 
movements would have had to emerge following a major financial crisis. 
And their supporters would have cited economic hardship as a key driv-
ing force for movement participation and mobilization. Movement lead-
ers would have engaged in economy- centered discourses to mobilize their 
mass support. The leadership failure approach would be suitable for the 
Thai case were we to ascertain a divergence on ideological orientations 
and voting preferences of both the masses and the elites of the PAD and 
the PDRC. Elites also would have shown little commitment to democracy, 
demonstrable through analysis of their behavior or discourse. Moreover, 
for the weak institutionalization approach to hold for the Thai case, the 
PAD and the PDRC would have mobilized at a time when its democratic 
institutions remained weak vis- à- vis their nondemocratic counterparts, 
its party system institutionalization low, and its government increasingly 
unable to meet the demands of the public.
For these case- specific explanations to hold true for the PAD and the 
PDRC movements, we would expect to observe the following conditions. 
For the class- based approach to explain these antidemocratic movements, 
we would anticipate the PAD and the PDRC to be mobilized based on 
class interests. If the movements are composed of upper- and middle- class 
members, then their interests would be shaped by fear of losing economic 
interests and power to the rural poor and would prompt the urban rich to 
subvert the democratic system. As for the intraelite conflict approach, we 
would expect elites’ interests to play an important part in the mobilization 
of both the PAD and the PDRC. The monarchy, military, and bureaucracy 
would play a major role in driving the opposition forces.
There are a number of reasons why both existing theoretical and empir-
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ical approaches discussed above cannot fully account for the emergence of 
the PAD and PDRC movements in Thailand. However, I acknowledge the 
importance of the structural, institutional, and class conflict explanations in 
providing the theoretical basis to understand why Thailand’s democracy is 
conducive to a breakdown. To be clear: the contribution that I make to the 
existing literature on the institutional blockage concept and the process of 
antidemocratic mobilization is an additional lens through which to under-
stand how a democratic collapse happens, particularly following a series 
of reforms that are designed to strengthen the prospects of democratic 
survival.
The PAD movement arose during periods of sustained economic 
growth in Thailand. For the economic crisis argument to hold, economic 
downturns need to be the driving force behind antidemocratic mobiliza-
tion. Yet, between 2002 and 2006, when opposition against the Thaksin 
government began, GDP growth in that country was 6 percent (see figure 
2.1). Following the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis, which left Thailand nearly 
bankrupt, not only did Thaksin’s administration restore the economy, it 
succeeded in paying back the IMF loans that had forced previous govern-
ments to cut critical social spending. While economic growth was not on 
par with that of the precrisis period, overall economic conditions when the 
PAD emerged were good. Consequently, a major flaw with the economic 
crisis approach is precisely that it cannot explain antidemocratic mobiliza-
tion during an economic boom. More broadly, the approach can similarly 
fall in the opposite direction: many countries that face severe economic 
downturns do not see mobilization against democracy (Roberts and Wib-
bels 1999; MacIntyre 2001; Levitsky and Murillo 2003).
The elite- centric approaches correctly flag the crucial role played by 
opposition elites in both facilitating and mobilizing antidemocratic move-
ments. This was more evident the second time around, that is, when the 
PDRC came together, given that it was primarily led by key figures from 
the main opposition party, the Democrats. The conflict between the new 
business elites under Thaksin’s leadership and the old powerhouses under 
monarchical and military tutelage, as a contributing factor in the coups of 
both 2006 and 2014, is well documented in the literature (McCargo 2005; 
Pongsudhirak 2008, Chachavalpongpun 2011; Chambers and Waitoolkiat 
2016). However, elite- centered explanations tend to downplay the agency 
of the masses in impacting the elite’s strategic calculations and overlook 
the masses– elite tensions in antidemocratic mobilization. I show here, 
through the cases of the PAD and the PDRC, that these movements’ inter-
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tion. Antidemocratic appeals were often “bottom- up” not top- down: it was 
the masses inside the movement that first demanded and pushed for an 
antidemocratic agenda, often resulting in ambivalence from the movement 
leaders themselves and those of allying elites.
The Huntingtonian arguments on weak institutions do provide back-
ground context for why Thailand is so susceptible to regime breakdown. 
The powerful monarchy and military— both nondemocratic institutions— 
have long served to stifle and intervene in politics and compete with the 
burgeoning democratic institutions, denying the latter a fair chance to 
strengthen. The frequent coups d’état interrupted and stunted any demo-
cratic progress that had been achieved previously. The Thai party sys-
tem fares no better as it ranks the highest in terms of electoral volatil-
ity, according to Hicken and Kuhonta (2014), signifying its low level of 
institutionalization. Thai parties have always been mere shells of their 
leaders: they lack organizational depth, party roots, and are largely void 
of programmatic policies (Ockey 2005). The party system appeared inca-
pable of accommodating social and political tensions. Opportunities for 
political participation for ordinary people were neither sufficiently open 
nor meaningful (Croissant and Volkel 2012). In this sense, the historical 
legacies of authoritarian institutions, frequent democratic breakdowns, 
and inchoate democratic institutions that sat alongside well- established 
nondemocratic institutions seemed all to combine in denying democracy 
a chance in Thailand.
But things seemed to be improving when the PAD rose up and 
demanded to dislodge the elected government of Thaksin Shinawatra. 
There had not been a coup in almost fifteen years— the longest stretch 
of democratic rule since Thailand became a constitutional monarchy in 
1932. Thaksin was widely popular and was the first prime minister in the 
country’s history to serve out his full four- year term and be subsequently 
reelected in a landslide victory. Unlike previous governments, Thaksin’s 
policies were responsive to many of the Thais who voted for him. He deliv-
ered on his campaign promises and successfully enfranchised many Thais 
for whom prior engagement in politics was limited to mere voting, encour-
aging them to be an active part of the Thai political arena. He gave voice to 
millions of Thais who had always felt “neglected” and did not understand 
the value of their political membership. The electoral success of the Thai 
Rak Thai party had also meant a significant decrease in electoral volatil-
ity— an important indicator of a stronger party system institutionalization. 
What, then, went wrong?
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Thailand’s democratic development under Thaksin was at a crossroads: 
some aspects of democratic quality were vastly improving, while others 
were simultaneously, and quickly, deteriorating. This democratic improve-
ment, from institutional perspectives, included stronger parties, a more 
empowered and engaged citizenry, more stable and more responsive gov-
ernments, greater political participation, fewer elections and changes in 
government, and new independent institutions to provide further checks 
and balances. The negative aspects, the focus of this book, included the 
marginalization of opposition voices, growing executive abuse of power, 
and a sharp reduction in interparty competition. The primary accounts of 
the rise of both the PAD and the PDRC provide additional crucial details 
of how things went awry: why the good democratic progress achieved 
eventually lost out— twice— to the nondemocratic forces that Thaksin and 
his political successors had unleashed.
That class plays a key role in accounting for various episodes of politi-
cal mobilization in Thailand is unquestionable. Chapters 3 and 4 provide 
a rich account of the nondemocratic tendencies among the Thai mid-
dle class that culminated in the formation of the Yellow Shirts. My own 
empirical accounts of the PAD and the PDRC movements also reveal 
a strong class component in the makeup of the movements’ support-
ers, together with its discourse. However, the main contribution of this 
research is not to dispute class as a key structural factor for mobilization, 
but to question the utility of “class” as a framework to explain the timing 
and the sequence of antidemocratic mobilization. Class cleavages, driven 
largely by economic inequality and hierarchical societal structures, are 
“constant” features of the Thai polity. Since the mid- 1980s, inequality 
has been on the rise.12 But we did not witness antidemocratic mobilization 
for the entirety of this period. In the same vein, the existence of powerful 
nondemocratic institutions in Thailand should make the country suscep-
tible to constant democratic breakdowns. But, again, democracies do not 
fall apart all the time.
Structural factors such as class and a powerful military tend to be 
“overly deterministic”: they assume that as long as there are large eco-
nomic gaps or a formidable military, then there will always be political 
mobilization and coups. I argue that these structural factors matter insofar 
as they further our understanding of the foundations of grievances and the 
frequency of coups. They do not, however, avail themselves to explaining 
the “when” and the “how” of movement emergence. Structural factors lack 
the dynamism and agency that are crucial to understanding an ad- hoc and 
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fluid movement such as the PAD. The emergence of the PAD was contin-
gent on both structural and specific circumstances. More importantly, the 
development of the PAD over time suggests that its mobilization pattern 
was based largely on “strategic interactions” with its opponents. Decisions 
on mobilization (and when to mobilize), on adopting certain campaigns, 
and on using specific language are calculated to respond to a movement’s 
immediate set of circumstances. I show in detail in chapters 4, 5, and 6 that 
the outcomes that emerged through the PAD and the PDRC mobilization 
did not happen in a vacuum but were also based on the interactions with 
the opposing sides. Structural analysis is useful for providing the broad 
picture of the political struggles, yet on its own cannot provide the nuanced 
explanation of such political mobilization.
Similarly, the rich- versus- poor argument oversimplifies the composi-
tion of both PAD and PDRC supporters. While the PAD and the PDRC 
were supported largely by the urban middle class, their economic positions 
alone did not drive their mobilization. What defines this conflict instead, 
and what accounts for why the PAD and the PDRC were, broadly speak-
ing, a “conservative- royalist movement,” was their vision of the nature of 
the state and its relationship to society. This is clearly a political/ideological 
conflict. Both movements regarded the monarchy as having a veto power 
and sought to preserve the status of the monarchical institution as the pin-
nacle of modern Thai polity. Their supporters also viewed the traditional 
power brokers, the military and the bureaucracy, as the protectors of the 
constitutional monarch. Such an illiberal and conservative view of the Thai 
political system is what defines the movement, not the economic class of 
its supporters.
There is no question that Thai politics have been marked by seri-
ous political polarization since the mid- 2000s, epitomized by the openly 
violent conflicts between the Yellow Shirts and the Red Shirts. But one 
does not observe democratic breakdowns all the time, even when political 
polarization heightens such as the case of the Bloody May in 2010, where 
more than a hundred Red Shirt supporters were killed in one of the coun-
try’s most bloody protests in recent decades. Where polarization plays a 
role is in intensifying conditions for democratic breakdown— but polar-
ization in itself does not make democracies die. Online, polarization has 
a demonstrable effect of creating echo chambers, which further worsens 
existing political divisions. In the cases of the PAD and the PDRC move-
ments, polarization contributes directly to its formation and mobilization 
as antigovernment protests, while the choices to become antidemocratic 
were strategic.
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Institutional Blockage and Mobilization Capacity
What is an institutional blockage? I define institutional blockage as the 
attempt by the incumbent government to marginalize opposition voices in ways 
that make them feel shut out of democratic institutions. In a multiparty system, 
political opposition, both in formal and informal institutions, is afforded 
a number of channels and platforms to air their grievances. A democratic 
system also provides guarantees for such fundamental civil liberties as free-
dom of speech, freedom of the press, and freedom of association. Insti-
tutional blockage occurs when the incumbent weakens the ability of the 
opposition forces to act as an effective check on the abuse of government 
power. Further, the opposition feels that when their basic freedoms have 
been encroached upon and cut short by the incumbent, its right to oppose 
is undermined by a democratic government.
Various opposition forces that normally have access to power in some 
form or other will seek to influence policy through formal democratic 
channels. Mechanisms for opposition through formal democratic channels 
include lobbying, bargaining, participating in the policy- making process, 
engaging the media, and using personal connections to influence govern-
ment policy. If the government blocks the opposition’s access to power 
within established democratic channels, this is considered formal insti-
tutional blockage. Note that opposition forces can come from both out-
side and inside formal democratic channels. Opposition within the formal 
democratic institutions might include opposition MPs, opposition sena-
tors, or independent bodies that would normally serve the purpose of plac-
ing checks on the executive. Opposition external to the formal institutions 
inside the democratic polity includes interest groups, pressure groups, and 
labor unions, to name but a few.
Is the opposition marginalized because of the incumbent’s majoritari-
anism or institutional exclusion? The key difference between a weakened 
opposition because of a majority incumbent and institutional exclusion is 
whether some basic democratic freedoms have been eroded. An incumbent 
that seeks to intentionally shun opposition voices and violate civil liberties 
is critical to the institutional exclusion approach. If a government is both 
majoritarian and violates certain democratic freedoms, then it closes chan-
nels for the opposition to effectively voice their grievances. This type of 
opposition marginalization is dangerous to the democratic system because 
it erodes civil liberties.
How does institutional blockage produce antidemocratic mobilization? 
I further argue that when oppositions are blocked from democratic insti-
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tutions, they tend to develop antidemocratic attitudes. These antidemo-
cratic attitudes need to combine with the capacity to become organized in 
order to produce an outcome of antidemocratic mobilization. As defined 
in chapter 1, mobilization capacity refers to the ability of groups to get 
organized and mobilized. Such capacity stems from organizational learn-
ing, leadership skills, and past experiences. In the process of becoming an 
antidemocratic movement, we see the formation of opposition alliances of 
various groups that have been adversely affected by the incumbent. When 
opposition actors and groups feel they are shut out from accessing power 
now and in the foreseeable future, they may appeal to nondemocratic 
alternative sources of power to reverse, or at minimum halt, the process of 
institutional blockage. If these nondemocratic institutions respond to the 
opposition forces, then we may see a complete democratic collapse.
The assumptions here are twofold. First, that there exist functioning 
democratic institutions in the polity. Examples include a national assembly, 
the judiciary, and independent bodies. This theory does not apply to coun-
tries that are in transition from an authoritarian regime to a democracy; 
it only applies to electoral democracies— states with routinized elections 
and established and functioning democratic institutions. Second, “opposi-
tion” at the initial stage of mobilization is a loose term: it refers to actors 
or groups that seek to offer alternatives or oppose government policies. 
These opposition forces have prior access to power in the sense of being 
able to wield some degree of influence over policy in the past. Some of the 
actors have direct bargaining leverage with the government, while oth-
ers, less powerful, can indirectly shape or put pressure on a government’s 
policy outcome. Lastly, there must be nondemocratic sources of power and 
authority in the polity that coexist with democratic institutions.
The institutional exclusion concept makes an analytical distinction 
between formal and informal institutional blockages. Such a distinction 
recognizes the political reality of so many electoral democracies today— 
that is, there are more routes than formal democratic ones for opposition 
voices to be heard. Formal democratic channels include institutions such 
as the National Assembly— which includes the lower house, the House of 
Representatives, and the upper house, the Senate— and independent bod-
ies (e.g., election authority, anticorruption agency). Conversely, informal 
ones comprise civil society organizations, labor unions, nongovernmental 
organizations, community groups, and the like. The formal institutional 
channels exemplify the representative dimension of the democratic polity, 
while the informal one represents a participatory one. When actors in the 
political arena feel that their interests are no longer represented, nor can 
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they participate in the bargaining process with the government, they feel 
“choked” and thus have “no choice” but to resort to nondemocratic sources 
of power.
The key factors that drive the process of institutional blockage are two-
fold. The first is the relative change in access to power or distribution of power, or 
both, within formal democratic institutions and between formal and infor-
mal ones. In a parliamentary system, relative change in the distribution of 
power among the executive, legislative, and the judiciary, for example, can 
induce formal institutional blockage. In the informal institutional setting, 
this can occur between the government and civil society organizations. 
The key thing to remember is that these actors or groups must have some 
power or, at a minimum, access to power prior to this change. It is their loss 
of access to power due to the institutional blockages that will set them off 
to look for alternative routes. The second and more important mechanism 
is the perceived permanent exclusion from power. Antidemocratic mobiliza-
tion will occur in a democratic system when actors in both formal and 
informal institutional arenas perceive their relative loss of power vis- à- vis 
other institutions as permanent or likely to persist indefinitely. This per-
ceived exclusion from power, due to institutional blockages both formally 
and informally, will drive these actors to nondemocratic sources of power 
to reduce and completely halt this process of institutional blockage.
In order to determine whether my concept of institutional blockage 
adequately explains the rise of the PAD and the PDRC movements, the 
following implications should be observed. Opposition actors must lose 
access to power relative to what they used to have. Channels for demands 
by organized groups and key political actors are closed off in the formal 
democratic institution. Means for opposition, such as a no confidence vote 
or Question Period in parliament, for instance, are closed to or rendered 
ineffective for the opposition. Organized groups are unable to lobby for 
support from the formal institutions, nor can they bargain with the gov-
ernment to provide them with a platform to voice their grievances. This 
clogging of opposition channels should drive the various groups to form 
an anti- incumbent mobilization. We should observe an upsurge of antigov-
ernment protest activities over time, increasing in frequency and intensity 
as the opposition forces become more desperate. The opposition should be 
calling for the resignation of the current government or leadership.
The viability and availability of powerful nondemocratic institutions are 
crucial to the success of democratic collapse. First, nondemocratic institu-
tions ought to be present in a polity to which antidemocratic movements 
can appeal. These appeals are more credible if such nondemocratic insti-
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tutions are powerful and politicized. This means that countries with his-
torical legacies of strong nondemocratic institutions are far more likely to 
see a successful creation of antidemocratic mobilization. By orchestrating 
support for antidemocratic solutions, through the mobilization of a large- 
scale movement, the costs of extraconstitutional interventions are effec-
tively reduced. This makes it even more likely for nondemocratic elites to 
intervene successfully. Of course, nondemocratic elites would intervene if 
they also felt adversely affected by the elected government. In this sense, 
their interventions are seen as an important means to protect their inter-
ests. The dynamic interactions between the antidemocratic movement, on 
the one hand, and the antidemocratic actors, on the other, is what this book 
seeks to capture.
Institutional Blockage in Thailand
The Thai political structure remains rather centralized, with few access 
points to political power and influence. Open channels for public engage-
ment prior to the Thaksin era were essentially obtained through the MPs 
of both national and local governments, senators (elected and appointed), 
and the state bureaucracies. The availability of access points to power and 
influence was increased as a result of the 1997 constitution. This devel-
opment provided additional public participation in politics through the 
legislature and the newly created independent bodies (a list of them is 
provided in chapter 4). Despite this, there are no feedback mechanisms 
between the public and powerful nondemocratic institutions such as the 
courts, the military, or the monarchy. While this seems intuitive, the fact 
that nondemocratic institutions are highly powerful (and popular) but in 
no way accountable to the people that legitimize them remains an unusual 
feature of the Thai political system.
Despite the rather centralized state, opposition groups find ways to 
voice their grievances. Thailand in the 1990s was marked by a period of 
sociopolitical liberalization. Opposition movements, which had been 
instrumental in the Black May Uprising in 1992, sought to instigate several 
reform initiatives aimed at liberalizing the Thai political arena and increas-
ing public participation in politics. The opposition found some measure of 
success in its reformist agenda, most arguably in pushing for the adoption 
of Thailand’s most democratic constitution to date— the so- called People’s 
Constitution of 1997. Following the Asian Financial Crisis that same year, 
more economic- oriented reforms were also implemented to restructure 
the economy. Throughout this period, waves of both proreform and anti- 
incumbent protests occurred, resulting in short- lived governments and 
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frequent dissolutions of the House of Representatives. This more inclu-
sive and open, albeit rather unstable, political arrangement increased pub-
lic participation in politics and increased the capacity of more groups to 
champion their causes.
The coming to power of Thaksin Shinawatra, the first prime minister 
to be elected under the new 1997 constitution, dramatically altered oppo-
sition politics (chapter 4). During his first term, opposition movements 
by and large were engaged in anti- incumbent mobilization. This strat-
egy had been primarily used because proreform politics already preceded 
the period, and many opposition figures and groups believed a reformist 
agenda would find no outlet in this powerful, absolute majority govern-
ment. Opposition groups employed confrontational, sometimes violent, 
tactics aimed to depose Thaksin and his government. Opposition leaders 
called for the resignation of Thaksin and his cabinet. It was not until Thak-
sin’s second electoral victory that the opposition movement recognized 
that neither proreform nor anti- incumbent mobilization had what it took 
to depose Thaksin.
The People’s Alliance for Democracy (PAD) was a clear case of an anti-
democratic movement, albeit not initially. When the movement began 
loosely mobilizing in 2005, it saw itself, by all accounts, as a “prodemoc-
racy” movement. Soon after its emergence, the movement began to adopt 
a number of antidemocratic measures. First, the PAD called for installing a 
royally appointed prime minister to replace the popularly elected govern-
ment of Thaksin Shinawatra. Second, the movement endorsed implicitly 
(and later more forcefully) both military intervention in politics and the 
coup d’état of 2006. Third, the PAD’s ideology was explicit about the kinds 
of political reforms it envisioned. These included unelected legislators, 
senators, and a prime minister, and veto power by the monarchical institu-
tion in Thailand’s political system. Fourth, the PAD sought a temporary 
cessation of elections to rid the system of corrupt politicians and “rotten 
politics.” Finally, the PAD prioritized the notion of a “good leader” over an 
“elected leader.”
The Thai case greatly problematizes the notion that civil society will or 
should inevitably promote and strengthen democracy. The PAD initially 
emerged largely as networks of NGOs, labor unions, opposition media, 
and religious networks, which formed an alliance to oppose the Thaksin 
administration. Several of the major networks of NGOs were those that had 
been key players in the political liberalization and democratization reforms 
in the 1990s. Their involvement and prominence in the PAD leadership 
provided strong empirical evidence against existing scholarship that links 
civil society to democratic stability (Diamond 1996; Putnam 1993, 2000; 
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Arato 2000). The NGO- led antidemocratic movement of the PAD shows 
that there is no necessary connection between civil society and democracy, 
and, most saliently, that civil society can have antidemocratic effects.
The PAD movement is not alone in its antidemocratic orientation 
when compared to other opposition movements in posttransition states. In 
Venezuela, the anti- Chávez movement was supported by sections of civil 
society organizations (the middle class and labor unions) that pushed for 
an extraconstitutional intervention that eventually led to a bizarre forty- 
seven- hour coup in 2002. The opposition forces in Venezuela too felt 
“blocked” and “excluded” from access to power (Encarnacion 2002). With 
President Hugo Chávez looking to stay in power “forever,” the opposi-
tion movements began to appeal to nondemocratic institutions such as 
the military and the courts to intervene. Although the coup government 
took power only very briefly, the success of the anti- Chávez movements 
in mobilizing key support from groups that should otherwise be support-
ive of democratic politics has had negative consequences for the country’s 
democratic development.
Why was antidemocratic mobilization a plausible strategy for the Thai 
opposition movement? Chapter 3 outlines in detail the structural condi-
tions in the Thai political system that make it conducive to democratic 
breakdowns. Of note are factors such as a history of frequent coups d’état 
and undemocratic tendencies among the public, since these have signifi-
cantly reduced the cost of a follow- on coup and made military intervention 
Figure 2.2. Opposition alliance formation
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a favorable option for conflict resolution. As such, military intervention is 
a real possibility in Thai politics— one whereby successful coups outnum-
ber failed ones. However, the backlash against the coup government in 
1992 has increased the cost of coups, making it imperative for the military 
to guarantee prior popular support for its intervention. The opposition 
movement— having failed to change the situation through anti- incumbent 
and proreform strategies— redirected its efforts to the last possible alterna-
tive: the call for military and royal intervention. The opposition had thus 
embarked on an antidemocratic path that would later shatter the country’s 
democratic development.
The PAD movement was composed of and driven by actors and groups 
in society that had not only been made worse off as a result of Thaksin’s 
policies, but whose opposition channels to convey their grievances were 
closed off. This happened in a highly arbitrary manner in both the formal 
and institutional arenas. In the formal democratic institution, opposition 
parties in the legislature, that is, certain sections of the Senate and inde-
pendent bodies, joined forces with the PAD movement for the following 
reasons: (a) inability to provide effective opposition to the government; (b) 
failure to provide effective checks on the executive; and (c) inability to pro-
pose alternative policies. There is, in essence, a breakdown of opposition 
mechanisms inside formal democratic institutions that “cripple” opposition 
voices. The judiciary, in fact, was best positioned to mount an opposition 
against the Thaksin government and intervene it did, with palace support, 
to weaken the executive and the Thai Rak Thai– dominated legislature.
Informal institutional channels, too, the NGO sector, labor unions, the 
media, and various other social groups, all experienced not just the loss of 
their political space. The possibility of presenting alternatives to govern-
ment positions was marginalized. During the pre- Thaksin period, many of 
these groups were able to lobby and put pressure on governments, senators, 
and independent bodies to represent their interests, albeit with varying 
degrees of success. During the Thaksin administration, however, a number 
of access points to formal institutions were blocked for the opposition: 
parliament, the Senate, and independent bodies. All of the resultant resent-
ment did not, however, materialize into a movement until Thaksin and 
his Thai Rak Thai party won their second consecutive landslide election 
victory in 2005, which gave the opposition the perception of permanent 
exclusion from power. It was at this moment that the PAD came together 
as a movement to collectively oppose Thaksin, and likewise petition the 
monarchy and military to intervene.
But why did the opposition resort to nondemocratic institutions? 
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What were the options available to the opposition during that critical 
moment? There were essentially two options available to the opposition 
when faced with institutional blockage: (1) fight or (2) give up. The first 
stage of opposition mobilization was intended to increase their own bar-
gaining power vis- à- vis the government by forming an alliance with other 
opposition groups. Such an alliance was considered a means to not only 
aggregate their interests and grievances but also to exert more pressure on 
the government. When such a strategy no longer yielded desirable results, 
they increased pressure by engaging in more coercive activities, such as 
mass protests. “Street politics” then becomes a confrontational strategy of 
choice for these opposition groups that seek to recruit supporters from the 
public at large.
In the third stage, the decision for the opposition to continue fighting 
as opposed to relinquishing depends on two factors. The first is what I 
call the “zero- sum game” motivation. Groups that remained in the PAD 
movement by this time were those that perceived their future to be dim 
should they not fight. Simply put, the stakes were too high to give up. The 
second factor is more strategic (and less desperate): the “no turning back” 
motivation. Essentially, opposition groups that have engaged in high- risk 
protest activities for quite some time, and gained popular support along the 
way, find themselves having gone too far to turn back— they simply cannot 
abandon the movement and lose momentum. Giving up would not only 
hurt their overall support but it also would delegitimize their cause for any 
future protests. Staying on course was perceived by some groups to be their 
only option, even though it meant putting their own ideals and demands 
aside. The PAD movement began to appeal to nondemocratic institutions 
when they perceived their loss of access to power to be permanent. There 
was no other choice but to press forward.
Opposition elites also have their own strategic considerations when 
faced with the problem of institutional blockage. Their main concern is 
similar to other opposition actors: if they feel threatened by the relative 
loss of access to power vis- à- vis other actors, they will intervene to change 
the situation. Opposition elites from both within democratic and non-
democratic institutions are those that rebel against their loss of access to 
power. Their major interests are shaped by their ability to (a) influence 
the decision- making process; (b) influence the policy discourse and policy- 
making process; and (c) provide an alternative agenda. For nondemocratic 
institutions, their interests are gravely threatened if there are systematic 
attempts to weaken their political power, shrink their political space, or 
undermine their institutional independence.
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In the Thai case, opposition actors from the parliament, Senate, and 
independent bodies first began to show support for opposition forces in the 
informal institutional arena. They then began to appeal to nondemocratic 
institutions: the military, the Privy Council, and the monarchy. The judi-
ciary, on the other hand, normally highly independent and insulated from 
political pressure, aligned its interests with those of the constitutional mon-
archy and sought to intervene to stop the process of institutional blockage. 
This entailed removing key actors and severely delegitimizing them. The 
military did the same and formed an alliance with the Privy Council— the 
monarchy’s de facto representatives. The constitutional monarchy became 
the place where opposition elites coordinated their interests. Should mea-
sures by opposition elites not work, then the latter would look to form 
an alliance with other opposition forces in society to increase their own 
popular support base and hence the legitimacy needed for the intervention 
in the democratic regime.
The People’s Democratic Reform Committee (PDRC), the PAD suc-
cessor movement, was both more popular and more antidemocratic in ori-
entation than its predecessors. Having failed to achieve the ultimate goal 
of uprooting Thaksin’s political legacies from the Thai polity even after 
the 2006 coup, the fear of being shut out of democratic channels returned 
when Thaksin’s sister, Yingluck Shinawatra, won a landslide 2011 election 
victory and formed yet another majority government. Attempting to alle-
viate fears of a Thaksin repeat, Yingluck initially kept democratic chan-
nels open to opposition voices. During the initial period of 2011– 13, while 
more radical antidemocratic voices attempted to regroup and reform, there 
was a lack of mass support behind them because too few people felt shut 
out of the system. But by mid- 2013, when Yingluck began to reempower 
her base, the Red Shirts, and showed signs of following the same route as 
her brother, the opposition was reignited, and the antidemocratic mobili-
zation grew quickly, thanks largely to the power of social media. Within the 
span of weeks, the whole of Bangkok came to a near complete halt. Both 
online and off, millions were demanding an end to democratic politics. The 
military finally stepped in, via a martial law declaration, and democracy 
once more collapsed in 2014.
Conclusion
This chapter has provided an overview of the typology of opposition mobi-
lization and has situated Thailand within the broader pattern of opposition 
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movements in a Third Wave democracy. There are three types of opposi-
tion mobilization: (1) proreform; (2) anti- incumbent; and (3) antidemo-
cratic. I argue that the conditions under which a movement adopts a prore-
form or anti-incumbent approach are neither exclusive nor chronological. 
In fact, a movement can both promote reforms and oppose incumbent gov-
ernment at the same time. However, the conditions under which a move-
ment becomes antidemocratic are contingent on the unavailability or inef-
fectiveness of other approaches. Moreover, becoming an antidemocratic 
movement is not always an option available in all democracies.
This research advances a theoretical concept that I call “institution 
blockage.” This is a process whereby both formal and informal channels 
of opposition in a democratic regime are perceived to be, and are in fact, 
closed. The result is a perceived loss of bargaining leverage by actors in the 
polity. When the opposition is or “feels” blocked from access to power, it 
rebels against such real and perceived closures in the democratic system 
by appealing to nondemocratic alternative sources of power to reverse, or 
at a minimum halt, this institutional blockage. Antidemocratic mobiliza-
tion then serves as a vehicle for various opposition forces whose leverage 
has been reduced, or completely eradicated, by the process of institutional 
blockage that unfolds. If such mobilization succeeds in attaining extra-
constitutional intervention from nondemocratic authorities, then we see a 




Why is Thailand known for its frequent military coups? Why does democ-
racy in Thailand experience a disproportionate rate of breakdown? This 
chapter provides a background to Thai politics after its transition to con-
stitutional monarchy in 1932. It focuses on outlining reasons for Thailand’s 
frequent coups d’état, the political and symbolic power of the monarchy, 
and major episodes of popular discontent prior to the emergence of the 
People’s Alliance for Democracy. The main argument of this chapter is that 
there are several structural and institutional conditions that make Thai-
land’s democracy susceptible to breakdown: (1) a politicized military; (2) 
a powerful monarchy; and (3) the middle class’s contingent support for 
democracy. Thailand has had many coups d’état in its political history. 
Coups were seen by political elites as a mechanism for crisis resolution and 
a “legitimate” form of government transition. Given that much of contem-
porary Thai history is marked by authoritarianism, a coup d’état accom-
plishes its purpose in the sense that, by force, it transfers power from one 
group of elites to another.
There have been two major popular uprisings during Thailand’s con-
stitutional monarchy, both of which have affected civil– military relations. 
However, here I argue that only the Black May Uprising in 1992 had direct 
impacts on the later emergence of the antidemocratic mobilization dur-
ing the Thaksin period. Black May significantly weakened the military’s 
position in the political arena. This is particularly true when considering 
the power of the military vis- a- vis the public, the monarchy, and career 
politicians. The second and related point is that the cost of coups d’état as 
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a mechanism for regime change has dramatically increased for the mili-
tary. Third, the Uprising set in motion a process of political liberalization, 
driven by reformist elites who had risen to political prominence following 
Black May.
In her seminal article “Contingent Democrats: Industrialists, Labor, 
and Democratization in Late- Developing Countries,” Eva Bellin rightly 
points out that support for democracy among late- developing nations is 
ambivalent at best.1 Indeed, Thailand has a history of mobilized middle- 
class movements that were simultaneously both pro- and antidemocratic: 
they supported some aspects of democratic reform all the while defending 
other aspects of the authoritarian status quo. Black May is a case in point: 
the uprising was not in opposition to the coup d’état per se. It was, rather, 
an opposition to the military staying on in power. Moreover, the public’s 
support for a royally appointed prime minister underscores as much the 
immense power of the monarchical institution as it illustrates public accep-
tance of political leadership that does not originate in democratic processes. 
These tendencies among the public are not new in Thai political history, 
and thus demonstrate continuity rather than change, in this respect.
Lastly, the monarchy has become the ultimate source of power and 
legitimacy vis- a- vis other democratic and nondemocratic institutions in 
the Thai polity. The king, namely, served as the arbiter of political conflict 
and brought major violence to an end during popular uprisings in both 
the ’70s and ’90s. The immense power wielded by King Bhumibol cre-
ated a dependency on the monarchical institution as an institution of “last 
resort.” While the monarchy has become the symbol of national unity, its 
extraordinary power has also been used, at times illegitimately, as a tool for 
mobilization and empowerment. This latter point is crucial to understand 
how the PAD movement emerged at once as a promonarchy and an anti-
democratic mobilization.
In the wider debate on the quality of democracy, Diamond and Mor-
lino (2004, 21) note that two types of accountability matter to the “proce-
dural” quality of democracy: vertical and horizontal accountability. Vertical 
accountability refers to the ways in which political leaders answer to their 
citizens, irrespective of whether they represent the very constituents that 
elect them. Horizontal accountability, on the other hand, requires politi-
cal leaders to answer to other institutions designed to provide checks and 
balances in the political system. Dan Slater correctly notes that vertical 
and horizontal accountability are not always mutually reinforcing: in some 
cases, they are in tension with one another.2 A tension between vertical and 
horizontal accountability emerged following the major political reform 
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efforts of the Black May aftermath. The reform process reflected serious 
disagreement over what kind of democratic accountability was needed in 
Thailand: inclusiveness or constraints.
Brief History of Thai Politics
Democracy in Thailand has taken a tumultuous, oscillating, path. Despite 
the end of absolute monarchy in 1932, Thailand’s democratic political sys-
tem did not prosper until the 1970s, and even then only briefly. When 
King Prajadiphok abdicated the throne following a coup in 1932, he asked 
that the power not be given to a single individual or group(s), but to all the 
people of Siam. The reality could not have been further from the king’s 
wish. From 1938 until 1973, military generals took turns ruling the king-
dom. “Elections” were neither free nor fair. In fact, political parties were 
not legal entities until the 1950s. Politics was oligarchic in nature, with 
the majority of the populace remaining disenfranchised despite the intro-
duction of universal suffrage. The armed forces were highly factionalized, 
and most coups during this period were launched by one military faction 
against another. Fred Riggs (1966) famously refers to this period as the 
“bureaucratic polity,” whereby bureaucratic leaders, military and civilian, 
were responsible for running the Thai state.
Yet Thai politics in the 1970s were far from calm. And the people were 
far from docile. Indeed, Thailand witnessed its first popular mobilization 
against the military regime in 1973, known as the October 14 Incident. 
Frustrated with the repressive and highly oligarchic rule of Field Marshal 
Thanom Kittikajorn, what began as a modest demand for improvement for 
university students rapidly evolved into a large- scale antigovernment dem-
onstration. The government refused to give in to the movement’s demands, 
opting instead to exercise brutal repression against the many thousands on 
the streets. This resulted in numerous injuries and deaths (Musikawong 
2006). The incident has come to be revered as a landmark event against 
dictatorship and the heroic protesters were dubbed the “October 14th 
Generation.” Their power and influence continue to the present day.
The brief democratic period that followed the October 14 Incident 
provided space for a rapidly expanding civic activism. Between late 1973 
and 1976, students, peasants, and workers all organized and mobilized to 
demand change. Protest became the order of the day: “Literally hundreds 
of other student groups and associations blossomed after the October 
1973 incident” (Morell and Samudavanija 1981).3 Meanwhile, numerous 
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students adopted left- wing ideological positions that advocated sweeping 
social reform. The growth in left- leaning protesters terrified the military 
elites, particularly since it occurred during the Cold War period and Com-
munist Party victory in Vietnam. The state responded with right- wing 
countermovements such as the Red Gaur, Nawaphon, and the Village 
Scouts. These attracted nearly two million supporters to counteract the 
leftists (Jamrik 1997).
Meanwhile, the elected governments during this three- year period— 
four in total— proved highly unstable and ineffective in their governance. 
On October 6, 1976 the right- wing forces, with the implicit consent of 
the cabinet, massacred students on the campus of Thammasat Univer-
sity in broad daylight, leaving scores dead and thousands humiliated as 
they were stripped and had their hands tied. General Sangad Chaloryoo 
staged a coup in the name of the Administrative Reform Council Resolu-
tion (ARCR). The ARCR appointed a privy councilor, Thanin Kraivichian, 
as prime minister. Following another coup by the ARCR a year later, the 
right- wing general Kriangsak Chamanan took over the leadership, a move 
that ended Thailand’s experiment with democratic politics.
In the 1980s, Thailand reembarked on a road toward democratiza-
tion through gradual political liberalization.4 Under the leadership of an 
unelected prime minister, General Prem Tinasulanond, Thailand was ruled 
for nearly a decade by an appointed leader who carefully balanced the 
interests of the military, career politicians, and the monarchical institution. 
Prem— highly respected by the military top brass, the king, bureaucrats, 
and career politicians— engineered a power- sharing agreement with the 
political elites. This “pact” allowed Prem, himself committed to remain-
ing “neutral” and “nonpolitical,” to satisfy key elites and keep the country 
moving forward without another coup d’état. The generals were handed 
authority over defense and national security matters; the politicians were 
authorized to run domestic affairs; while the bureaucrats enjoyed bigger 
budgets and better pay. The technocrats were able to implement major 
economic development plans and Thailand gradually democratized its pol-
itics.5 Power- sharing in Thailand worked for nearly a decade because the 
military began to recognize that in an increasingly globalized world, they 
could no longer afford to govern through the barrel of a gun. As Neher 
(1995, 197) argues, there was a “rising view among the military that the 
country’s new economic complexity and international standing required a 
sharing of power between technocrats, business persons, trained bureau-
crats and politicians.”
Thailand did not return to full democracy in the post- Prem period, 
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despite claims by some scholars (Bunbongkarn 1992; Jamrik 1997; Boon-
mee 2007). Although Prem refused to stay on as the country’s leader fol-
lowing the 1988 election, paving the way for the first democratically elected 
government under Chatchai Choonhavan, the “elected” prime minister’s 
legitimacy and power remained squarely with both previously unelected 
prime minister Prem and the military. The sole reason for Prem’s decision 
to allow the country’s transition into a “full” democracy was because he 
knew that the Chatchai government was supported by the army. Chatchai 
himself had announced that he would not intervene in any military appoint-
ments or transfers, and would approve whatever the military proposed; but 
he also admitted to turning to the generals for their approval.6 General 
Chavalit, the army chief, confirmed: “I set up this government with my 
own hands.”7 The Chatchai government represented a failure of political 
liberalization in the late 1980s and paved the way for a full return of the 
military to politics.
The loss of military backing spelled the end of Chatchai’s government 
and the demise of Thailand’s democracy. The power- sharing agreement 
that Prem had built and worked hard to keep was collapsing. The gov-
ernment was plagued by internal infighting, a sour relationship with the 
military, and many corruption scandals. The military top brass eventually 
felt threatened by the possibility of removal from power by the Chatchai 
government and staged a coup in February 1991.
The 1991 coup d’état and subsequent uprising, known locally as “Black 
May,” was a key turning point in the history of civil–military relations. 
Taking the Black May Uprising of 1992 as the watershed event in Thai 
political history, one that had both direct and indirect consequences in the 
emergence of antidemocratic mobilization and the 2006 coup, this chapter 
seeks to situate Black May in the historical development of Thailand. A 
decade later, Black May had direct ramifications for the emergence of the 
PAD movement.
On February 23, 1991, the upper echelon of the armed forces seized 
power from the Charchait government. Chatchai and General Athit 
Kamlang- ek were held at gunpoint while on a plane to Chiang Mai for an 
audience with the king. The Constitution was scrapped, martial laws were 
imposed, and the National Assembly was dissolved. The coup was led by 
General Sunthorn Kongsompong and most of Class 5 from the elite (U.S. 
West Point– style) Chulachomklao Military Academy, the members of 
which occupied most major positions in the armed forces. The putsch like-
wise had the support of the Academy’s Class 11 and 12 (Maisrikrod 1992, 
328; 1993). The coup plotters named themselves the National Peace Keep-
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ing Council (NPKC) and promised an election soon. The NPKC cited 
large- scale corruption within the Chatchai government and the protection 
of the monarchy as justification for their action.8 The military generals 
cobbled together seasoned politicians, retired generals, and those close to 
the NPKC to form the Samakhi Tham Party (STP). The STP competed in 
the March 1992 election, and it won. In what was dubbed Thailand’s “dirti-
est election,” a reported US$100 million was spent on vote- buying.9 The 
STP- led five- party coalition10 came to power and one of the coup leaders, 
General Suchinda Kraprayoon, eventually became prime minister.
On the surface, the coup d’état of 1991, which subsequently led to the 
Black May Uprising, was not unlike the many coups that had come before 
it (table 3.1): a handful of military generals roll in on their tanks to Bang-
kok, the country’s capital, and take it under siege. The men in uniform 
claim that the elected government is too corrupt, and that failing their 
restoration of order and stability, the country would descend into chaos. 
The elected government is overthrown and the military government takes 
over— promising a return to democracy “soon.” A new constitution is writ-
ten up that gives impunity to the coup plotters, a bogus corruption investi-
gation into the previous government is launched, and the military receives 
a massive boost to their budget. Meanwhile, civic and political rights are 
curbed with periodic curfews.
There were two major causes for the 1991 coup d’état: (1) serious con-
flict between the Chatchai government and military top brass; and (2) a 
high degree of unity among the armed forces. Coup rumors began to surge 
in 1990 and government–military relations turned for the worse. Mili-
tary chief General Sunthorn Kongsompong warned that politicians had 
no right to shuffle military rankings. “I will never meddle with military 
appointments,” Prime Minister Chatchai claimed. “Why would I? I ask 
approval from both General Suchinda and General Sunthorn every time 
if it’s ok.”11 However, even General Chavalit had a fallout with another 
minister, which led to his eventual resignation. Sukhumbhand Paribatra, 
advisor to the prime minister, resigned because he did not get on well with 
the army chief. Chatchai sought to resolve the crisis by himself resigning, 
but the parliamentarians continued to back him as prime minister as he 
clung to power.
What began as a hunger strike to protest the military- installed govern-
ment of General Suchinda Kraprayoon soon expanded into a full- blown 
uprising. Opposition leaders, the media, and nongovernmental organiza-
tions wanted a new election and a more democratic constitution. At the 
height of the crisis, more than 200,000 protesters occupied the main arter-
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ies of Bangkok (Callahan 1998). The government mobilized pro- Suchinda 
rallies in the provinces, particularly in the Northeast. They refused to con-
cede to the people’s demands and began to retaliate against the demonstra-
tors. The violence quickly escalated in the days leading up to the massacre 
of May 17– 20, 1992. Some 600 people were reportedly killed at the hands 
of the military, although actual figures are believed to be much higher. 
The Black May Uprising only ended when the king summoned General 
Suchinda and opposition movement leader Major General Chamlong 
Srimuang and “advised” them to end the political conflict.
The failure of the 1991 coup and the subsequent Suchinda govern-
ment had three major consequences for Thailand’s political development. 
First, coups became costlier and would now require popular support. The 
Black May debacle created internal division within the military itself; 
this significantly raised the cost for future coups. Coups d’état are more 
likely when the military is unified, particularly in the Thai case (Tamada 
1995). After Black May, several young officers began to challenge the 
military hierarchies. They called on the top brass to take responsibil-
ity for the May crackdown (BBC Black May, 385). Moreover, military- 
initiated coups devoid of any regard for public backlash were simply no 
longer viable. Black May was the first massive outcry since the mid- 1970s 
against military dominance in politics, and it tarnished the public image 
of the military as an honorable institution in Thai society. This would 
prove a crucial game changer in military strategic calculations as one of 
the most powerful entities in Thailand: not only regarding whether to 
stage a coup, but when to stage it. It would no longer be the case— as it 
was in the lead- up to the ’70s— that a coup is justified because one faction 
of the military is in conflict with the other.
Second, the king’s intervention in ending a conflict between the military 
and the people’s movement demonstrates the power of Thailand’s monar-
chical institution. That the monarchy remains today the most powerful 
institution in Thailand is not merely on account of a centuries- old tradi-
tion. It is also, and crucially so, the personal cultivation of the late monarch, 
King Bhumibol Adulyadej. Suwannathat- Pian (2003) argues that King 
Bhumibol almost single- handedly brought the monarchy from a position 
of decline to one that represents a pinnacle of the nation. He did so by 
way of “personal dedication and devotion to the commonwealth, public 
relations tours of the country and foreign nations, royal- sponsored socio- 
economic welfare projects, and royal financial independence. Most of these 
means and methods are as much image- enhancing as they are altruistic.”12 
Moreover, the long reign of King Bhumibol allowed him to cultivate a 
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key virtue of political leadership: barami.13 The late king was considered to 
have much barami (charisma) according to many Thais; this explained why 
his blessing was so critical to the success of many unelected prime minis-
ters such as Prem Tinasulanond and Anand Panyarachoon. This informal 
“soft” power of the monarchical institution can shape and change political 
outcomes in times of crisis.
Third, Black May reinforced the ambivalence of the Thai middle class 
toward democracy. The coup did not garner much resistance from the 
public who felt that the coup was justified (Uthakorn 1993). Like previous 
coups, the 1991 coup did not elicit public outrage or negative response.14 
The Black May protests did not emerge until the coup leader and army 
chief, Suchinda Krapayoon, became prime minister himself. David Mur-
ray (1996) argues that what, significantly, had upset people was that the 
unelected leader came from the military— not that he was unelected. Had 
a more “acceptable outsider” like Prem or Anand assumed power, such a 
move would have been acceptable.15 While there had been past cases of 
popular yet unelected prime ministers, such figures were usually appointed 
by the king as an interim measure following the fall of a coup government. 
Prem and Anand left such important legacies in Thai political history that 
their own personal clout and charisma had a significant impact on the 
emergence of both the PAD and PDRC movements.
Some sections of the middle class had previously shown support for 
nondemocratic actors during times of political upheaval. The successful 
student uprising of October 14, 1973, “motivated conservative elements 
and the elites to counter- mobilize” (Kongkirati 2006, 12). The right- wing 
groups, responsible for the massacre of students in 1976, formed organiza-
tions to counter the peasants, labor unions, and students in 1975 (Kasert-
siri 1998). Ji Ungpakorn also argues that the military and anti- Communist 
groups actively organized and supported the nationalist Red Guar and 
Nawaphon.16 The Village Scouts, officially endorsed by the state, was “the 
largest counter- movement with its membership of more than 20,000 drawn 
almost exclusively from the middle class in Bangkok” (Kongkirati 2006, 25). 
“In upcountry towns,” posits Kongkirati, “the movement attracted local 
officials, merchants, and other well- to- do figures. In Bangkok, the wives of 
generals, business leaders, bankers, and members of the royal family took 
part.”17 While it is not uncommon for the middle class in Asia to be “con-
tingent democrats”18— given that the middle class’s expansion has tended 
to rise during authoritarian times— their support for antidemocratic actors 
still defied a large literature within the modernization school (Jones 1998; 
Sinpeng and Arugay 2015).
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Black May also holds its contradictions: it confirms long- standing 
nondemocratic tendencies within the Thai polity. The uprising was not 
in opposition to the coup d’état per se, but in opposition to the military 
staying in power. Public support for the royally appointed prime minister 
underscored the monumental power of the monarchical institution. It also 
illustrated public acceptance of political leadership that did not derive from 
the democratic process. These tendencies among the public were not new 
in Thai political history— they instead demonstrate continuity, rather than 
change, in this respect.
Thailand’s Susceptibility to Coups:  
Structural and Institutional Factors
Thailand is a classic case of a crisis- prone democracy susceptible to regime 
breakdown. The structural and institutional conditions of the Thai polity— 
frequent coups d’état and powerful extraconstitutional institutions— make 
democratic collapse likely. They provide the background conditions for 
the emergence of an antidemocratic mobilization. Key factors that make 
Thailand conducive to the rise of antidemocratic mobilization include (1) 
patterns of previous mobilization; (2) legacies of successful coups d’état; 
(3) past “popular” support for undemocratic tendencies; and (4) power-
ful extraconstitutional institutions. As I will later argue, these structural 
and institutional conditions make antidemocratic mobilization more likely; 
they do not, however, activate mobilization. In other words, Thailand’s 
democracy does not always break down, even under conditions of severe 
economic crisis like the Asian Financial Crisis in 1997.
The Politicized Military
A politically active military and frequent coups have become a hallmark of 
contemporary Thai politics. Between 1932 and 2019, Thailand witnessed 
nineteen coup attempts— the highest number of coups d’état in the world. 
Thailand continues to be trapped in this cycle of coups and crises due to 
conflicts among political elites over access to spoils. Parliamentary poli-
tics are wrought with corruption, factionalism, and in- party fighting. The 
military, still the only institution capable of launching a coup, intervenes 
to protect its own interest and put an end to democratic politics with the 
promise of returning to it shortly afterward. Before elections can be rein-
troduced, a new constitution is written to promote the interests of the coup 
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plotters and to provide them with impunity. An election is held and par-
liamentary politics resumes. Politicians pursue pork barrel politics, crisis 
ensues, and the vicious cycle continues.
The price tag for a military intervention, however, has risen signifi-
cantly since the popular backlash of Black May. Although the frequency 
of successful coups d’etat in a polity increases, in theory, the chance of 
another coup (McGowan 2003),19 coups are ultimately a means of power 
transfer that is contingent on certain favorable conditions. Prior to Black 
May, there were two major ways to successfully launch a coup d’état in 
Thailand, depending on the nature of the coup itself (table 3.1). In the pre- 
1970s period, where coups were launched by one military faction against 
another and the public remained largely disenfranchised, military faction-
alism was key to whether a coup will be launched or not. However, follow-
ing the October 14 Incident in 1973, there was a rising expectation that 
military dictatorship was less desirable among the populace. As such, politi-
cal consensus that a change of government is necessary, particularly among 
the military elites themselves, was critical to whether a coup is launched. 
This explains why coup attempts failed during the Prem years: some sec-
TABLE 3.1. Causes and consequences of successful coups in Thailand
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tions of the military top brass continued to pledge their support to Prem, 
leaving other factions that desired change hung out to dry.
Popular support for coups has become necessary following the backlash 
against the Suchinda coup government.20 While a coup is still deemed at 
times “necessary” in the case of a crisis, some indication of popular sup-
port has proven critical to its success. It is no longer enough that there 
must be sufficient unity among the military top brass to launch a coup; 
the success of a coup hinges also on the perception of popular support 
for a coup. The Black May Uprising ultimately altered the calculus of a 
coup for the military. Because there have been so many successful coups in 
the past, coups will be a factor in Thai politics for the foreseeable future. 
However, from the 1980s onwards, there has been public expectation that 
the military must pledge its support to democratically elected govern-
ments (Samudavanija 1997 57). The military intervention is thus regarded 
as an “emergency only” measure— one that, moreover, must receive some 
degree of public support. Also, military governments are considered tem-
porary only in nature, and their main task is to clean up the “mess” of the 
dislodged democratic government and to lead the country back onto its 
democratic path.
The Middle Class and Democracy
Although scholars have yet to reach a consensus on a direct measure for 
the “middle class,” most agree that this class grew over time in Thailand— 
mirroring a growing trend across Asia (ADB 2010). Depending on the 
definition used, the Thai middle class in 2013 was between 20 percent to 
40 percent of the population (ILO 2013). In addition, according to esti-
mates published by the National Statistical Office, Thailand’s middle class 
grew continuously between 2000 and 2013. A more detailed analysis of the 
middle class is beyond the scope of this book; suffice it to say, however, that 
the burgeoning middle class in Asia is often seen as a “hope” for more open 
and perhaps democratic politics.
Yet the middle class in Thailand has been both illiberal and ambiva-
lent toward democracy. This is not uncommon in Asia, as much of the 
middle class in the region grew and expanded under authoritarian rule 
(Jones 1998). The role of the middle class during the Black May and earlier 
popular mobilizations suggests their ambivalence toward, and sometimes 
opposition to, democratic politics. Clearly the middle class in Thailand is 
not a unified group with a defined set of ideology or political preferences. 
However, examining its role in political upheavals sheds light on its pref-
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erences in ways that voting behavior cannot always do, particularly dur-
ing nondemocratic times. An investigation into middle- class behavior and 
attitudes shows that the middle class, particularly those originating from 
Bangkok, has demonstrated support for antidemocratic regimes since its 
first manifest participation in popular politics in the 1970s.21 The ways in 
which the middle class has shown its undemocratic stripes can be catego-
rized in three key ways: (1) support for antidemocratic forces; (2) support 
for an appointed prime minister; and (3) support for coups.
On balance, the undemocratic nature of the Suchinda regime may not 
have been the key issue in the Black May Uprising. Thais had not been 
against the 1991 government that had risen to power via military coup 
one year earlier because it was deemed undemocratic. The reason, instead, 
is that it was generally acknowledged that the government was corrupt. 
In fact, the 1991 military coup was “widely accepted— almost popular.”22 
In the words of a Thai academic, “it was like watching a piece of rotten 
fruit— everyone was expecting it to fall and no one is sad now that it has.”23 
Puey Ungpakorn, a highly respected bureaucrat, argued that public apa-
thy toward the coup was widespread and similar to previous coups, and 
credited the coup makers for brainwashing the public that the coup was 
the right thing to do (Boonbongkarn 1992). Suchit Boonbongkarn likewise 
laments, “As with other coups in Thailand, there were no large- scale pro-
tests. Only some academics and politicians who had lost their jobs quietly 
expressed resentment. For the general public, the coup seemed acceptable” 
(Asian Survey 1992, 131).
The mass protest movement that eventually led to the crackdown of 
May 1992 did not emerge until the coup leader and army chief himself, 
Suchinda Kraprayoon, became prime minister. This was some time after 
martial law was imposed, the constitution abolished, and civic rights exten-
sively curbed. To therefore state that the antigovernment popular upris-
ing was “prodemocracy” certainly requires important qualifications. The 
muted public response after the 1991 coup, much like previous public reac-
tions to earlier coups d’état, indicates, in the main, public acceptance of 
coups as a legitimate means for political power transferal. It is no surprise 
then, that the coup in 2006 received close to 90 percent popular support, 
according to polls. Samudavanija (1997, 53), along similar lines, argues that 
the 1991 uprising was not so much prodemocracy as it was “a movement 
opposed to the possibility of a new alliance of the military and business 
leading to a dictatorship.” Likewise, David Murray (1996, 181) contends:
Although superficially the rallying cry [Black May Uprising] had 
been for an elected MP as prime minister, the real issue was that the 
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unelected MP came from the military— a military which, with con-
siderable doubts, the people had entrusted with the task of cleaning 
up Thai politics and returning the country to a more democratic 
form of government. That it had failed to do this was the real issue. 
Had an “acceptable” outsider been nominated for the premiership— 
someone like Anand or even Prem— the populace would probably 
have accepted it, particularly given the poor quality of the leaders of 
the government coalition parties.
Indeed, some sections of the middle class were also actively involved in 
the right- wing countermovements against students in the 1970s. The suc-
cessful student uprising of October 14 “motivated conservative elements 
and the elites to counter- mobilize” (Kongkirati 2009, 12). The right- wing 
groups, which were responsible for the student massacres of 1976, formed 
organizations to counter the peasants, labor rights groups, and students 
around 1975 (Kasertsiri 1998). Ungpakorn (1998, 61– 64) also argues that 
the military and anti- Communist groups actively organized and supported 
the nationalist Red Guar and Nawaphon. The Village Scouts, officially 
endorsed by the state, was “the largest counter- movement with its mem-
bership of more than 20,000 drawn almost exclusively from the middle 
class in Bangkok” (Prajak 2009, 25). “In upcountry towns, the movement 
attracted local officials, merchants, and other well- to do persons. In Bang-
kok, wives of generals, business leaders, bankers, and members of the royal 
family took part” (Kongkirati 2009, 25).
Popular Unelected Leaders
Unelected prime ministers have been viewed favorably in Thailand. Given 
the highly unstable electoral democratic periods in the 1970s and the 
1990s, in contrast with the stability brought on by the Prem leadership in 
the 1980s, there is a sense among the public that an impartial leader who 
can stay “above politics” is a marker of good leadership. Royally appointed 
prime ministers, in particular, are viewed in a positive light because they 
are perceived to possess three qualities: (1) royal blessing, (2) neutrality, 
and (3) incorruptibility. The idea of having an unelected prime minister is 
to provide an incorruptible “buffer” between different political groups that 
struggle to gain control of the government. A lofty ideal, perhaps, but an 
appointed premier must show that he does not seek political office for his 
own personal gain and that he maintains enough distance from the influ-
ence of both the military and political parties. Support for an unelected 
prime minister stems from the idea that both the military and politicians 
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have been extremely corrupt when they govern and thus do not represent 
the needs of the people.
Royal blessing gives a political actor an immense leverage vis- à- vis his 
counterparts. The palace will support someone who can steer the country 
out of a crisis and can rise above politics— the constant competition over 
access to pork and patronage. When the king appoints someone to lead the 
country, he emboldens both that particular person’s political power and 
status. This is called the process of “royal legitimization.”
Although the king does not have any political or administrative 
power under the system of constitutional monarchy, his role in 
times of political crises has been crucial. The Thais view the King as 
sacred and as a spiritual leader who serves as a symbol of unity. . . . 
Because of this the monarch remains an indispensable source of 
political legitimacy. A political leader or regime, even a popularly 
elected government, would not be truly legitimized without the 
King’s blessing. (Maisrikrod 1992, 334)
Historically, highly respected individuals are appointed prime ministers 
in times of crisis— often after the fall of a particular coup government. They 
are meant to serve in a “transition” period of an authoritarian government 
and an electoral democracy in the near future. Two particular appointed 
prime ministers, Prem Tinasulanond and Anand Panyarachoon, have left 
such important legacies in Thai political history that their own personal 
clout and charisma have had a significant impact on the emergence of the 
anti- Thaksin movements, the 2006 coup, and the current ongoing political 
crisis— years after their administrations ended. Prem was known to be an 
acceptable choice by the palace, the military, the parliamentarians, and the 
public. Prem endured through eight years of rule, four administrations, 
two coup attempts, and an assassination attempt, while maintaining par-
liamentary politics the best he could. Because he never ran for election, he 
was able to position himself as being “above politics” or “nonpoliticized.” 
He maintained equal distance from both the armed forces and the political 
parties, and he was able to choose persons whom he deemed most suit-
able to form coalition governments. Yet Prem was no democrat as, during 
his long rule, he did not allow a no confidence motion against him, for 
instance. A staunch supporter of Prem and a veteran politician, Prasong 
Soonsiri (2000, 267), shares a popularly held view of his premiership:
Prem understands Thai society better than any career politician. 
Elected officials have a lot to learn from him. . . . Prem has a con-
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science of a true democrat— more than those elected. He never 
abused his power even though he could have, with the military’s 
backing and all. He solved problems not to benefit any political 
party, but the nation. . . . He never had businessmen or people with 
vested interests lobbying him. . . . He’s the only prime minister who 
ended his term in grace.24
Indeed, part of the reason why Prem refused to stay in power after the 
1988 election was because some doubts regarding his supposed neutrality 
emerged. This decision came after some public wariness about his admin-
istration. A petition signed by ninety- nine people, mostly academics, was 
submitted to the king. It stated: “We request Your Majesty’s assistance with 
this matter to ensure that the political leader in the position of prime min-
ister will strictly maintain his neutrality to any institution for the sake of 
protecting his political position.”25
Anand Panyarachoon,26 a soft- spoken, highly respected diplomat, 
served as a premier twice without once being elected. He was handpicked 
by the junta following the military coup in 1991 to restore Thailand’s 
image abroad after much criticism from the foreign press with regard to 
the military takeover. Anand always portrayed himself as “neutral” and 
“apolitical”— which gained him widespread support. “I had no intention 
to be a prime minister and never had any aspiration to enter politics. In 
the past many people asked me to take up various ministerial positions but 
I always said no.”27 Anand was regarded as the nation’s “savior” after the 
military coup in February 1991 (Surin 2005, 405). General Suchinda asked 
him to be prime minister because he needed someone acceptable to both 
the public and internationally— particularly because the foreign press was 
condemning the coup.28
Following Suchinda’s resignation after the Black May Uprising, inter-
nal bickering inside the parliament eventually led to the nomination of 
Anand to take the leadership position until a new leader was elected. 
The House Speaker at the time, Athit Urairat, was expected to nominate 
General Somboon Rahong as premier but then shocked everyone at the 
National Assembly when Anand’s name was announced. “It’s one of the 
most commendable decisions Dr. Athit had ever made,” writes academic 
Rangsan Pattanarangsan.29 Prinya Tewanaruemitrakul, one of the leaders 
of the Black May Uprising, admits that choosing Anand as premier averted 
the crisis. “When Anand came he reshuffled a number of military positions 
that were directly involved with the crackdown and . . . the situation that 
could have exploded again in fact calmed down.”30
This is particularly ironic given that part of the motive for the protest 
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movements was against the coming to power of the “unelected” Suchinda, 
but the public was willing to accept Anand, whom they believed could 
resolve the crisis. Indeed, a group called “Friends of Anand” was formed 
among a small circle of elites at the time to support a “good” and “honest” 
person like him to stay as premier.31 The group believed a “good person like 
Anand must be protected and cherished.”32 Some influential academics also 
joined in, including Jermsak Pinthong, Methi Krongkaew, Kasien Tejapira, 
and Rangsan Thanapornpan. The membership shot up in less than a week 
after its inception and the group held rallies such as “Run for Anand” or 
“Flowers for Anand.”33 Such activities to protect someone because he was a 
“good person” was a unique phenomenon to Thailand.
Some section of the Thai elites and the middle class favor unelected 
prime ministers precisely because there seem to be no “obvious” vested 
interests with the military. Theerayut Boonmee, a Thai academic, explains 
(Meksophon, 72):
The middle class was motivated by a special situation in which the 
dark sides of both moral and democratic values centralized in one 
figure [General] Suchinda. They did not have anything against 
unelected prime minister before the outbreak of the [Black May] 
turmoil, or against any other unelected prime minister before that 
because they found this type of leader more accessible.
The Monarchy
That the monarchy is the most powerful institution in today’s Thailand is 
not only the result of centuries- old tradition but also the personal cultiva-
tion of King Bhumibol Adulyadej, who until his death in 2017 was the 
longest reigning monarch in the world. Kana Ratsadorn, a group of mili-
tary and civil officers, sought to undermine the power and legitimacy of 
the monarchical institution when it overthrew the absolute monarchy in 
1932. Yet the monarchy was not completely deprived of its influence and 
dominance in the Thai polity as the new political order retained the role of 
the patriarchal king, who stands as the symbol of national unity and moral 
rectitude to his subjects.34
Nonetheless, the power of the monarchical institution remained weak in 
the first two decades of constitutional monarchy. This is evidenced by King 
Bhumibol’s failed attempt to prevent Field Marshal Phibul from reinstating 
the 1932 constitution in 1951 (Chaloemtiarana 2007, 204). It was not until 
after 1957, during the long rule of Field Marshal Sarit Thanarat, that the 
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position of the monarchy was elevated (Hewison 1997, 63). Suwannathat- 
Pian (2003) argues that King Bhumibol almost single- handedly brought the 
monarchy from a position of decline to one that represents a pinnacle of 
the nation. Likewise, the Thai government explained why King Bhumibol 
was deeply revered: “The love and reverence the Thai people have for their 
King [Bhumibol] stem in large part from the moral authority His Majesty 
King Bhumibol Adulyadej has earned during his reign, one that involves a 
remarkable degree of personal contact with the people.”35
While formally the king enjoys a ceremonial position as the head of 
state, a careful reading of the Thai constitution reveals a much more pow-
erful position. In the second chapter of the 2007 constitution, Section 
8 says: “The King shall be enthroned in a position of revered worship 
and shall not be violated. No person shall expose the King to any sort of 
accusation or action.”36 Such an article in the constitution may seem at 
odds with the conventional understanding of a constitutional monarchy. 
Yet in the Thai case, such reference to the power of the king reflects both 
traditional and modern understandings of the Thai monarch— one whose 
actual power cannot be captured in words. Thai people refer to the king 
as “Phra Chao Yu Hua,” which literally translates to “God upon our head.” 
In this instance, the king continues to be perceived as the “Lord of the 
land” whose main duty is to preserve and protect the land and the people 
who live on it.
In normal times, the king serves as a symbol of unity and stability of 
Thailand and guides by moral suasion and example through words and 
writing. A prime example of this is the king’s oath of coronation on May 5, 
1950: “We shall reign with righteousness for the benefit and happiness of 
the Siamese people.” This particular phrase has been frequently replayed 
in the past six decades and it became a yardstick for “good governance”— 
one that those with the constitutional powers to govern in the democratic 
system should follow. In times of crisis, however, the monarch is expected 
to play a role in resolving the situation. The Thai government describes 
the king’s role in crisis management:
His Majesty’s moral authority was reinforced by his judicious inter-
ventions to put an end to widening political bloodshed. Two of the 
most crucial of those times occurred in 1973 and 1991. . . . Through 
these interventions, the King did not involve himself in the politi-
cal problems, which should be and were resolved through political 
mechanisms. Rather, he stopped bloodshed among Thais when state 
machinery had failed to do so.37
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The king’s ability to resolve the conflicts, both in 1973 and 1991, speaks 
volumes to his power and authority above and beyond constitutional stand-
ing. But the king’s power is a two- way street: on the one hand, it is how the 
king perceives it to be, while on the other, it is what the populace expects 
from their monarch. Clearly there are sections of the population that 
called out for the king’s intervention in both incidents, thus, his actions are 
reactionary. However, each intervention leaves a legacy and builds future 
expectations. This will become particularly important when discussing the 
emergence of the promonarchy movement of the PAD.
Moreover, the long reign of King Bhumibol allowed him to build a 
key virtue of political leadership, barami. Barami, an important concept in 
Thai studies, means “virtue” and “innate authority.”38 This “barami” is not 
hereditary and cannot be given or passed on to anyone. Rather, barami is 
“earned” and is built over a long period of time through hard work and 
dedication. Barami is a marker of legitimacy and authority that can be used 
to enhance someone’s power. The king is regarded as having a lot of barami, 
which makes his actions and words powerful moral suasion that can shape 
behaviors and outcomes in the political arena. This is why a royal blessing 
is so critical to the success of many of the unelected prime ministers such as 
Prem and Anand. In times of conflict, many political elites look to the king 
for a solution and royal appointments. This power and authority the king 
derives from his barami as opposed to the fact that he is the king per se.
The moral and political dominance of the monarchical institution pres-
ents a set of unique challenges to the development of democracy in Thai-
land. First, the power and authority of the monarchy, at times, competes 
with that of formal democratic institutions. The fact that the monarchy suc-
cessfully intervened to stop two major episodes of bloodshed in Thai history, 
where state agencies and other democratic bodies failed, is testament to the 
strength of the palace vis- à- vis other institutions. To leave the task of conflict 
management to the monarchy may serve to alleviate ad- hoc crisis situations, 
but in the long run the political system needs to develop and strengthen its 
own mechanisms of conflict management. As the greatest strength of the 
monarchy has rested on the personage of King Bhumibol, future succession 
may leave both the monarchy and the country vulnerable to conflicts.
Second, the king’s moral suasion can be a more powerful marker of 
legitimacy than any power derived from constitutional or parliamentarian 
positions. This is particularly true because of the deep reverence toward 
the king among the majority of Thai society, which further contributes 
to the power of the king’s words and actions. As Suwannathat- Pian (2003, 
192) argues:
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It is evident that Bhumibol’s socio- political strength comes from the 
unconditional devotion of his subjects who are willing to support 
and be guided by him because they have been convinced that his 
interest for their well- being is a genuine mission that Bhumibol has 
embraced since he took the reign . . . that Bhumibol has been able to 
defy ruling military juntas, parliaments and even constitutions with 
impunity is by itself proof of his unshaken bond he has cultivated 
with his people.
This “informal” power of the monarchical institution can shape and change 
political outcomes in times of crisis.
Lastly, some groups have manipulated the power of the monarchy for 
their own political gain. They use the monarchy as a “front” to achieve 
their ends, knowing full well that the monarchy cannot always respond to 
political matters. In fact, the most powerful way to discredit someone is to 
accuse him of defaming the monarchy. Even the rumor of being alleged 
to have done so can go a long way in tarnishing that person’s reputation, 
which sometimes leads to dismissal and even temporary exile. Sulak Siv-
araksa, a well- known public intellectual, a prominent leader of a number 
of key NGOs, and a self- confessed royalist,39 was accused by General 
Suchinda40 after the 1991 coup of lèse- majesté. Sulak, who was forced into 
exile for four years, was targeted because he was a popular challenger to the 
coup government. Such examples of abuse of the monarchical institution 
have occurred throughout Thai history. The Yellow Shirts will use “royal-
ism” as a key driving force for mobilization as well as a legitimization of 
their movement.
While these factors make coups more likely in Thailand, compared to 
other Third Wave democracies, democracy in Thailand does not always 
break down. The Black May Uprising and its implications dramatically 
changed Thai politics in ways that have fundamental impacts on future 
coups d’état as well as the emergence of mass- based politics. First, Black 
May significantly weakened the military’s position in the political arena. 
This is particularly true when considering the power of the military vis- à- 
vis the public, career politicians, and the monarchy. The second and related 
point is that the cost of coups d’état as mechanisms for regime change 
dramatically increase for the military. Third, the uprising set in motion 
the process of political liberalization, driven by reformist elites who have 
gained political prominence following Black May.
Black May also contains its contradictions as it confirms a long- standing 
nondemocratic tendency within the Thai polity. The uprising was not in 
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opposition to the coup d’état per se, but rather an opposition to the military 
staying on in power. Moreover, the public support for royally appointed 
prime ministers underscores the monumental power of the monarchical 
institution as well as illustrating public acceptance of political leadership 
that does not come from the democratic process. These tendencies among 
the public are not new in Thai political history and thus demonstrate con-
tinuity, rather than change, in this respect.
Contesting Visions of Accountability
Black May set in motion a broader- based reform movement centered on 
reducing corruption and improving accountability. However, there was 
serious disagreement over what accountability meant, for whom, and to 
what end. I argue that tensions emerged among three different notions 
of accountability, (1) horizontal, (2) vertical, and (3) moral accountabil-
ity, with the former two dimensions of democratic accountability while 
the latter is aligned with authoritarianism. While the resulting political 
reforms implemented after Black May represented a compromise among 
these three notions of accountability, they were heavily influenced by the 
moral notion of accountability. As Rodan and Hughes argue, the moral 
approaches to promote accountability can end up undermining democratic 
reforms.41 In the Thai case, the sources of moral accountability are drawn 
from nondemocratic sources, with the monarchy at the pillar. These moral, 
but inherently antidemocratic, undertones of the reforms clashed with 
other democratic dimensions of the reforms, eventually paving the way for 
the emergence of a mass antidemocratic movement a decade later.
Horizontal accountability and vertical accountability are conceptions 
of accountability that sit within the broader concerns of improving demo-
cratic accountability. Advocates for improving horizontal accountability 
in a democratic polity are fundamentally concerned with holding those 
in political office answerable to the public. Reforms that are designed to 
safeguard democratic institutions and citizens against the concentration of 
executive power or the potential for executive abuse of power are meant to 
strengthen horizontal democratic accountability. On the other hand, verti-
cal accountability is concerned with inclusiveness in a democracy: how we 
can design a democratic system that maximizes inclusion and power- sharing 
as well as reducing political inequality. But both horizontal accountability 
and vertical accountability can be advanced at the expense of each other. 
For champions of a majoritarian vision of democracy, where the voices 
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of the majority population matter most, promoting vertical accountabil-
ity, not curbing it through executive constraints, is paramount. Conversely, 
others may worry about the potential for the executive to abuse power if 
insufficient measures to constrain it exist. The Thai case demonstrates how 
this uneasy tension between the two notions of democratic accountability 
manifest themselves throughout the reform process.
But the post– Black May reform efforts were also influenced by the 
moral notions of accountability, which espouse attachment to conserva-
tive political sources of power. Moral accountability, as a distinct notion 
of accountability, does not mean that other types of accountability ideolo-
gies do not have moral bases, but that it may also draw on nondemocratic 
sources of authority.42 In Thailand, the moral ideologies that guided the 
reform efforts and subsequent antidemocratic movements were based on 
unaccountable traditional sources of power— namely, the monarchy and 
Buddhism. As the subsequent paragraphs will demonstrate, advocates of 
the moral accountability ideology sought to exert its influence over those 
seeking to champion democratic notions of accountability. Ultimately, the 
tensions that existed between horizontal and vertical accountability, on 
the one hand, and moral versus democratic accountability, on the other, 
became exacerbated following the election of Thaksin Shinawatra, which 
symbolized the victory of vertical accountability at the expense of other 
accountability ideologies.
The key areas of the 1990s political reforms in Thailand were moti-
vated by concerns regarding accountability in these three dimensions: (1) 
checks and balances on the executive abuse of power and the military (hori-
zontal), (2) greater political participation from the masses (vertical), and (3) 
reducing corruption and attracting good people to politics (moral). This 
process of reform remained largely elite- driven despite a concerted effort 
to include the voices of the people in the process.43 The reformist elites 
constituted a loose and varied coalition of academics, activists, profession-
als, bureaucrats, and public intellectuals. It is important to view them as 
“elites” for despite the fact that some have deep roots in society at large 
(i.e., activists), they remained at the top of the hierarchy of their networks 
and often represented their own personal opinion rather than the interests 
of their groups. Also, their participation in the reform process was much 
more pronounced than that of their networks; this signified the rather elit-
ist nature of the reform.
The reformists took charge of the reform process under the leader-
ship of a highly respected public intellectual who subscribed to the moral 
accountability ideology, Professor Prawes Wasi, to create a political system 
TABLE 3.2. Reformist approaches to three accountability ideologies and the 
subsequent reforms enacted in the 1997 constitution
Accountability 
ideologies Key problems Reform outcomes Key reformists (selected)
Moral  
accountability
Morality and ethics 
of political office 
holders
1. Single- member district 
replaces bloc voting
2. Funding for party 
development
3. Restrict party switching 
(must be member of 
party for 90 days before 
election)
4. PR list second tier voting
5. More oversight on 
campaign donations
6. 5% threshold










Poor checks and 
balances on 
executive power
1. Creation of legislative 
ordinary session
2. Smaller cabinet size
3. MPs cannot be cabinet 
members at the same 
time
4. Creation of new 
independent bodies 





Office of Ombudsman, 
Constitutional Court, 
National Anti- Corruption 
Commission)
Anand Panyarachoon, 











1. Public hearings with  
state officials
2. Petition to dismiss 
MPs, ministers (50,000 
signatures)
3. Community rights/ 
conservation of 
traditional culture
4. Autonomy to local 
government
5. Direct election of Senate
6. Compulsory voting
7. Prime minister must 








* Not part of the 99- person Constitutional Drafting Committee (1996) but noted as having some influence in 
the discourse of constitutional drafting
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that would be ruled by “good people.” While there was some broad agree-
ment as to what is “wrong” with the Thai polity, there was no consensus as 
to what exactly needed reforming. The reformists’ ideas for reforms could 
be categorized into three domains of accountability: moral, horizontal, and 
vertical. The moral ideologists were reformists who believed the “people” 
were what was really wrong with the Thai political system. They ques-
tioned the morality and ethics of the political elites and purported that 
unless their behavior could change for the better, no amount of constitu-
tional or electoral engineering could increase Thailand’s political stability. 
These immoral and corrupt political elites were going to find loopholes 
to circumvent new institutions to continue their clientelistic, corrupt, and 
nepotistic ways. Unless the behavior of political elites were to change, no 
“real” reform could occur. Democracy must rest on moral and ethical foun-
dations, otherwise it would not work, according to the morality reformists. 
Key problems that needed reforming in the Thai polity, according to this 
group of reformists, were poor-quality politicians, vote buying and sell-
ing, patron–client relations, and a lack of general moral ethics among the 
political elites.
The biggest proponent of this approach was none other than Prawes 
Wasi, who advocated for Buddhist moral principles and ethics as a key to 
building a better society. In his earlier writing (Wasi 1990), he lays out his 
thoughts on what democracy should be in Thailand:
Democracy and dharma44 need to go together so that democracy 
would be more righteous. . . . If everyone lives by moral and ethical 
principles, then they would be better people . . . they would not be 
interested in politics just to seek power or benefit themselves. .  .  . 
Dharma- based democracy will help political parties to recruit good 
people into politics, which will improve the quality and morality of 
democracy.45
Two decades later, Prawes’s famous “triangle that moves a mountain” 
(สามเหลี่ยมเขยื่อนภูเขา) theory, which he promoted widely among prore-
form academics, politicians, and activists, underscores his earlier pessimism 
about the lack of morality among politicians. Since politicians will never be 
“good” or “honest,” according to Prawes, they must be pressured to reform 
by other groups in society, namely the empowered citizenry and those with 
knowledge (academics).46 Some of the supporters of this approach take a 
royalist stance by using King Bhumibol’s words and teaching as a yardstick 
for how people should behave. Prasong Soonsiri, veteran politician dubbed 
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the “CIA of Thailand” for his long tenure at the National Security Coun-
cil, said: “Where politicians seek power for themselves and their cronies, 
that country will not likely prosper. Politicians know they should be good 
people but they don’t want to be.  .  .  . They should adhere to the king’s 
[Bhumibol] advice and follow his teaching.”47
Influenced by the moral reformists, strengthening horizontal account-
ability was a priority for another set of reformists made up largely of law-
yers and political science academics. They believed that if the right institu-
tions were put in place, they would exert sufficient constraints on political 
officeholders to curb executive abuse of power and corruption. Bawornsak 
Uwanno, a law professor and constitutional drafter, saw in a new consti-
tution the solution to the malaise of Thai politics. He pointed to three 
key problems: (a) representative democracy was highly problematic; (b) 
political affairs were writ large with corruption, and lacking in ethics or 
legitimacy; and (c) parliament lacked stability, the prime minister lacked 
leadership skills, and both government and parliament were ineffective.48 
A new constitution would make the political realm an arena for the peo-
ple; make the political and bureaucratic systems honest and legitimate by 
empowering citizens at all levels; and increase the government’s stability 
and capability by both ensuring that the prime minister has leadership 
qualities and enhancing parliamentary effectiveness.49 Likewise, Pongthep 
Thepkanchana, another constitutional drafter who subsequently served in 
both Thaksin’s and Yingluck’s governments, argued that the independent 
bodies created by the 1997 constitution are at the heart of good gover-
nance. “These institutions are needed to create mechanisms of transparent 
checks and balances.”50
Champions of horizontal accountability had good reason to be optimis-
tic. After all, out of Thailand’s eighteen constitutions since 1932, only three 
very short- lived constitutions (1946, 1949, and 1974) had any elements of 
democratic accountability. But these, as a result, were quickly torn up by 
the various military juntas that came to power.51 The majority of the con-
stitutions were written to allow authoritarian regimes to remain in power, 
not provide rights and protection for citizens under the law. Field Marshal 
Sarit, who staged a coup in 1958, took nearly ten years to write up the 1968 
constitution: a foil that served to keep him in power. “For the past 77 years 
Thai constitutions have failed to serve as rules and social contracts.  .  .  . 
Thailand is unable to establish a regime that uses the rule of law to solve 
conflicts and always relies on coups d’état,” claimed law professor and stu-
dent leader of the Black May uprising, Parinya Thewanaruemitkul.52
Advocates of vertical accountability, supported largely by reformist 
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elites drawn from civil society organizations, viewed existing sociopolitical 
structures as major impediments to a more participatory and just society. 
Pervasive and growing gaps between the rich and the poor, a lack of access 
to resources, a lack of social mobility, and a foreshortened future all made 
the majority of Thais feel powerless, according to proponents of vertical 
accountability. They saw measures to empower citizens and opportunities 
for their meaningful participation in the political process as key to fix-
ing the broken political system. Raewadee Prasertchareonsuk, head of the 
Coordinating Committee of NGO Networks, argued that a true democ-
racy must have the people, especially the poor and the disadvantaged, at 
its center.53 Rights, liberty, and equality must be given to the people in 
order for any structural reforms to be sustainable, adds Raewadee.54 Som-
kiat Pongpaibul, a propoor activist who later became one of PAD’s top 
leaders, contended that Thailand needed “new politics” that was not a poli-
tics of representation, but a politics for the people.55 This “civic politics” 
would open doors for people at the grassroots level to participate in politics 
and have their voices heard beyond the mere act of voting. Thailand really 
needed participatory, not representative, democracy, adds Somkiat.56
The resulting 1997 constitution was an extraordinary but contentious 
compromise across all three dimensions of accountability. First, provisions 
were made to increase public participation in political life and to empower 
ordinary citizens with new rights as a means to guard against the abuse 
of state power. A total of fifty- one new rights were extended to Thai citi-
zens by virtue of this new constitution.57 Examples include the right to 
hold public hearings (Article 59); community rights to preserve natural 
resources (Article 56); the right to submit a petition for consideration of 
legislation (Article 170); and increased devolution of state power to local 
governments (Articles 282– 90). Boonlert Changyai, one of the 1997 Con-
stitution drafters, argued that these social rights constituted a flagship of 
the constitution because they had been so poorly dealt with in the past.58
Second, the 1997 constitution sought to build a political environment 
conducive to moral governance. The drafters’ conception of “good gover-
nance” followed along the same lines as King Bhumibol’s notion of pro-
moting “good” people to rule. In order to reduce incentives for corrupt 
politicians to stay in politics, or to reduce the extent of vote buying and 
money politics, a number of articles were drawn up to bring about moral 
politics with the effective aim of helping to improve good governance. The 
upper house, for instance, would be directly elected for the first time by the 
populace (Article 315). However, candidates would not be allowed to cam-
paign to dissuade political parties from intervening. This unprecedented 
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measure was intended to reduce the influence of the “old elites” since the 
upper house had long been dominated by retired generals, bureaucrats, and 
public intellectuals. Samudavanija calls this “the informal political party” 
or the “legislative arms” of the bureaucracy (Samudavanija 1989, 333– 34). 
It was hoped that a popularly elected Senate would make the National 
Assembly more democratic and that the elected enators would be less likely 
to be corrupt.
To attract better- quality candidates to enter politics, the drafters put in 
place measures to overhaul the entire electoral system. The previous sys-
tem of bloc voting, which Hicken (2006) argues creates incentives for more 
corruption as candidates from the same parties are forced to compete with 
one another, was done away with. The new electoral system introduced a 
mixed member system of single- member districts at one tier and closed- 
list proportional representation at a second tier. Single- member districts 
would reduce intraparty competition, while closed- list proportional rep-
resentation would create stronger incentives for party identification and 
reduce vote- buying opportunities. The combined effect of these measures 
was to help reduce the number of parties, force parties to develop a national 
agenda and broad appeals, and strengthen the overall party system. With 
these significant changes, the drafters hoped that gone were the days of 
personalistic campaigning, an endless number of parties, and a lack of party 
roots in society. To enhance government efficacy and stability and to dis-
suade party switching, new rules required politicians to hold membership 
with a political party for at least ninety days before an election. The prime 
minister must also be drawn from the body of MPs; and if an MP wanted 
to be in a cabinet, he would have to resign his seat.
A major concern for the horizontal accountability reformists was the 
abuse of power by political elites and state agencies. To curb power abuse, 
new independent institutions59 were created to provide checks and bal-
ances against the administrative branch of powers. A Constitutional Court 
was established (Article 255) to ensure that the rights afforded by the 1997 
constitution would be protected. The Ombudsman position was created 
(Article 196) to keep abuses of the state and government in check. The 
National Human Rights Commission was created (Article 199) to allow for 
the protection of human rights. The National Anti- Corruption Commis-
sion was established (Article 297) to reduce and deter corruption: namely, 
that of political leaders. The National Human Rights Commission was 
notable because it had the power to prosecute those in political positions, 
remove someone from office, and enforce the declaration of assets for 
politicians— all powers that did not exist in previous constitutions.
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The last notable change that the constitution sought to effect was a 
stronger executive. Given the history of weak and unstable coalition gov-
ernments in the past, the constitutional drafters wanted to lengthen the 
government’s term and empower the prime minister to govern more effec-
tively. As such, the prime minister could dissolve parliament and call new 
elections within sixty days (although he cannot do so during a no confi-
dence motion). This, in combination with the ninety- day party member-
ship requirement, would make it very difficult for MPs to defect from a 
party or a coalition party to cause government collapse. Moreover, the 
prime minister would have the power to remove and appoint cabinet min-
isters at will (Article 217)60 and no less than two- fifths of the lower house 
would be required to call a no confidence motion on the prime minister 
(Article 185).
While supporters heralded the success of the 1997 constitutional engi-
neering, the so- called People’s Constitution contained illiberal and con-
servative elements that did not necessarily facilitate democratic develop-
ment. This was partly because of the heavy influence of the reformists’ 
moral accountability ideologies whose overemphasis on “good people” 
reflected a deep- seated bias against elected politicians, whom they saw as 
“bad.” Moreover, those not elected, like Prem or Anand, were considered 
to be better alternatives. Another conservative and elitist example was Arti-
cle 107, which required MP candidates to have, at minimum, a bachelor’s 
degree. Such a requirement was wholly out of touch with reality given that 
only 5 percent of the Thai population had completed tertiary education in 
2000.61 In effect, the degree prerequisite discriminated against the majority 
of the population by preserving the position of MP for the educated few.62 
This requirement also reflected the reformists’ idea of what “good” and 
“capable” politicians should be. Better- educated people were thought to be 
needed to govern the country.
Many of the new provisions of civil and community rights promulgated 
in the 1997 constitution were seen as ineffectual without legislative guar-
antees. One of the flaws of the 1997 constitution was that “many of the 
rights guaranteed under the constitution cannot take effect without legis-
lation.”63 This generated much contention with the people’s sector, which 
demanded more legislation to implement these rights provisions in the 
constitution. Bamrung Kayotha of the Assembly of the Poor contended 
that many of the constitutional provisions that were greatly needed by the 
poor were likely to be of no use due to the lack of further legislation. “The 
state tries to prevent the constitution from taking effect. Issues like com-
munity rights, protection of traditional way of life, conflict over access to 
76 Opposing Democracy in the Digital Age
land and resources are all very important to the poor. If they don’t become 
legislative acts, they would be of little use to the poor.”64
The draft constitution also elicited some strong opposition from the 
public. The so- called People’s Constitution was not as popular as many 
people had assumed. Waves of protest between the supporters of the 
draft— “the Green Group”— and their counterparts erupted weeks before 
the parliamentary vote. Some 30,000 village chiefs or kamnans, mostly from 
the North and the Northeast, were protesting against the draft.65 Another 
royalist group that called itself “Those Who Love Their Monarch” (กลุม่
ผู้รักเจ้า) was among the oppositional voices that argued that the new con-
stitution sought to change the regime from a constitutional monarchy to 
a republic.66 Meanwhile, some 3,000 supporters, drawn from the Student 
Federation of Thailand, prodemocracy groups, labor unions, and NGO 
groups, gathered to support the draft. Pipob Thongchai, a senior NGO 
activist who later became one of PAD’s top leaders, was among the sup-
porters. “We need to put pressure on the politicians so that they back down 
and let the draft through.”67 At some point they shouted former Prime 
Minister Anand’s name as he joined the proconstitution movement.68
The 1997 constitution had a real deficit in mechanisms that might 
work toward increasing vertical accountability, most critically between 
the state and its citizens. It did not emphasize good governance because 
it did not create mechanisms necessary to hold the ruling class and civil 
servants accountable to the citizens. The way that the constitution was 
written suggested that it was the public who should shoulder the initial 
costs of creating good governance.69 For instance, those who wanted to 
push through legislation needed to obtain 50,000 signatures. Moreover, 
they had to pay for such a process in order to petition parliament. Those 
who sought transparency or access to public service data likewise had to 
pay for the process of obtaining such data. The 1997 constitution discussed 
good governance only superficially— namely on issues of transparency and 
participation. Poor people, particularly, would be hard- pressed to produce 
either sufficient documentation or the financial resources necessary to file 
a petition. The defeat of those reformists who believed in improving verti-
cal accountability— many NGO activists— provided the grounds for their 
involvement and leadership in the PAD movement later on.70
Conclusion
I argue in this chapter that the political reforms in the post– Black May 
period exemplify a contestation over the meaning of accountability. While 
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the reformist elites agreed that reforms were needed to make the Thai 
polity more open and more democratic, there was serious disagreement 
over how to go about it. The 1997 People’s Constitution and other associ-
ated political reforms represent a compromise across the three domains 
of accountability— moral, horizontal, and vertical. Yet the dominance of 
moral accountability proponents meant that the reforms of the 1990s were 
not grounded in democratic or liberal principles, but rather in traditional 
sources of authority. Understanding the illiberal, undemocratic, and con-
servative elements within the 1997 Constitution is crucial to help make 
sense of the subsequent emergence of antidemocratic movements whose 
leaders were drawn from the same group of reformists.
Despite frequent government changes in the 1990s, an increasingly 
mobilized society, and the most severe economic crisis in contemporary 
times, an antidemocratic movement did not emerge in Thailand during 
the 1990s. Why not? First, there was an alternation of power and signifi-
cant uncertainty over the makeup of the government. Political leaders felt 
included in the political arena, and all considered they held a fair chance 
of securing a place in government. The military was allowed full control 
of its budget, and no one meddled with its internal structure. Political 
parties had a fair chance of either winning the next election or of being 
part of a multiparty coalition government. Between 1992 and 2001, small, 
medium, and large parties rotated power, amalgamated, or opposed one 
another. Factions were fluid: they joined a new party when they pleased, 
and there was no “fixed” political arrangement. Since parties were neither 
rooted in society nor had much programmatic appeal, party switching was 
not a costly action for politicians to take. There were effectively no “for-
ever” friends or foes in this political arena. Losing an election was not a 
detrimental event because parties knew they could wait their turn to take 
power next time. Given that a government lasted on average, just eighteen 
months, that wait was never long.
Second, the society became more open and inclusive in the aftermath 
of the Black May Uprising. The opening up of the society was exemplified 
partly by a greater degree of activism and a massive expansion of the civil 
society sector. Civil society organizations were able to gain concessions 
from the central government, and even held political elites responsible for 
their action at the time (Pathmanand 2001a). Moreover, the Thai political 
system became more devolved in part due to the decentralization of the 
early 1990s that saw the creation of subnational governments in order to 
meet local demands.
Lastly, an executive could be dislodged from power, and a government 
replaced, in multiple ways. The mechanism for power alternation was not 
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crippled or rendered ineffective. A coalition partner or even a faction could 
defect from a governing coalition, resulting in dissolution of the House of 
Representatives and a new election. Because coalition governments in the 
1990s were so weak and fragmented, opposition groups, be it in formal or 
informal democratic channels, felt they could influence the course of poli-
tics in one way or another. The Chuan government (1997– 2000) tried to 
cling to power for as long as possible despite frequent and intense protests, 
as well as much internal bickering with the coalition partners, but it even-
tually succumbed to a House dissolution. In sum, both formal and informal 
channels to channel grievances for both elites and the mass were open, and 
no organized group felt shut out by the system.
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The Origins of the Yellow Shirts
The 1990s was not just an important period of political reforms, it was 
also the time of great turmoil. Thailand was also hit especially hard by the 
1997 Asian Financial Crisis— which sent its currency into free fall, caused 
millions of people to lose their jobs, and led to incessant street protests. 
Not even at its weakest, though, did Thailand witness mass antidemocratic 
mobilization. Instead, the People’s Alliance for Democracy was born at a 
time of political stability, economic growth, and expansive civil society: all 
three major conditions that should make democracy work. Why and how?
The People’s Alliance for Democracy started out as a prodemocracy 
movement but evolved into an antidemocratic one. This chapter examines 
the first stage of the PAD’s transformation: becoming an anti- incumbent 
movement. It discusses how democratic institutions become blocked, and 
in so doing, exclude the participation of key groups and actors in the polity. 
Initially, the PAD began as separate and diverse antigovernment opposition 
groups— many of which were ideologically opposed to one another. As the 
number of opposition groups grew and their protest activities intensified, 
the former made the decision to unite under the banner of the PAD, and to 
wear yellow shirts in symbolic allegiance to King Bhumibhol. Uniting as a 
PAD movement was strategic: leaders of the opposition groups recognized 
the difficulty of gaining leverage against the uncompromising incumbent 
without presenting a strong and united front. As a number of the PAD’s 
demands continued to go unmet, the movement leaders made another stra-
tegic choice: to oppose democracy. Chapter 5 will cover in detail how the 
PAD took an antidemocratic turn.
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To clarify, adopting antidemocratic tactics was not a natural outcome of 
the process of institutional blockage; but it was a strategic option that was 
most likely to succeed. Their chosen strategy directly affected whether the 
process of institutional blockage would continue— or not. As such, both the 
sequence and timing of this process affects the outcome. When opposition 
groups feel cut off from access to power both in the present and foresee-
able future, they appeal to nondemocratic, alternative sources of power to 
reverse or, at a minimum, halt this process of institutional blockage. And 
it is when these nondemocratic institutions responded to the opposition 
forces that we see a complete democratic collapse.
An examination of the Thaksin government also reveals how its mar-
ginalization of opposition voices was perceived as a threat to democratic 
accountability. Both the political dominance of the Thaksin government 
and his increasingly illiberal rule had made, for his opposition, constraints 
on the executive very difficult. As I will show in detail, each opposition 
group that mobilized against Thaksin had at once been adversely affected 
by his policies and experienced political intimidation and harassment. The 
closing down of opposition space coupled with encroachments on funda-
mental democratic freedoms underscored the nature of institutional block-
age during the Thaksin era.
While much of the focus of this research is on the PAD movement, I 
will also discuss the broader Yellow Shirts movement of which the PAD 
was part. The Yellow Shirts encompassed three major groups. The engine 
of the movement was a loose network of alliances, this being the PAD. Sup-
porting the movement, albeit indirectly, were sections of the armed forces 
and key individuals close to the king. I discuss these broader networks and 
the PAD by referring to them collectively as the Yellow Shirts but am care-
ful to distinguish among the three. This chapter will break down the key 
groups and actors within the PAD and will also discuss their key allies as 
part of the broader Yellow Shirt movement. The PAD set the stage for a 
coup d’état, while the armed forces launched the coup with support from 
those close to the monarchy. These three components were, I argue, cru-
cial to the successful overthrow of a democratically elected government. 
The emergence of this antidemocratic mobilization and the breakdown of 
democracy was regarded, from the perspective of numerous 1990s reform-
ists, as an extension of the reform process shaped by proponents of the 
moral accountability ideologists— those who believe in political reforms 
centered on morality, Buddhism, and ethics. Viewed in this light, many 
PAD protesters believed that supporting a military coup and the eventual 
overthrow of the Thaksin government was democratic. A coup was merely 
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a means to “recalibrate” the political system in order to attract moral and 
ethical leaders capable of providing good governance to the nation.
The first section of this chapter offers a background analysis to the 
emergence of the People’s Alliance for Democracy. Following the 1990s 
political reforms, significant in that these ushered in the first- ever constitu-
tion written by “the people,” Thailand entered a period of extreme instabil-
ity: the economy collapsed, millions became unemployed, civil society was 
mobilized with incessant protests, and yet we observe no antidemocratic 
movements. Instead, Thailand saw democracy as the answer to its political, 
economic, and social woes, and voted in the most popularly elected prime 
minister in the country’s history: Thaksin Shinawatra. The second sec-
tion chronicles the meteoric rise of Thaksin and his party, Thai Rak Thai 
(TRT). It outlines a number of policies that made Thaksin such a popu-
lar leader. The second section additionally chronicles the emergence of 
the anti- Thaksin opposition, examining key groups, their grievances, and 
their opposition activities. The third section outlines major civil society 
networks that later become the key drivers of the PAD, recounting their 
beginnings as prodemocracy activist groups that ended up supporting a 
military coup. The institutional blockage theoretical framework is empiri-
cally applied throughout this chapter to demonstrate its operationalization 
in the Thai case.
The 1990s: Economic Collapse and Civil Society Growth
The 1990s were not only a period of great political reforms, the decade 
also bore witness to Thailand’s economic collapse in the aftermath of the 
1997 Asian Financial Crisis and its significant expansion of the civil society 
sector. In many ways, democracy had the best chance of collapsing in the 
1990s: the country was embroiled in its worst economic crisis, millions 
had spilled onto the streets in protest, millions more lost their jobs, and 
the numbers of NGOs and civic groups in Thailand had risen to levels not 
seen before. Thailand in effect was bankrupt, civil society was mobilized, 
and it had a ready and willing military to step in to restore order should 
it be called upon. But that call never came. There was no antidemocratic 
mobilization. Instead, there was only a series of anti- incumbent protests— 
these subsequently led to leadership change, but not to democratic col-
lapse. Indeed, the very same people who would later become leaders of the 
antidemocratic PAD and PDRC movements were at this moment in the 
streets protesting against government corruption and the handling of the 
82 Opposing Democracy in the Digital Age
financial crisis— yet they never took the antidemocratic turn.
Prior to the economic collapse, the majority of business figures steered 
clear of direct involvement in politics. A major impediment to business 
leaders entering into politics was the existing patronage- based politics that 
is at once time- consuming and resource- intensive (Prasirtsuk 2009). One 
has to build local networks with key vote- canvassers over time to generate 
electoral support. For these reasons, provincial bosses (political mafias) have 
long held an advantage in the political arena. Another barrier to entry for 
business leaders is their likely unwillingness to have their finances probed 
as politicians often do. Not that the Thai system does not have lax rules 
about scrutinizing politicians’ assets, but the 1997 Constitution ordained 
stricter guidelines for asset declaration for those seeking political office. 
Nonetheless, the 1997 crisis prompted a number of key business figures to 
become fully involved in politics. Ironically, if being connected to politi-
cians helped to propel the crash of 1997, what major Thai firms learned 
instead was that the only way to survive was to increase, not decrease, their 
ties to politics. A number of business leaders who survived the economic 
crash concluded that the only way to protect their business interests would 
be to run the country themselves. More importantly, as Prasirtsuk (2009) 
argues, as globalization and the push for economic liberalization intensify, 
key business firms, especially those dependent upon government conces-
sions, become wary of leaving their fate in the hands of non- business- savvy 
politicians and bureaucrats.
Thaksin Shinawatra, who made his fortune from telecommunication 
concessions, explained his decision to found a new party, Thai Rak Thai, in 
1998: To bring Thailand into the new era requires leadership that under-
stands sales strategies so we can compete in the world economy. Business 
elites have the advantage over career politicians because they understand 
the complex nature of business. (Pisitsethakarn 2004, 36). Figure 4.1 shows 
that in the wake of the Asian Financial Crisis, candidates from the busi-
ness sector outnumbered career politicians. In the 1996 general election, 
business leaders accounted for 29 percent of MPs, while career politicians 
accounted for 59 percent. By 2005, the number of career politicians run-
ning for parliament dropped to 17 percent in the party- list system, and 
23 percent in single member districts. As for their business counterparts, 
these figures rose to 28 percent and 27 percent, respectively.
First, as more businessmen entered into politics to defend their busi-
ness interests, more opportunities arose for rent- seeking. Most major busi-
ness conglomerates in Thailand are family- run and largely by Sino- Thais. 
While a few are publicly traded, the founding families of the remaining 
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companies manage to maintain large shares of ownership (Nikomborirak 
and Tangkitvanich 1999). This makes rent- seeking easier when some of the 
family members become politicians. Second, opportunities for rents are 
not concentrated in certain political figures but diversified among many 
political actors. This means that private rents can be sought through vari-
ous positions in the political arena, be it in the cabinet, the lower house, or 
the upper house. Imai’s (2006, 241) detailed study of politically connected 
firms in Thailand between 2001 and 2005 shows that political participation 
of family members yields private rents. Moreover, these economic benefits 
are largest when family members are cabinet ministers. Third, the new 
electoral system introduced by the 1997 Constitution made it easier for 















Figure 4.1. Professions of candidates in national elections (1995– 2005)
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members of parliament are elected through a closed- list proportional sys-
tem, influential business families who are financiers of certain parties could 
become party- list candidates without having to have established local net-
works and patronage like their nonbusiness counterparts in a given con-
stituency. This explains why there were more businessmen in the party- 
list system than single- member district ones in both the 2001 and 2005 
elections.
This proliferation of “crony capitalism” stands in stark contrast to the 
intentions of the political reforms in the 1990s. It is precisely these “con-
flicts of interest” between family businesses and politics that the reformists 
sought to rectify both through the 1997 Constitution and through other 
economic reforms. There are a number of provisions built into the 1997 
Constitution that are specifically designed to prevent conflicts of interest, 
such as not allowing ministers to hold shares in public companies (Article 
209); not allowing members of the National Assembly to be granted con-
cessions from the state (Articles 110, 128, 208); and that anyone in political 
positions must declare their assets and liabilities before taking office (Klein 
1998). But because business conglomerates in Thailand are family run, 
upon joining politics, members simply transfer their shares to their spouses 
or relatives. To illustrate but one such case, the wife of Warathep Rathana-
korn, a Peau Thai MP, transferred both her and her husband’s shares of 
their family- run tour businesses to her mother prior to him taking office.1 
Kanlaya Sopohonpanich, a member of the banking tycoon Sophonpanich 
family, transferred shares worth 300 million baht to her children and their 
spouses prior to taking office during the Abhisit Vejjajiva administration.2
The superrich entered Thai politics in full throttle when they formed 
the Thai Rak Thai party in 1999. Although it is not uncommon for the 
wealthy to finance or be involved in politics (table 4.1), what is completely 
unprecedented, in the case of the TRT, is the extent of wealth concentra-
tion in the party. The Bangkok Post reports that the ten richest families, 
owning between them in excess of 40 percent of market capitalization on 
the Thai Stock Exchange, have close ties to the Thaksin government.3 
Many of the rich within the TRT party made their wealth as concession-
aires or through long- standing close ties to political elites. This raises the 
potential for conflicts of interest when they hold positions that allow them 
to make national policies and agendas that could directly influence their 
business interests. When concessionaires hold a political position, particu-
larly in policy making, there is a real danger of this leading to monopoli-
zation, as a leading economist of the think tank Thailand Development 
Research Institute observes: “When monopolization occurs as a product 
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of the political process, it can lead to less competition as those with politi-
cal power legislate or have access to state resources in ways that hamper 
competition.”4
The period of the 1990s also saw the greatest expansion of the civil 
society sector with the number of registered nonprofit organizations ris-
ing nearly 700 percent between 1997 and 2007.5 Civil society organiza-
tions really began to proliferate in the 1990s as a result of a more open, 
democratic, and inclusive political environment. Veteran NGO leader and 
activist Pipob Thongchai, who later became one of the leaders of the PAD 
movement, saw the growing NGO sector as critical to curbing the abuse of 
state power by politicians and to fighting against crony capitalists (Praser-
tkul 2005, 158). The 1997 Constitution also provides hope for a more 
open and people- oriented politics for civil society organizations— many 




Shinawatra Thai Rak Thai Founder, Thaksin (PM) $1.3 billion
Chiarawanon Thai Rak Thai Founding member, party list MP 
(Veerachai Veeramethikul)
$1.4 billion
Bodharamik Thai Rak Thai Deputy head, party list MP, 





Maleenont Thai Rak Thai Deputy head, party list MP, 
and cabinet minister (Pracha 
Maleenont)
$380 million




Chirativath Democrat Financier $485 million
Sirivadhanapakdi Thai Rak Thai Close ties to cabinet ministers 
(Chaiyoth Sasomsab and 
Wiruth Techapaibul)
$3 billion
Asavabhokin Thai Rak Thai Financier $540 million
Yoovidhya Democrat Financier (ties to Bhirombhakdi 
and Banthadtan families— both 
influential in the Democrat 
Party)
$2.2 billion
Mahakijsiri Thai Rak Thai Deputy head and party list MP 
(Prayuth Mahakijsiri)
$365 million
Jungrungroengkij Thai Rak Thai Party secretary, party list MP, 
and cabinet minister (Suriya 
Jungrungroengkij)
$420 million
Bhirombhakdi Democrat MP candidate, minister’s 
secretary (Jitpat Bhirombhakdi)
$500 million
86 Opposing Democracy in the Digital Age
of which believed in the need for greater vertical accountability and moral 
accountability in the Thai polity. A more mobilized society combined with 
consecutively weak governments did not, however, give rise to an antidem-
ocratic movement. Rather, what we see in Thailand during this rather tur-
bulent period are proreform movements following the Black May Uprising 
and anti- incumbent mobilization after the 1997 crash. In 1998, a backlash 
against austerity measures resulted in a wave of discontent that had eco-
nomic nationalism in its sights. Some sections of the business and academic 
communities mobilized to oppose eleven bills introduced into parliament 
by the Chuan Leekpai government that they dubbed “11 bills to sell off the 
nation.” The opposition alliance was loosely referred to as the “People’s 
Alliance to Save the Nation” (พันธมิตรกู้ชาติ), composed of some forty- five 
organizations, including those leading the Black May uprising that aimed 
at opposing IMF reform packages. This alliance drew support from the 
State Enterprise Workers’ Relations Confederation, the Confederation of 
Democracy, the Assembly of Lawyers, and the Retail and Wholesale Trade 
Association, to name but a few. The opposition came out in protest against 
globalization, against the IMF, against the free trade agreements, and so on 
and so forth. Moreover, Thailand’s largest civil society organization, the 
Assembly of the Poor, having staged a ninety- nine day rally (its longest) in 
1997, won “unprecedented concessions” from the government.6
This protest wave of nationalist mobilization pushed for parliament 
dissolution and several policy changes, as opposed to an attempt to over-
throw the democratic regime altogether. This took place despite the fact 
that many of the very same figures behind the antigovernment and anti- 
IMF mobilization would, only a few years later, be instrumental in the 
emergence of the PAD movement. The Alliance sought to maximize the 
greater access to power provided by the 1997 Constitution to stop the pas-
sage of the “11 bills.” They did so by submitting a petition to table the 
proposed bills. At the same time, the Alliance also staged mass rallies in 
opposition to the Chuan government.7 By 1999, more protests from activ-
ists, academics, students, and state enterprises had taken place, calling for 
Chuan’s resignation and the dissolution of the House. Throughout this 
entire period, the Chuan government reshuffled the cabinet three times in 
the hope of surviving a no confidence motion despite rising public discon-
tent. Yet the government was besieged by internal scandals and threats of 
defection, and it eventually succumbed to a collapse when the House was 
dissolved in November 2000.
Antidemocratic mobilization did not arise during this period, despite 
dire economic conditions, highly contentious politics, and an actively 
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mobilized mass base for two reasons. First, when political conflict reached 
an impasse, the conflict was able to be resolved within the formal demo-
cratic institutions. In the 1990s this often meant that governments tended 
to dissolve the House in the face of a crisis, whether the latter originated 
from within the coalition government itself or externally from societal 
pressure. Given the fluid nature of the party system, a new election is the 
least bad option for most parties. Since there were several successive coali-
tion governments in the 1990s, major parties of all sizes felt they had a fair 
chance of again forming a government if they could make the right deals. 
Second, the channels for opposition to be heard were not blocked or ren-
dered ineffective in ways that prevent the opposition from having a voice. 
Opposition parties could threaten a motion of no confidence if they gained 
support from two- fifths of the parliament. Opposition movements on the 
streets, such as the Assembly of the Poor, were able to make some inroads 
with the policymakers. In essence, the democratic system was still working 
to channel grievances and provide access to power for the opposition.
The Paradox of a Functioning Democracy
The deaths of Thailand’s democracy in 2006 and 2014 paradoxically 
occurred at a time when democracy, supposedly, was working well: Thai-
land elected an extremely popular leader who became the first prime 
minister to ever serve a full term. His unprecedented electoral victory in 
2001— the first election to be held since the 1997 Constitution had come 
into effect— was astonishing, even for his skeptics. No other party had ever 
won more than one- third of the seats in national elections since the 1990s. 
As a new political party, Thai Rak Thai (TRT) was able to garner 49.6 
percent of the seats in parliament— two seats shy of an absolute majority. 
TRT would eventually go on to win an absolute majority in the subsequent 
election of 2005, and become the first ever party to win two consecutive 
elections. Scholars have sought to explain the astonishing rise and success 
of the TRT. Phongpaichit and Baker (2004) attribute Thaksin’s wealth and 
huge business and government connections to his party’s success. Others 
have pointed to institutional changes, such as a new constitution and elec-
toral system rules (Ockey 2003; Hewison 2004; Hicken 2006; Pongsud-
hirak 2008). What were the sources of opposition to the Thaksin govern-
ment, particularly given its immense popularity? I answer this question 
in two respects. First, I identify the nature of the opposition’s emergence; 
and, second, I capture the ways in which the opposition framed its discon-
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tent. As I later argue, these elements both helped to propel anti- incumbent 
mobilization. What is crucial to emphasize here is that being blocked from 
channeling their grievances both through formal and informal institutions 
is what turned the PAD antidemocratic.
Part of Thaksin’s popular appeal to the Thai people was without doubt 
his propoor policies. As Sinpeng and Kuhonta (2012) pinpoint, the use 
of meaningful policies to drive election campaigns was surprising given 
that most support for Thai political parties is garnered largely through 
their patronage networks and not through programmatic policies. Before 
running in the 2001 national election, Thaksin toured the country to talk 
with various NGOs, activist groups, and people in rural areas8 to assess 
their needs and problems.9 The “dual- track policy,” as it was referred to 
by the Thaksin administration, was an effort to maintain stable economic 
growth: a slowdown in exports due to slackening external demand would 
be met with a boost in domestic demand through government policy mea-
sures. Conversely, domestic demand stimulation would be held back when 
exports picked up. Thaksin’s economic team10 strongly believed in the need 
to overhaul the economic structure to prevent the economy from succumb-
TABLE 4.2. Thaksin’s key propoor policies
Program Description
30 Baht Healthcare Aimed to create universal healthcare by offering a 
30- baht fee (US$1) for each visit to a healthcare 
unit regardless of procedure
One Tambon One Product (OTOP) Promote local products and indigenous knowledge 
through state subsidies. Encourage Thai producers 
to export their goods.
One Million Village Fund One million baht (US$33,000) given to each village 
nationwide as development fund to be managed by 
the community itself
Debt Moratorium for Farmers Debt relief for farmers for at least 3 years, no interest
SME Subsidies Government subsidies to aid small and medium- size 
enterprises (investment, development, and export 
promotion)
Farmers’ Subsidies Debt restructuring for farmers, co- operative 
development, debt relief with private banks
People’s Bank Target low- income families who want to borrow but 
lack credit; aimed to keep them away from loan 
sharks
Low- income Housing Government housing for low- income citizens 
nationwide.
Education loan Students from low- income families can take 
government loans for education to be paid back at 
low interest
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ing to another crisis similar to that of 1997. Thaksin asked: “How is it that 
Thailand is wealthier overall but [its] people are poorer? We’re too depen-
dent on exports and foreign investment  .  .  . and such growth increases 
inequality.”11 “We’ve long neglected the gap between urban and rural and 
between industrial and agricultural sectors,” argued Somkid Jatusripitak,12 
one of the architects of the TRT’s policies.13
The socioeconomic context for the TRT’s rise to power and its cham-
pioning of propoor policies was extremely important. While the TRT’s 
economic policy aimed to reduce the income gap and raise overall growth 
through a combination of exports and increased domestic consumption, 
one must not forget that the party was driven by some of the country’s 
wealthiest individuals. Yet the fact that these powerful businessmen had a 
strong mandate to run the national economy, some argue, was tantamount 
to allowing them to capture state power to control and manage national 
resources (Phongpaichit and Baker 2004, 97). This “political capture” of 
the business elites could be a double- edge sword. On the one hand, the 
country’s economy is in the hands of a (supposed) highly capable group of 
people who understand what is required for Thailand to compete in the 
global market. On the other hand, they could use their state power and 
access to resources to benefit their businesses. Tejapira (2006) argues that 
the Thaksin government was made up of “crony capitalists,” who “com-
bined aggressive neo- liberalization with capitalist cronyism and absolutist 
counter- reform politics with populist social policy to radically transform 
the existing patterns of power relationships and elite resource allocation.” 
Yet Thaksin defended his propoor policies as “policies for the development 
of human capital” and not as populist. He argued that Thailand suffers 
from three diseases: poverty, corruption, and drugs.14
Unlike many leaders before him, Thaksin in fact followed through with 
most of the policy announcements that he had made in the lead- up to the 
election. Many of Thaksin’s policies were widely welcomed, both at home 
and abroad. His supporters are quick to point out that no other prime 
minister had given them anything “tangible,” nor did they ever keep their 
campaign promises. Even long after Thaksin was ousted from power, his 
supporters proclaimed him the best leader Thailand had ever had. A taxi 
driver from Payao province explained why Thaksin was his “hero”:15
When Thaksin was in power, it was so easy to make money.  .  .  . 
Whatever Thaksin promises, he follows through. Like the 30- baht 
healthcare, I used it right away. My son has low platelet count— 
medicine costs 10,000 baht a pop. Without the 30- baht program, he 
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would not have survived it. This current prime minister, Abhisit, he 
promised free schooling. But it’s a lie. They only give 490 baht per 
child, which doesn’t even cover the cost of a uniform. I have to take 
out a loan to put my kids through school. Thaksin would never let 
that happen.16
Another key factor for Thaksin’s success was his charisma and likeabil-
ity. He presented himself as an approachable person, one who understood 
the needs of the poor. Being from Chiang Mai Province in northern Thai-
land, Thaksin was able to portray himself as a self- made man from the 
provinces, whose hard work had helped to propel his success. “I don’t need 
to be a prime minister. I’m already rich enough  .  .  . why bother? But I 
volunteer to help the country. I don’t gain anything from trying to com-
bat corruption . . . only to put myself and my family in trouble,” claimed 
Thaksin.17 Thaksin’s seemingly down- to- earth nature and approachability 
struck a chord with many people from the provinces. When Thaksin was 
under investigation for falsely reporting his shareholdings in his first year 
in office, some 50,000 people in Khon Kaen Province held a massive cer-
emony to brush away “bad omens” so that he might be acquitted.18 His 
popularity with people, particularly those in the North and Northeastern 
provinces, which later became his electoral stronghold, was unmatched by 
the many leaders who had preceded him.
Thaksin’s brilliant marketing schemes served to strengthen his lead-
ership. He pioneered the weekly “Prime Minister Thaksin Talks to His 
Citizens” (นายกทักษิณคุยกับประชาชน) radio shows, where he established a 
rapport with listeners by discussing what he or the TRT had done recently. 
Not only did he try to reach out to people living in the provinces, his radio 
shows also sought to counter the largely military- dominated radio airwaves 
(McCargo 2000). For instance, Thaksin was the first prime minister to set 
up “mobile cabinet meetings.” In these, cabinet minister meetings were 
rotated throughout various provinces around the country instead of always 
being held in the capital city, as was the norm. These marketing maneu-
vers were clever ways for Thaksin and the TRT to not only better market 
themselves but also to expand their influence and presence. “They want to 
show the electorate that it’s not enough they elected TRT and Thaksin on 
election day, but the voters need to be reassured that their government is 
doing their job. They can build long- term relationships with citizens this 
way,” argued Pipon Udorn during a seminar on “Thai Politics of Market-
ing vs. Marketing of Thai Politics” (Kasertsiri 2009).
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The Nascent Opposition and Institutional Blockage
Yet Thaksin was a man shrouded in controversy and corruption allega-
tions. While his supporters admired his policies, his charismatic leadership, 
and his can- do attitude, his opposition loathed him for the same reasons. 
When Thaksin was campaigning for his first election as head of the TRT, 
members of the National Anti- Corruption Commission, an independent 
body created through the 1997 Constitution, voted almost unanimously 
that, while deputy prime minister under the government of Chavalit Yong-
chaiyudh in 1997, he and his wife had been guilty of falsely declaring their 
assets by transferring their shares to their housemaids and drivers, and of 
insider trading and securities price manipulation. Since this was considered 
a “political case” the matter was referred to the Constitutional Court; the 
Court narrowly struck it down by 8– 7 votes. His critics cried foul that 
this “miracle” was only possible because Thaksin bribed officials to influ-
ence their vote.19 This corruption allegation was the first among many that 
plagued the Thaksin government throughout its first and second terms 
(figure 4.3). Thaksin was not the first corrupt prime minister that Thailand 
had had, but his scale of corruption, his opponents claimed, far outstripped 
that of his predecessors.20
Skeptics who had been wary of the influx of the “superrich” into Thak-
sin’s cabinet only found cause for further critique. Ukrist Pathmanand 
authored a piece in Matichon Weekly, just weeks after Thaksin took up the 
prime ministership, about the “total monopolization of telecommunica-
tions and mass communications business”— warning not to trust politi-
cians with vested interests.21 Thaksin’s own family business, AIS, Thanin 
Chianravanont’s (finance minister advisor) Telecom Asia,22 and Adisai 
Bodh aramik’s (cabinet minister) Jasmine and TT&T account for most of 
the shares in telecommunications providers in Thailand. By late 2001, aca-
TABLE 4.3. Selected corruption allegations during Thaksin administration
Case Amount (Baht)
Shin Corporation sales tax evasion 73 billion
CTX bomb scanner purchase 35.8 million
Computer auction 900 million
Rubber purchase 1.4 billion
Electricity concession 4 billion
Solar home project 7.9 billion
Car park bribery 300 million
Ample rich investment 16 billion
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demics had begun to protest what they believed was a “major conflict of 
interest” when the Thaksin government sought to convert telecom con-
cession fees into excise charges (which they would eventually succeed in 
doing in 2003). Researchers at the Thailand Development Research Insti-
tute published reports arguing that the move would not only reinforce 
existing telecom monopolies, but would make them billions at the expense 
of the state and the Thai people. “This is a blatant example of conflict of 
interest as well as policy- based corruption,” the institute report claimed.23 
Thaksin’s close allies also admitted to his corrupt ways. One close aide, 
who chose to remain anonymous, revealed: “Thaksin is no democrat. He’s 
a businessman. He’s a man of ‘grey’— not white or black.”24
As a highly successful businessman, Thaksin had a tendency to monop-
olize control and was not particularly open to dissenting voices, even from 
his own people.25 His CEO- style management was viewed by some as 
abrasive, controlling, and dictatorial.26 Thaksin shuffled cabinet ministers 
often, regardless of their performance, so that no one felt secure in their 
position. For example, he shuffled Pongthep Thepkanchana, a minister of 
justice (a US- trained lawyer and a drafter of the 1997 Constitution), to the 
Ministry of Education and then switched him back to the Ministry of Jus-
tice. An interview with an unnamed former minister during Thaksin’s sec-
ond term also revealed that Thaksin did not like any cabinet minister tak-
ing credit for his or her work. A Matichon Weekly article entitled “Thaksin 
Does Everything, His People Become Mute” mocked Thaksin for being 
controlling to the point that his inferiors (including ministers) dared not 
openly disagree with him. His former deputy government spokesperson, 
Jakrapob Penkhae, agrees that Thaksin had his faults: “I am with Thai Rak 
Thai because Thaksin has plans to bring progress to Thailand. But his way 
of getting things done may not be legitimate. . . . another of his faults is 
that he is too focused on what he wants to do and is not open to alterna-
tives, especially from the opposition” (Matichon 2008b).
Mechanisms for opposition through formal democratic channels 
TABLE 4.4. Seat share of Thai Rak Thai vs. opposition parties (2002– 2006)
 
Government
(% of seat shares)
Opposition
(seat shares)




Thaksin 2 (2005– 2006) Thai Rak Thai 75 Democrat Party 19
* Following party mergers occurring between 2001 and 2002
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include lobbying, bargaining, participating in the policy- making process, 
engaging the media, and using personal connections to influence govern-
ment policies. If the government blocks the opposition’s access to power 
within democratic channels, this is considered formal institutional block-
age. Note that opposition forces can come from both outside and inside for-
mal democratic channels. Opposition within the formal democratic institu-
tions might include opposition members of parliament (MPs), opposition 
senators, or independent bodies that would normally serve the purpose of 
placing checks on the executive. Opposition external to the formal institu-
tions but inside the democratic polity includes interest groups, pressure 
groups, and labor unions. In the following paragraphs, I demonstrate how 
the process of institutional blockage occurred in Thailand when opposi-
tion to Thaksin mounted between 2002 and 2005 and eventually became 
the PAD.
Parliament
Opposition in parliament was rendered completely ineffective on two 
grounds: (1) executive unaccountability; and (2) declining electoral com-
petitiveness. First, parliamentary means for the opposition to hold the 
executive accountable were rendered ineffective. The 1997 Constitution 
required two- fifths of MPs to launch a no confidence motion against the 
prime minister— something that the main opposition party, the Demo-
crats, was never able to do throughout the Thaksin administration. Thak-
sin was successful at consolidating political power by absorbing coalition 
parties into the TRT,27 which meant that the threat of coalition defec-
tion was significantly reduced. In essence, the TRT had a majority in 
parliament— something unprecedented in parliamentary politics in Thai-
land.28 One of the most effective tools for parliamentarian opposition— 
the no confidence motion— was rendered useless. Things turned for the 
worse for the Democrats in Thaksin’s second term as its seats amounted 
to merely 19 percent of the total seat share, compared to the TRT’s mam-
moth 75 percent (table 4.4).
Not only was it difficult to put constraints on the executive, the rul-
ing government allowed little opportunity for question time. The Speaker 
sometimes had to close business early because parliament lacked a quo-
rum, and five times between 2002 and 2004 House sessions were effec-
tively halted following head counts. As Uthai Pimjaichon, House Speaker 
during the TRT government, revealed: “Thaksin doesn’t value parliamen-
tary sessions. Even important issues like budgetary meetings, sometimes 
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he was absent. . . . I don’t need to mention how [many times] he did not 
answer questioning periods. . . . Sometimes he chose to go see people in 
the villages, who would give him praise, as opposed to showing up to par-
liament” (Pinthong 2004, 76). Eventually the TRT whip proposed a salary 
raise for MPs to entice them to attend meetings (McCargo and Pathman-
and 2005, 106). Wittaya Kaewparadai, Democrat MP and former minister, 
commented:
Parliamentary mechanisms for checking the executive were crip-
pled. The 1997 Constitution created such a strong executive and 
Thaksin knew it. We in the opposition couldn’t launch the no con-
fidence motion on Thaksin. So many times parliamentary sessions 
had to be cancelled because not enough MPs showed up. Thaksin 
did not respect parliamentary procedures. The upper house couldn’t 
do anything either. This is a total parliamentary tyranny. . . . Since 
formal parliamentary channels were closed off, we had to pursue 
extraparliamentary ones.29
While not rare in parliamentary democracies with majority govern-
ments, this blockage drove anti- incumbent mobilization from within the 
formal democratic institutions. The Democrat Party (DP), which had 
become the only viable, permanent opposition party,30 could not win 
elections. This made national elections in Thailand no longer competi-
tive. The Democrats’ last election win in which they were able to form a 
government dated back to 1992, following the Black May uprising. Since 
then the Democrats had only been part of a coalition government or the 
opposition. But the rise of the TRT and its later electoral dominance ren-
dered the Democrats as the only main opposition in town. Other small 
and medium parties, such as Chart Thai, Chart Pattana, and Kwam Wang 
Mai, were either absorbed by the TRT (in the case of Kwam Wang Mai) 
or remained fluid enough that they still had the option of joining either 
the TRT or the opposition. In essence, the rise of the TRT meant that the 
Democrats had become the de facto opposition party. Since it could not 
win elections while the TRT or other Thaksin- aligned parties still existed, 
its only chance of being in government would be through extraconstitu-
tional means, or through a collapse of the TRT government.
The frustration of the opposition party prompted its members to join 
forces with anti- Thaksin groups. Democrat MPs began to frequent PAD 
rallies, some even going on stage to demonstrate their support for the 
movement. Democrat MPs who went on the PAD stage included Kasit 
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Piromya, Somkiat Pongpaibul, Kulaya Soponpanich, Anchalee Thepbutch, 
and Kraisak Choonhawan. Kaewparadai confirmed this during an inter-
view: “The Democrat Party considered the PAD as an ally.  .  .  . indeed 
some of our members joined PAD and engaged in their activities. Some 
went on stage, others donated food and money. . . . What the PAD leaders 
said on stage resonated very much with how we felt in parliament. We saw 
eye to eye on a number of issues.”31 The biggest contribution the Demo-
crat Party made to the PAD movement was to provide mass support. In 
fact, Democrat Party leaders admitted mobilizing their mass base to attend 
PAD rallies— most notably the infamous 193- Day Protest in the postcoup 
period. While figures varied, according to party estimates the Democrat 
Party forces most likely accounted for about half of the total PAD mass 
base. “Democrat Party members, mostly from the southern region of Thai-
land, mobilized the mass to join PAD rallies.”32
Senate
Some senators felt that the upper house could not provide the checks and 
balances to the lower house, as was envisioned by the 1997 Constitution. 
In fact, the first ever elected Senate was plagued by both corrupt elections 
and the fact that many elected senators were from families and friends 
of the ruling party, raising serious concerns over nepotism and conflict 
of interest.33 The Senate election in 2000 was held five times. In the first 
round, 78 of the 200 candidates elected were not approved by Thailand’s 
Election Commission due to concerns over electoral misconduct. This 
resulted in an additional thirty- five by- elections. Such by- elections were 
to be repeated for four more rounds until all 200 senators were signed 
off on by the Election Commission. Some elected senators later resigned 
from the upper house to run for a position in the lower house, which was 
a clear indication that they remained very much part of the political party 
system.34 Another senator was found to have bribed a fellow senator (Klaew 
Norapathi from Khon Kaen) with cash and Buddha amulets in exchange 
for his committee’s withdrawal. The last nail in the coffin of the 2000– 
2006 affairs of the upper house was the first ever “fight” in the history 
of Thailand’s National Assembly: Bangkok senator Prathin Santhiprasop’s 
brazen punching of Maehongson senator Adul Wanchaithanawong during 
the debate over the Tak Bai Incident.
A more politicized and progovernment Senate also meant it could not 
act as an effective institution to constrain the executive branch. First, sena-
tors could never reach the required three- fifths to submit a motion for 
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general debate and request that cabinet ministers explain important mat-
ters on state affairs. Somkiat On- wimol, Supanburi senator, questioned 
Thaksin during a seminar: “Is it true that you, Prime Minister, and Thai 
Rak Thai intervened in the affairs of the upper house by buying off sena-
tors?”35 Nakornsawan senator Prasit Pithunkijja voiced similar concerns: 
“Don’t think that the Senate is fully independent— not all 200 of us— 
because some have vested interests. . . . I don’t believe we [the Senate] will 
ever have the necessary three- fifths vote to remove anyone from political 
office.”36 Second, the upper house’s committee work was no more effective.
The opposition to Thaksin’s government that had formed inside the 
upper house as early as 2002 massively escalated following the Tak Bai 
Incident in 2004.37 Some senators formed an alliance with the opposition 
party, the Democrats, to question Thaksin during a joint parliament- Senate 
session following the Tak Bai Incident.38 However, when Thaksin turned 
up, he explained his side of the story for half an hour and then left without 
allowing senators to question him, despite a number of senators raising 
their hands.39 “This is not a press conference. We, as senators, are elected 
to represent the Thai people. Why did the prime minister come and not 
let us do our job and question him?,” asked Senator Sompong Srakrawee 
angrily.40 Senator Jermsak Pinthong, one of the most outspoken critics of 
Thaksin and himself a 1997 Constitution drafter, led the opposition move-
ment inside the upper house against the Thaksin government, with sup-
port from senators drawn largely from academia and NGOs.41
Independent Institutions
Independent institutions were created following the 1997 Constitution to 
provide more checks and balances in the political system and to reduce the 
abuse of state power by political elites.42 The fact that Thaksin surpris-
ingly escaped the verdict of the Constitutional Court in 2001 cast a long 
shadow of doubt with regard to the impartiality of the newly created inde-
pendent bodies. Over the course of Thai Rak Thai rule, there were numer-
ous allegations of Thaksin’s interference in independent bodies. “The cur-
rent [Thaksin] government has influence over every single institution; be it 
parliament, Senate, independent bodies, and the media,” warned academic 
Sangkit Piriyarangsan.43 By 2005, as talks over potential constitutional 
amendments surged, some sections of the judicial system went so far as to 
suggest the complete dissolution of all independent bodies, since they were 
neither impartial nor independent.44 “These institutions were created to 

















































































































98 Opposing Democracy in the Digital Age
they dominated by political influence, they also lacked the capacity to hold 
those in political positions accountable,” lamented a judge.45
As the opposition inside the formal democratic institutions was find-
ing that their channels for grievances were blocked and becoming futile, 
groups in the informal institutional realms met with the same fate. While 
in the 1990s academics, civil society, activists, and other groups were 
engaged in proreform mobilization, there was little of that during the rule 
of the TRT before it turned into anti- incumbent mobilization. This was in 
part because the proreform mobilization had already taken place over the 
course of the prior decade, and so the reformists were less willing to push 
for more reforms since much of this should have happened when the 1997 
Constitution was implemented. It was also partly because some of the key 
reformists felt they had their own lobbies for change within formal insti-
tutions. The “shock” and “disappointment” that followed brought many 
of the reformists into the whirlwind, which forcefully mobilized various 
groups into an anti- incumbent movement. They took to the streets.
The Thaksin government saw a flurry of protest activities during its 
administration. Between 2001 and 2006, there were more than 1,850 pro-
test events reported in the media. More than 60 percent of these were orga-
nized by NGOs. The biggest and most continuous spike in the number of 
protests reported was between mid- 2005 and the end of the first quarter of 
2006. Opponents of the Thaksin government had begun to engage in pro-
test politics in 2002. Much of the opposition movement was directly tar-
geting specific pieces of government policy. Protest activities started slowly 
in 2001 but effectively gained momentum in 2002, when a number of large 
rural NGOs, such as the Assembly of the Poor and the Small- Scale Farm-
ers’ Assembly of Isan, began to demand governmental responsiveness to 
their problems— a promise of the 2001 election campaign. The Assembly 
of the Poor staged a protest that lasted more than sixty days in late 2002. 
During this time it demanded that the government reconsider its plan to 
build the controversial Thai- Malaysian pipeline and the Pak Mun Dam.
Civil Society
Thaksin sought to sideline civil society organizations in order to establish 
direct relationships with the poor. Initially there was immense optimism 
that Thaksin’s victory would usher in a new era of democratic politics, one 
in which political leaders would finally be responsive to the people’s sector. 
In the early years of his administration, Thaksin showed signs of commit-
ment to the people’s sector, either by personally talking to demonstrators 
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or by sending his personal aides or cabinet members to hear their claims, 
be it the Assembly of the Poor, anti- power- plant groups from Bo Nok, or 
antipipeline groups. Yet, for Thaksin, it was more important to establish 
direct relationships with the people, instead of working through NGOs. 
Professor Saneh Jamrik, a well- known academic within the human rights 
NGO community, agrees: “When Thaksin became prime minister initially 
we [the NGOs] were all hopeful; he was a wealthy man who wanted to help 
the poor . . . but as time passed he’s not what we thought and even said bad 
things about us, saying we sound like a broken record. Now Thaksin would 
deal with the poor himself without having to work through us or Anand. 
So, we are disappointed.”46
The broad discontent against Thaksin from the civil society sector was 
first shaped by the general feeling of marginalization. Underneath this 
broad resentment were deep disagreements with Thaksin’s policies and his 
unwillingness to negotiate with NGOs and labor unions. Four key con-
stituencies represented the most vocal of the opposition groups, among 
whose civil society organizations rose up in protest against the Thaksin 
government: (1) state enterprise workers; (2) teachers’ unions; (3) media 
activists; and (4) grassroots networks against megaprojects. As opposition 
from the people’s sector continued, it became clear that many of the NGOs 
were ideologically against the TRT party platforms. Table 4.5 shows some 
of the key dimensions of the NGO opposition to Thaksin’s policies.
Two key issues underscored much of the grassroots discontent toward 
Thaksin and his government: (1) executive abuse of power, and (2) eco-
nomic redistribution to the poor. The growing lack of effective constraints 
on the executive— particularly on Thaksin— was the most contentious 
issue for the people’s sector. This “policy- based corruption” (Khor rup chan 
cheung nayobai), defined as large- scale corruption committed by those in 
the highest political positions determining national policy, allowed the rul-
ing party elites to abuse power for personal gain. Policy- based corruption 
was rife within Thai Rak Thai because, according to critics, many of the 
TRT cabinet members were elite businessmen who themselves possessed 
monopolies or semimonopolies in their industry (McCargo and Path-
manand 2005). By being at the highest level of government, their busi-
nesses continued to enjoy far greater monopolies due to their very sta-
tus as policymakers. After he came to power, Thaksin’s own businesses in 
telecommunications— Shin Corp, AIS, and Jasmine— posted impressive 
profits.47 Within a few years of Thaksin coming to power, AIS became 
the largest mobile phone provider in Thailand. Thaksin also exercised his 
executive decree power— power reserved for emergency situations only— 
100 Opposing Democracy in the Digital Age
which enabled him to block future competition in the mobile phone ser-
vice industry (Phongpaichit and Baker 2004, 209– 10).
The most explosive example of executive abuse of power, according to 
his critics, was the sale of Shin Corporation to Singapore- based Temasek 
Holdings in 2006— the biggest stock market trade in Thailand’s history. 
The sale outraged such vast numbers of people that it became one of the 
biggest rallying points for the opposition movement; it quite literally drove 
hundreds of thousands to join protests on the streets. The biggest point of 
contention was the fact that the sale was completed exactly two days after 
the passage of a new telecommunications bill that allowed foreign owner-
ship of Thai companies to increase from 25 to 50 percent. More signifi-
cantly, the deal was exempted from capital gains taxes since, prior to the sale, 
Thaksin had opportunely amended the law regarding foreign investment 
in the telecommunications sector. Supinya Klanarong, who led the media 
opposition against the TRT, declared: “Thaksin has prepared for this deal 
for quite some time. This trade is not transparent— no one can actually 
explain the entire process.”48 Thaksin never offered a full explanation for 
the Shin Corporation sale. He merely stated that his son had sold the shares, 
but he was unable to explain why the tax was not paid on the sale.
Thaksin’s successful welfare policies instigated the loss of popular sup-
port and credibility for NGOs.49 Thaksin’s propoor policies were not wel-
TABLE 4.5. Civil society organizations that led major protests (2001– 2005)
2001 Small- Scale Farmers’ Assembly of Isan
2002 Assembly of the Poor, Small- Scale Farmers’ Assembly of Isan, Buddhism 
Protection Centre of Thailand, Network Against the Trans Thai- Malaysia 
Pipeline, Association of Tambon Administrative Organization, Campaign for 
Popular Democracy, Assembly of the Poor (Pak Mun Dam Division)
2003 Network Against the Trans Thai- Malaysia Pipeline, Assembly of the Poor 
(Pak Mun Dam Division), Campaign for Popular Democracy, Muslim 
Organizations of 5 Southern Border Provinces, State Enterprise Workers’ 
Relations Confederation, Southern Network of Land Reform for the Poor, 
Ram Kamhaeng University Student Assembly
2004 State Enterprise Workers’ Relations Confederation, Provincial Electricity 
Authority, Metropolitan Water Authority, EGAT, State Railway Union of 
Thailand, Students of Luangta Mahabua Group, Tak Bai Incident, Network 
Against the Privatization of EGAT, Entertainment Industry Association 
(Bangkok), People’s Alliance for Democracy
2005 State Enterprise Workers’ Relations Confederation, Four Region Slum Network, 
Network of the HIV Positive, Anti- FTA Network, Assembly of the Poor, 
Network Against the Privatization of EGAT, Student Federation of Thailand, 
Network Against Education Transfer, Farmers’ Debt Network, Network of 
Agricultural Non- Governmental Organizations of Thailand, Thailand Weekly 
(Sonthi)
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comed by a large share of the NGO sector because they drove a wedge 
between the people and this sector as a result of state intervention. These 
populist policies were not intended to transform the structure of poverty 
in Thailand, according to NGO critics, but were instead meant to weaken 
the ties between the people and civil society, all the while strengthening the 
state’s power. Opposition NGOs further argued that some of the economic 
redistribution programs made poor people more dependent on the state 
instead of empowering them.50 They allowed the state to not only expand 
its presence and influence in rural Thailand but also reduced the right of 
communities to mobilize in favor of alternative initiatives.51 NGOs were 
forced to compete with the state for allegiance from the lower class on 
similar issues. Never before in such a way had NGOs lost their credibility, 
their support, their leverage vis- à- vis the state, and their standing in politi-
cal space (Winichakul 2010).
There was also a sense of betrayal among some NGO groups about 
how Thaksin manipulated their ideas for his own benefit. Before running 
for election in 2001, Thaksin consulted widely with a number of NGO 
groups, especially with rural NGOs. They felt that Thaksin’s propoor poli-
cies had incorporated many of the ideas of their various groups without 
giving them due credit. As Prapas explained, “Thaksin’s redistribution pol-
icy took its shape gradually, incorporating many elements from civil society 
groups and various societal factors, so that when we looked at the success of 
Thaksin’s populist policies, we had to recognize the success of various com-
munities and villagers for their input” (cited in Prapas Pintobtang 2007, 
145). Yet, following the implementation of the propoor policies, the NGO 
sector had serious doubts about the actual intention of these policies.52 His 
critics were convinced that TRT used these policies as a tool to benefit 
the party electorally, for these policies did not aim to create justice for 
the poor.53 Sulak Sivaraksa, a well- known figure in the nonprofit sector, 
condemned populist policies for turning citizens into “consumers” and in 
the process stripping away their power to be self- reliant (Sivaraksa 2002). 
Likewise, Sansit Chanpoon, leader of the Network of the Chee River Basin 
Community (which was negatively affected by the construction of a dam in 
Roi- Et Province), claimed that Thaksin did not understand the problems 
of the poor: “Thaksin came to Roi- Et to show that he was serious about 
solving our problem. . . . he began giving away free buffaloes, cows, land, 
cheap housing, etc., but he did not see the root cause of the poverty: the 
dam. The dam construction has caused flooding for five years now and we 
all got considerably poorer.”54 NGOs feared that economic redistribution 
policies hurt the prospects for human development because they did not 
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empower the people.55 Thaksin, in the eyes of many NGOs, lacked the 
right incentives to help the poor. “I agree with some of Thaksin’s policies,” 
claimed Bamrung Kayotha, a well- known activist. “But he doesn’t have the 
right principles to guide him. For example, the Village Fund, instead of 
decentralizing power to the local level, he just threw a pile of money at the 
villagers. That’s not community development through empowerment of 
the people. That’s throwing money at a problem.”56 There was deep resent-
ment and skepticism among the propoor NGO leaders that Thaksin lacked 
the experience, foresight, and patience to deal with complicated issues such 
as poverty.
The Thaksin government’s tough stance and hostile attitude toward 
some of the civil society organizations further created a rift between the 
people’s sector and the government, which bred distrust and hostility. 
Toward the end of 2002, Thaksin displayed obvious frustration with the 
lingering demonstrations of the Assembly of the Poor, Small- Scale Farm-
ers’ Assembly, and Pak Mun Dam activists, and he sought to discredit the 
public credibility of NGOs. He accused NGOs of “taking money from 
foreigners” and “inciting violence.”57 Thaksin told the Pak Mun Dam 
communities: “I want to consult with the people who experience prob-
lems directly. I don’t want to discuss with NGOs, which act like their advi-
sors.  .  .  . NGOs are like salesmen  .  .  . they make commissions off poor 
people.”58 Even some of Thaksin’s own supporters recognized his flaws in 
dealing with the people’s sector. Sombat Boon- Ngam Anong, founder of 
the Red Sunday Group, admitted:
I don’t particularly like Thaksin and have been critical of him in 
the past— he’s too dictatorial. Thai Rak Thai’s version of democ-
racy lacks participation. It’s what I call “wholesale democracy.” He 
[Thaksin] won’t let the people suggest ways to solve problems. You 
tell him you have a problem in something. He tells you, no problem, 
I’ll take care of it. He won’t let others help him think through prob-
lems. No feedback mechanism. And if anyone disagrees with him, he 
gets very defensive. He does not understand why public intellectuals 
exist. He closes up space for independent thinking. He works too 
fast, if you try to intervene, he gets really upset. This tends to create 
enemies.59
A group of eight NGO leaders felt that they were unnecessarily 
“harassed” by the government because they were under investigation by 
the Anti- Money Laundering Office without justifiable cause. Banjong 
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Nasae, a well- known activist in fishermen’s rights from the south and 
among those investigated, complained that this was a tactic of intimida-
tion utilized by the government. Further, the fact that the Anti- Money 
Laundering Office agreed to undertake the investigation without giving 
any reason for it meant that supposedly “independent” bodies were being 
used as a tool by the government. The cabinet motion on April 23, 2002, 
which gave state authorities more power to deal with claims made by citi-
zens, prompted more than 1,000 protesters from more than 300 NGOs to 
take to the streets. They saw the new motion as yet another extension of 
state power abuse, as Senator Nirand Pitakwatchara explained: “What the 
government is doing is worrisome and is destroying opportunities to solve 
poverty and violence in those communities. What the NGOs proposed to 
the prime minister were actual facts from the ground, which reflected the 
poverty and inability to secure resources on the ground. . . . Such [a cabi-
net] motion only exacerbated this problem.”60
For a country that, in the past, used to pride itself for having one of 
the freest presses in Southeast Asia, the TRT government had, for some, 
significantly shrunk the space for independent thinking. Toward the end 
of Thaksin’s first term opposition had begun to grow, particularly from 
media activists in the people’s sector. Other news outlets were under 
pressure to produce positive news for the government. The first sign of 
Thaksin’s open war with opposition media occurred when the National 
Anti- Corruption Commission abruptly began investigating members of 
the executive board of the independent Nation Multi- media Group, Thai 
Post newspapers, and Naewna newspapers— all of which were openly criti-
cal of the Thaksin government.61 The government claimed that “someone 
TABLE 4.6. Selected PAD networks by sector
Sector Organizations
Media Manager Media Group, the Nation, Thai Post, Naewna
Nationalists Network for the Protection of Electricity and Water for the Citizens, 
Alliance of Teachers for Saving the Nation 4 Regions, Saving the Nation 
Club
Labor State Enterprise Workers’ Relations Confederation, Provincial Electricity 
Authority, Thai Airways, TOT
NGO Student Federation of Thailand, Four Region Slum Network, Network 
for Senior Doctors, Center for the Protection and Restoration of Local 
Community Rights, Network of HIV Positive in Northern Region
Farmers Federation of Farmers in Northern Region, Assembly of the Poor, Farmers’ 
Group
Royalists The Royalty (Ratchanikul), Club for Truth and Transparency, the Noble 
Women Group, the Sakdina
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asked us to look into their financial accounts” but gave no justifiable cause 
for this investigation.62 Then Assumption University (ABAC) poll was 
threatened, and attempts were made to rid UBC cable TV Channel 8 of 
political news. Other media outlets began to worry that their own financial 
accounts would be investigated by the National Anti- Corruption Commis-
sion without cause. By early 2003, the Thai Journalists’ Association made a 
public statement condemning the government for its crackdown on media 
independence through the abuse of state power, personal wealth and con-
nections, and intimidation.63 Between 2004 and 2005, Reporters Without 
Borders registered a dramatic spike in the degree of press repression— a 
trend that continued into the postcoup period. By early 2006, many media 
NGOs, such as the Thai Journalists’ Association, had joined forces with 
the PAD in protest of the Thaksin government’s growing encroachment 
on media freedom.
The most dramatic, and arguably the worst, move made by Thaksin in 
his attempt to suppress opposition voices was the cancellation of a popu-
lar talk show, Thailand Weekly. Sonthi Limthongkul, owner of the mul-
timedia Manager Media Group and a one- time supporter of the TRT, 
began to expose the TRT government through his talk show that was 
broadcast on state TV Channel 9 in late 2005. As the show’s popular-
ity surged,64 the government ordered a reduction in Thailand Weekly’s 
airtime from five days to one day per week. By Sonthi’s own account, 
the trigger for his campaign to oust Thaksin came when his show was 
abruptly canceled altogether.65 Instead of silencing Sonthi, dropping his 
show prompted the rapid rise of what became known as the “Sonthi phe-
nomenon.” He and his Manager Media crew began to broadcast Thailand 
Weekly Mobile, first at a public university, then at parks until eventually 
hundreds of thousands were turning out and tuning in to listen to what 
Sonthi had to say.66 His ability to draw large crowds at rallies and many 
more on TV and radio via a diversity of (his own) media channels made 
him a strong candidate for leadership of the PAD. As such, when the PAD 
was born, leaders of many other opposition groups all agreed that Sonthi 
would be the top leader.67 Moreover, Sonthi was able to raise substantial 
funding for the PAD cause. Chamlong Srimuang, one of the PAD’s key 
leaders, first made an announcement asking for donations on September 
1, 2006; within two weeks, opposition- run ASTV had received more than 
15 million baht.68 It was especially important for an opposition move-
ment to have its own media outlet to create and expand its membership 
base, as well as avoid any government censorship. “Sonthi is the most 
important leader of the PAD top ranks,” admitted Suriyasai Katasila, a 
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member of the PAD secretariat. “He owns the media and he gets to frame 
the movement the way he sees fit . . . and he has the funds.”69
One of the largest and earliest oppositions to Thaksin and his govern-
ment similarly came from state enterprise workers. Under the leadership 
of Somsak Kosaisuk, chairman of the State Enterprise Workers’ Relations 
Confederation and later one of the top five PAD leaders, antigovernment 
protest had been gathering force since 2002. He was able to prompt tens 
of thousands of supporters to turn up to protests— many of whom were 
workers themselves. The single most important issue for the labor side of 
the opposition was TRT’s plan for state enterprise privatization. Somsak 
was head of the Electricity Generating Authority Thailand (EGAT) work-
ers union and had long fought against any plan to privatize it. Somsak was 
such a prominent labor leader that he was one of the movers and shakers of 
the economic restructuring plans following the Asian Financial Crisis. He 
outlined, together with other activists, a list of state enterprises that could 
never be privatized, including the EGAT. In 2003, Thaksin himself vowed 
that no privatization would be allowed under the new restructuring leg-
islation put forth by the TRT. Yet Thaksin backflipped, and in seeking to 
privatize EGAT, enacted the exact opposite of those promises. This move 
prompted some of the largest protests against Thaksin in the precoup era. 
On several occasions, EGAT threatened to cut off electricity should the 
government continue with its privatization plan. Other state enterprise 
unions followed suit. Between 2002 and 2006, unions such as the Provin-
cial Electricity Authority, the Metropolitan Water Authority, and the State 
Railway Union of Thailand joined in the antigovernment protests.
Beginning in 2005, teachers spanning the whole country also staged a 
number of mass rallies against the government’s plan to transfer control of 
state schools to local authorities. Teachers argued that the government did 
not understand the problems that teachers faced; they were concerned that 
their profession would fall prey to corrupt local politics once it was trans-
ferred to local authorities.70 Thanarat Samok- nae, leader of the Network 
against School Transfer to Local Administration, discussed the reason for 
joining the PAD:
The cabinet motion to transfer the school system claimed it was 
based on approval and agreement on behalf of teachers. We cannot 
accept this.  .  .  . Imagine transferring the entire education system 
into the hands of local elected officials; we would lose integrity and 
quality and we do not feel certain it’d be good for our nation. The 
education system is the foundation of our country’s stability. . . . The 
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government must stop this. They can take any other infrastructure 
but not the education system. They need to leave the system to 
[those of] us who are teachers and know what is best.71
The nationwide mass teacher protests, totaling at one point some 
150,000 individuals in the street, greatly strengthened the opposition 
movement to the Thaksin government. The teachers’ union protests gen-
erally helped also to draw more supporters to the PAD due to their effec-
tive protest campaigns. These involved protesters spilling their blood to 
demonstrate contempt, boycotting AIS phones, and the threat of a nation-
wide teachers’ strike. Again, leaders of the “teachers against the school 
transfer” were able to frame the issue as one of a threat to national security 
and to the fabric of the nation. This carried a powerful message to the 
conservative- minded, who represented the bulk of PAD supporters. The 
ability of teacher leaders to build a network across seventy- six provinces 
also meant that they were able to stage protests in numerous provinces 
across the country— further heightening the stakes between the govern-
ment and the opposition forces.
Two Buddhist organizations emerged as the backbone of the PAD 
movement from the very onset. These were Santi Asoke and Luang Ta 
Mahabua Group. Members of Santi Asoke, or Asoke Group, were devout 
followers of Bodhiraksa (the organization’s founder, who lived a very mod-
est lifestyle), were vegetarians,72 consumed organic products, and ate once 
a day. Santi Asoke had always been political. Bodhiraksa and his follow-
ers began engaging in national- level politics with the establishment of the 
Palang Tham party, led by Santi Asoke’s very own Chamlong. Initially, the 
party was filled with Santi Asoke members but they were slowly replaced 
by career politicians, including Thaksin in the mid- ’90s. Santi Asoke estab-
lished Dharma Forces (Kongthap Tham), a political unit of Santi Asoke to 
support its political aspirations and to largely organize political activities, 
such as demonstrations and petitions. Dharma Forces were crucial to the 
success of the PAD movement. It began opposing the Thaksin govern-
ment openly in 2005 when it protested against Thaksin’s policy of allowing 
some of Thailand’s largest liquor producers to be listed on the Thai Stock 
Exchange. “In fact,” revealed Sam Din, a key leader of Dharma Forces, “we 
began opposing Thaksin towards the end of his first term, be it his politics, 
his policies, and now this alcohol issue and cronyism. . . . we feel betrayed 
because we have known him to be supportive of Chamlong as he began 
his political career with Palang Dharma Party (headed by Chamlong). . . . 
Chamlong used to give him advice all the time when he first took office. 
We had no choice but to act.”73 As soon as Chamlong decided to escalate 
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his opposition to Thaksin he brought Dharma Forces in to join the PAD, 
while he himself became one of the PAD’s top five leaders.
Santi Asoke’s Dharma Forces was indispensable to the PAD movement 
for two reasons. First, it brought some of the most organized, highly disci-
plined manpower to the movement. Asoke members were those who had 
given their lives to Santi Asoke, had given up everything as laymen, and 
strictly followed the lifestyle prescribed by Bodhiraksa. As such, when their 
leader, Chamlong, gave orders, they followed these strictly. Yolsiri Dam-
chua, a long- time Asoke member and active member of the Dharma Forces, 
revealed: “Santi Asoke group is the main ‘servant’ of the PAD movement. 
During protests, we had a meeting every day at 7 a.m., we take care of the 
orderliness and cleanliness of the protest sites, we provided food, water and 
sanitation; we provided security; donations— you name it. We made it pos-
sible for other PAD members to be able to stay at rally sites.”74 Their highly 
disciplined nature and unwavering loyalty to Bodhiraksa and Chamlong 
made them powerful organizers of the PAD movement. Dharma Forces 
also had a permanent force. This meant that if their leaders decided to join 
a protest or mobilize against something, there was no shortage of support-
ers from Santi Asoke. Unlike other civil society groups, whose members 
waxed and waned over the protest period, Dharma Forces always supplied 
a steady number of people whom the PAD could rely on. Second, Santi 
Asoke made the PAD movement “more holy” or more allied to Buddhism. 
This religious spin on the PAD was crucial to the framing of their cam-
paigns. One of the tenets of the PAD ideology was its belief in dharma, 
dharmic democracy, and righteousness. The preaching of Bodhiraksa and 
Chamlong on these issues not only provided common ground between 
other PAD members and Dharma Forces, it significantly helped to rein-
force and consolidate the opposition movement and its message.
Luang Ta Mahabua was another important group inside the PAD, most 
crucial to the initial efforts to mobilize forces to oppose Thaksin. In the 
precoup stage, Sonthi Limthongkul had a close relationship with Luang 
Ta, so there was a deeper connection with the ASTV forces. However, 
Luang Ta was fiercely against Thaksin’s plan to list alcohol beverage com-
panies on the stock exchange. Luang Ta and Thaksin had some degree of 
personal relationship and Luang Ta admitted to using his followers to help 
Thaksin in the lead- up to his first election victory. Luang Ta had thousands 
of devout followers, many of whom turned out to protest against Thak-
sin, under the name of the “Luang Ta Mahabua Students Association.” 
They therefore provided a reliable source of supporters to the overall PAD 
movement and further solidified Buddhism as one of the key aspects of the 
PAD’s opposition to Thaksin.
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A number of academics, public intellectuals, and students began to 
adhere to the mobilization movement. The Student Federation of Thai-
land reached an agreement to join forces to “save the nation” on February 
4, 2006. Katchawan Chaiyabut, the Student Federation’s secretary, went on 
stage to proclaim its stance and call for the prime minister’s resignation. 
The Ramkamhaeng University Student Assembly also joined the move-
ment soon after. The other student bodies from Thammasat, Chulalong-
korn, and elsewhere joined forces. Many of the student groups felt that 
Thaksin had abused loopholes in the Constitution, abused the law, and 
used his overwhelming majority in parliament for his own and his cro-
nies’ benefit. This was policy- based corruption. They called for yet another 
major political reform— one that would lead to real and tangible reforms. 
Academics from Chulalongkorn University, the National Institute of 
Development Administration, and the like began to submit petitions or 
write open letters in support of other academics’ opposition to the Thak-
sin government. These academics proclaimed that there were a number of 
serious violations committed by Thaksin.75
The royalists were a small but powerful and influential section of the 
PAD movement.76 There were two key types of royalists. The first type 
included individuals and groups who had royal lineage. They were drawn 
to the PAD mainly because they were convinced that Thaksin presented a 
real threat to the Thai monarchy, their heritage. Groups like the “Royalty” 
(Ratchanikul), the “High Society Group,” and the “Noble Women Group” 
formed to defend the monarchy and to support Sonthi’s opposition to 
Thaksin. Many of these royalists were high- ranking bureaucrats and, sig-
nificantly, many of them already despised the many bureaucratic reforms 
TRT had undertaken. Another group of royalist supporters included pro-
monarchy, conservative groups and individuals. Some of these people had 
worked on various royal projects and had been their long- time support-
ers. They believed in the king’s philosophy and joined the PAD to defend 
the monarchy. The Club for Truth and Transparency, for instance, was a 
group of promonarchy individuals who believed that Thaksin had plans to 
subvert the monarchical system and turn Thailand into a republic. These 
royalist groups would come to define the PAD movement.
Opposition Alliance Formation
Anti- Thaksin opposition groups, which had separately protested against 
the government, eventually formed a collective alliance in early 2006 in 
an attempt to drive out Thaksin once and for all. The People’s Alliance for 
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Democracy was an anti- Thaksin movement77 that brought together a broad 
range of groups whose interests had been adversely affected by the Thaksin 
regime. Despite the diversity of the groups that allied themselves under the 
rubric of PAD, the nature of PAD’s core was exemplified in their five top lead-
ers: (1) Sonthi Limthongkul represented the fight against Thaksin’s crack-
down on the media; (2) Chamlong Srimuang symbolized the fight against 
Thaksin’s money politics; (3) Pipob Thongchai exemplified an opposition 
to Thaksin’s political reforms; (4) Somkiat Pongpaibul represented a force 
against Thaksin’s reform of the bureaucracy; and (5) Somsak Kosaisuk exem-
plified forces against Thaksin’s plan to privatize state enterprises (Songthai 
2008, 99). Indeed, the precoup PAD anti- Thaksin rallies were largely sup-
ported by networks of NGOs, state enterprises, and trade/labor unions. 
Somsak, for instance, was the leader of the State Enterprise Workers’ Rela-
tions Confederation, which represented over 200,000 workers. Similarly, 
Pipob was a highly respected NGO leader and head of the Campaign for 
Popular Democracy, which drew support from a large nationwide network 
of NGOs. Drawing on the networks of the core leaders themselves and other 
non- NGO anti- Thaksin groups, such as the 40 Senators Group, university 
academics, Luang Ta Mahabua Students, high- ranking civil servants, stu-
dents, and opposition parties,78 the PAD came together to form an alliance 
in February 2006— just months before the September coup.
The PAD self- identified as a “largely middle- class urbanized” move-
ment.79 Chaiwat Sinsuwong, one of the PAD’s top leaders and former 
Palang Tham MP, concurred: “The majority of PAD supporters are middle 
class, although we have some lower- class folks too. Many had followed 
Sonthi’s TV show ‘Thailand Weekly’ and joined the protests of their own 
accord. But people who attended rallies often had money.”80 The urban 
middle class from all across the country constituted the bulk of the PAD 
movement support base. They were drawn to the anti- Thaksin movement 
largely on account of their political and ideological dispositions. The PAD 
supporters believed in the monarchy as the utmost important institution in 
Thailand. Their reverence toward King Bhumibol, affinity with and emo-
tional attachment to the monarchical institution, helped to propel their 
opposition to Thaksin (Bowie 1997, 82). But it was also for a practical 
reason: manipulating the issue of the monarchy was an effective tool for 
mobilization. A PAD leader revealed: “We [PAD leaders] use the monar-
chy for forming an alliance.  .  .  . A broad- based movement like the PAD 
needs a common ground. . . . We know the monarchy doesn’t really like us 
because we troubled the king. But we need to mobilize people, to draw in 
the masses. So, we had to do it [use the monarchy].”81
Because the government restricted the number of access points to chan-
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nel demands from the public, opposition and resistance built up among 
the many affected groups. In need of outlets to express their demands 
and opinions, these groups held separate rallies before ultimately coming 
together in an alliance against the Thaksin government.
The PAD comprised two levels of networks: (1) the most active and 
committed supporters, some with a vertical relationship to the leadership; 
and (2) transient supporters, with a horizontal relationships to the lead-
ership. While all the opposition groups formed networks and relation-
ships with one another under the umbrella of the PAD, differences were 
apparent in the type of relations and the degrees of separation from the 
PAD’s core leadership. Moreover, over the course of the PAD’s three- stage 
mobilization, the structure of the PAD network was far from static. Indeed, 
while over time some of the groups remained as core supporters, others 
left, while still others rejoined. The dynamic nature of the PAD structure 
had serious consequences for the size of its membership, which waxed and 
waned over time.
The core leadership of the PAD was divided into three parts. The first 
we can identify as the first generation leadership, which was composed of 
five leaders drawn from a variety of groups. Sonthi Limthongkul repre-
sented the ASTV/Manager Media portion of the PAD, which was among 
the largest. The membership of the ASTV was particularly useful to mobi-
lize thousands of protesters at every major rally. In fact, more of Sonthi’s 
followers subscribed to ASTV or were regular consumers of Manager 
Media. The second group was under the de facto leadership of Chamlong 
Srimuang, which, apart from drawing the devout Santi Asoke members and 
numbering into the thousands as well, also elicited support from those who 
liked Chamlong. Chamlong was an extremely popular Bangkok governor 
in the 1990s and among the top leaders of the Black May uprising. Somkiat 
Figure 4.3. The PAD leadership structure
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Pongpaibul and Pipob Thongchai were representatives of the NGO sec-
tor. While numerous in terms of the number of organizations that joined 
the PAD, in absolute terms the number of supporters that these NGOs 
brought into the movement was not large. For instance, the Network of 
30 Organizations against Corruption had thirty members, each with its 
own membership, but they may have collectively sent just one or two of 
the Network’s representatives to a PAD protest rally at any particular time. 
The overall support of NGOs inside the PAD was thus less visible from 
the perspective of rally attendance. The same was true of the labor unions, 
under the leadership of Somsak Kosaisuk. Somsak was a chairman of the 
State Enterprise Workers’ Relations Confederation, an umbrella interest 
group that represents state enterprise workers. He was asked to join the 
leadership of the rank and file because of the labor portion of the PAD 
movement that he represented; but the number of workers that actually 
attended PAD rallies was not a true representation of their overall sup-
port. Again, few leaders of the labor groups were sent to attend, while the 
remainder (and majority) stayed behind due to their inability to miss work 
to join the long rallies.
The first generation of leaders made major decisions with regard to the 
movement (figure 4.3). The structure of the PAD was centralized in this 
respect— albeit with five leaders, not one. They met regularly and voted 
on issues such as rallies, protest strategy, legal actions, or the position to 
adopt toward the opposition and government. The name, the People’s Alli-
ance for Democracy, was adopted following Suriyasai’s suggestion (Katasila 
2007). Based on fieldwork interviews, these leaders divulged that the deci-
sion to take action did not take the strict form of unanimity or a majority 
vote. Rather, all leaders tried to find grounds that would be acceptable to 
all. Often prior to each major rally or major action taken by the PAD, the 
leaders issued a press release via Manager Media outlets. The leadership 
was not set apart from its members: it spent significant amounts of time 
with the PAD members, particularly during rallies. During quiet times, 
these leaders appeared frequently on PAD media outlets, be it on ASTV or 
other non- ASTV media, and writing in Manager Media’s various publica-
tions. During rallies, they spent much of their time with fellow protest-
ers, speaking on stage, and making the rounds of mingling with the PAD 
members.
Of note was the fact that all of the PAD first generation leaders had 
significant experience in mass mobilization and in organizing protest 
activities. Those representing NGOs and the labor section of the PAD, 
in particular, had a number of decades- long experience in “street politics.” 
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They had the know- how to organize protests, and this particularly came 
in handy when conducting protest strategies. They deeply understood 
the logistics of protest activities, knowing what worked and what might 
not. Prior to the PAD’s official establishment, each of the core leaders had 
in fact mounted their own protest against the Thaksin government. For 
instance, Sonthi’s Thailand Weekly Mobile drew thousands of supporters to 
his weekly shows. Somsak himself had staged numerous protests against 
the privatization of state enterprises between 2003 and 2005. The PAD 
movement, in some respects, was the conglomeration of multiple opposi-
tion movements against Thaksin into one major, unified movement.
The second part of the core PAD leadership was composed of the PAD 
coordinators. They had responsibility for the day- to- day running of the 
PAD movement. The coordinators also formed the link between the core 
leaders and other groups inside the PAD. Suriyasai Katasila, Chachawal 
Chartsuthichai, Panthep Pongpuapan, and Prapan Koonmee, for example, 
were key coordinators of the PAD. They often partook in the decision- 
making process along with the first generation of leaders, particularly on 
the question of press releases and media relations.
Another important part of the PAD structure was the movement’s secu-
rity apparatus. This was composed of three major elements: (1) PAD Vol-
unteer Guards; (2) Dharma Forces; and (3) Srivichai Warriors. The PAD 
Volunteer Guards (PVG) were recruited largely from protest attendants, 
but also from state enterprises and NGOs that represented the core of 
the PAD movement. Kittichai Saisa- ad was the main leader of the PVG. 
The EGAT, the Waterworks Authority, and the like sent in their people as 
volunteers. According to guards, the PVG went through rigorous recruit-
ment processes. There was a Center for Public Safety inside PAD that did 
background checks and required trial periods for all guards. Addition-
ally, because there were instances of ill- intentioned persons impersonat-
ing as PAD guards, every few weeks they would change the badge for the 
guards: guards without the appropriate badge would not be given access 
to the PVG. The most organized security apparatus for the PAD was dur-
ing the third stage of mobilization— the 158- day rally— in which Cham-
long insisted on using the Dharma Forces only. In addition, the recruit-
ment of Srivichai Warriors was under the leadership of Damrong Yotarak, 
a southerner in charge of a PAD subgroup, Pak Panang PAD. Damrong 
recruited men from other PAD subgroups in Thailand’s south to form the 
Srivichai Warriors. The hijacking of a train headed to Bangkok from the 
south resulted in the group making a name for itself; they subsequently 
became front- liners for various occupation activities such as the Suvanab-
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humi Airport (Thailand’s largest, and a significant regional aviation hub), 
Government House, and various other major arteries in the capital. They 
also acted as guards for the five core leaders of PAD.
The second generation of the PAD leadership was composed of 
second- in- command leaders. Officially there were only three leaders: 
Sirichai Mai- ngam, Sawit Kaewwan, and Samran Rodpetch. There were 
also five additional spokespersons for the PAD: Prapan Koonmee, Sarocha 
Pornudomsak, Anchalee Paireerak, Kamolporn Worakul, and Saranyoo 
Wongkrajang. These individuals were either all close associates of the First 
Generation leaders or heads of powerful PAD allies. Unofficially, there 
were many more Second Generation PAD leaders who frequented the 
PAD stage and ASTV and were respected as the “elders” of the PAD, but 
they did not assume the official title of Second Generation leaders. They 
provided leadership support to the First Generation leaders and at times 
helped make major decisions related to the overall direction of the move-
ment. Some of these Second Generation leaders were the right- hand men 
of their First Generation counterparts, so their relationship predated the 
PAD movement. Trust is a major issue, particularly when it comes to being 
responsible for mass protests.
Conclusion
This chapter examines the Thaksin regime and the emergence of the Peo-
ple’s Alliance for Democracy as an antidemocratic movement. It illustrates 
the development of the PAD formation, which went through stages of 
opposition mobilization. This chapter addresses the first two stages: for-
mal and informal institutional blockage, and opposition alliance forma-
tion. The first stage took place in the 1990s, a proreform phase, when a 
number of key figures (who would later become PAD leaders) engaged in 
the reform process. Following the government of Thaksin and his Thai 
Rak Thai party, opposition groups began to form to oppose a number of 
TRT policies as well as Thaksin himself. This stage of opposition politics 
is considered as an anti- incumbent mobilization when opposition forces 
sought to pressure Thaksin to resign. Then, the last stage of opposition 
movement occurs— antidemocratic mobilization— when all other strate-
gies have failed.
An examination of the Thaksin government also reveals a number of 
key issues that drove both the actual and perceived institutional blockages. 
At one level, the strength of the Thaksin government served to marginal-
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ize the voices of the opposition. At another level, however, the actions and 
behavior of Thaksin and his government created the perception of exclu-
sion among the opposition. Over the six years of Thaksin’s dominance, 
numerous triggering events occurred to fuel the opposition discourse for 
anti- incumbent dissent. What constituted the PAD opposition to Thaksin, 
I argue, is based on both substantive and constructed discourse. In other 
words, while Thaksin and his party sought to block a number of insti-
tutional channels for dissenting voices, the opposition also intentionally 
constructed this discourse to further its own case for opposition. Embed-
ded within the early anti- Thaksin discourses were conservative, royalist, 
nationalist, and antidemocratic elements that eventually evolved to form 
the identity of the PAD movement. At the heart of the PAD’s characteris-
tics lies its different conception of democracy.
Beyond class structure, what defined this conflict and what accounted 
for why the PAD was, broadly speaking, a “conservative- royalist move-
ment” was the PAD’s vision of the nature of the state and its relation to 
society. This was clearly a political and ideological conflict. The PAD saw 
the Thai state as being composed of what Thais understand to be the tra-
ditional sources of power: the monarchy, the military, and the bureaucracy. 
The military and the bureaucracy have the duty to protect and safeguard 
the monarchical institution. All three units work to uphold the system of 
“constitutional monarchy” whereby the monarchy continues to be the ulti-
mate source of moral authority and righteousness. The democratic institu-
tions, such as the lower (House of Representatives) and upper (the Senate) 
chambers of parliament, ought to accept such a hierarchy and work hand 
in hand to preserve this constitutional monarchy. Electoral democracy is 
an important aspect of the polity, but it is deeply flawed due to ongoing 
corruption and money politics. As such, reforming the polity to halt the 
progression of this very corrupt form of “democratic” politics is necessary 
for Thailand to move forward. The middle class must become enlightened 
in order to educate others about what is right or wrong so that once the 
majority of the populace understands this, then they will choose good lead-




This chapter outlines the process of antidemocratization of the PAD 
movement and the eventual overthrow of the Thaksin government. The 
PAD started out as a movement seeking more accountability, particu-
larly from the executive, yet ended up supporting a military coup. How 
did this happen? I argue here that the institutional blockages facing the 
PAD, both in the formal and informal democratic institutions, forced the 
movement to turn toward nondemocratic institutions. The antidemocratic 
turn happened gradually and was a strategic decision made by the move-
ment’s leadership, which became increasingly influenced by royalist and 
Buddhist groups, whose moral ideologies and authoritarian tendencies 
lent support to antidemocratic strategies to remove Thaksin. Becoming 
an antidemocratic movement was a means to an end, but it also reflected 
latent undemocratic tendencies among the leadership and support base of 
the movement. When opposition actors and groups felt they were shut 
out of accessing power now and in the foreseeable future, they appealed 
to nondemocratic alternative sources of power to reverse or, at a mini-
mum, halt this process of institutional blockage. In essence, the strategic 
interactions between the opposition forces and Thaksin mattered to the 
former’s perception of “blockage.” Thaksin took a number of steps during 
the critical moments in the lead- up to the 2006 coup to not only cement 
the opposition’s perception of permanent exclusion from access to power 
but he also underscored on multiple occasions the government’s lack of 
credible commitment. These two key conditions helped to further drive 
the PAD movement to mobilize around nondemocratic sources of power 
to help break the political deadlock.
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The next section outlines the anatomy of the 2006 military coup d’état. 
I advance a claim here that the coup was not a purely elitist overthrow of an 
elected government. Rather, the alliance between the People’s Alliance for 
Democracy and other groups opposed to the Thaksin regime was crucial 
to the success of the 2006 coup. The PAD afforded the basis for legitimacy 
to the coup by signaling strong mass support for military intervention that 
would overthrow the government. To illustrate the importance of popu-
lar support for extraconstitutional interventions, I provide empirical evi-
dence such as public opinion polls and an analysis of the PAD discourse to 
demonstrate popular backing for the coup. Nondemocratic actors moved 
against Thaksin on the condition of “sufficient popular support.” To sub-
stantiate this claim that the 2006 coup hinged upon the perceived popular 
support of the military, I later examine the absence of another military 
intervention at the end of 2008, following the world’s longest street dem-
onstration. Popular support for the movement was dwindling, while public 
opinion in favor of another coup d’état had become progressively negative. 
The military leaders likewise admitted to “making a mistake” in relation 
to their 2006 coup. All of this suggests that an elite- centric explanation, 
which centers on the internal power struggles of elites alone, is insuffi-
cient to explain the democratic collapse of 2006. The last section offers a 
detailed examination of the discourse and ideology of the PAD movement. 
Understanding the PAD’s disposition toward antidemocratic attitudes tells 
us much about how its members previous experiences of democracy had 
adversely affected them.
Antidemocratization
The PAD movement began to transform itself from an anti- incumbent 
movement into an antidemocratic one following a series of political dead-
locks that occurred in early 2006. Up until early 2006, the PAD remained 
at the stage of antigovernment mobilization, but as its demands contin-
ued to go unmet and its voices continued to be ignored by the political 
leadership, the movement needed to find a way to “amp up their game.” 
The perception of “permanent exclusion” and “desperation” was a result 
of strategic calculations as well as outcomes from a series of failed nego-
tiations with Thaksin. When the opposition did not get what it wanted, 
or Thaksin refused to negotiate, that perception of desperation esca-
lated. The shift toward becoming an antidemocratic movement was also 
an inward- looking strategic move to save the movement or risk losing 
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momentum and support. For the PAD, being an antidemocratic move-
ment was unplanned— something that would not ring true for its succes-
sor movement, the PDRC. But it was the first major decision made for 
this once prodemocracy movement— one that succeeded. Significantly, 
its success set a precedent for what would later become the PDRC. This 
section will also illustrate that the nondemocratic norms and beliefs, 
which had been residual to the movement during its anti- incumbent 
stage, would subsequently take center stage.
To elaborate, the process of antidemocratization occurs in two parallel 
steps. On the one hand, the strategic interactions between the opposition 
and Thaksin eventually convinced the former that (a) their other strategies 
have failed; (b) their future is foreshortened; and (c) they are likely to be 
excluded from access to power. This perception of “permanent exclusion” 
and “desperation” is a result of strategic calculations as well as outcomes 
from a series of interactions with Thaksin. When the opposition does not 
get what it wants, the feeling of desperation escalates. Note that because 
the later stage of the movement’s antidemocratization is largely driven by 
emotions and perception, perceptions of actions by the opposition matter 
as much as the actions themselves.
Three things constitute an “antidemocratic” mobilization: (1) appeal-
ing to nondemocratic sources of power; (2) supporting extraconstitutional 
interventions to dislodge a democratically elected government; and (3) 
demanding an end to elections. The precoup period of PAD mobilization 
was marked in large part by its appeal to powerful nondemocratic insti-
tutions. Its demand to overthrow the democratic system occurred in the 
later stage of the movement’s mobilization (postcoup) as the PAD’s iden-
tity evolved; specifically, when it became the People’s Democratic Reform 
Committee. While the PAD reached out to nondemocratic institutions, 
namely the military and the monarchy, the latter’s responses and reactions 
to the PAD’s appeals served to directly and indirectly empower the opposi-
tion movement. The military’s conflict with the Thaksin government, in 
particular, provided hope to the PAD movement that an intervention from 
the “men in uniform” could break this political deadlock.
By early 2016, a political deadlock between the Thaksin government 
and the PAD protesters emerged. From the antigovernment side, demands 
for Thaksin to step down after months of long drawn- out and escalating 
protests went unheeded. Thaksin and his supporters felt that Thaksin has 
no reason to resign: he had just won the country’s biggest electoral victory 
in history in early 2005. With such a mandate, Thaksin felt he did not need 
to compromise with the opposition. The opposition felt they needed to 
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find other strategies to break the deadlock and mobilize more support for 
Thaksin’s resignation. This was when the PAD leaders began to contem-
plate taking an antidemocratic turn. Becoming antidemocratic was a con-
tentious decision even among the top five leaders of the PAD movement, 
with NGO leaders being the most opposed to the strategy. The power 
dissymmetry among the movement’s leaders became evident. With media 
mogul Sonthi Limthongkul and Buddhist sect leader Chamlong Srimuang 
the more powerful of its leaders, the PAD made demands for extraconstitu-
tional interventions from the monarchy and then the military— this paved 
the way for a coup d’état in September 2006.
The PAD leaders began to appeal for royal interventions as a strategy 
to bolster momentum and mobilize additional public support. The PAD 
leaders exposed what they strongly believed was Thaksin’s plan to sub-
vert the monarchy and transform Thailand into a republic. This was called 
the “Finland Plan.” PAD leaders argued that Thaksin’s strategy was to (1) 
create a one- party system; (2) weaken the bureaucratic system so that it 
would serve the politicians unconditionally; (3) privatize state property; (4) 
ensure that the monarchy was merely a national symbol; and (5) turn the 
party system into a cadre party under the guise of a mass party.1 “Thaksin 
had succeeded in overtaking the Thai economy and political arenas with 
his money and capitalist ways, now he would take on the most important 
institution in Thailand— the monarchy,” PAD leader Sonthi Limthongkul 
claimed.2 A Bangkok senator went on a PAD stage and claimed to con-
firm the existence of the Finland Plan. This drew thousands of supporters 
to the PAD rallies to drive away Thaksin.3 Some of the PAD supporters 
were outraged that Thaksin was allegedly both disloyal and disrespectful 
to the king. They launched a powerful campaign called “Save the Nation” 
to illustrate that in overthrowing this man they would be both doing the 
nation a favor and saving the monarchy. A coup would indeed be the only 
way to save democracy in order to rebuild a new one, which would uphold 
the ideals of “constitutional monarchy” (Nakornthap 2011, 10).
One of the most powerful appeals to the monarchy was the call for a roy-
ally appointed prime minister. Royal decree, in particular, the right for the 
king to appoint a leader set forth by Article 7 of the 1997 Constitution, was 
among the most widely discussed, and admittedly controversial, issues within 
the NGO community. Sonthi Limthongkul, through his televised talk show, 
Thailand Weekly, which mobilized opposition to Thaksin and Thai Rak Thai 
government, was responsible for the construction of this discourse. In late 
2005, Sonthi had his audience (over 10,000 people) take an oath:
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Your Majesty, from the situation in Thailand right now it is evident 
that a crisis is looming . . . the kind of crisis that cannot be solved 
within the existing political system. The issue of a royal decree has 
been discussed so widely— something so unprecedented. This is no 
accident. Whenever the country has a political leader who has no 
morality, that’s when the people look to you, your Majesty. . . . the 
union between the king and his people, which has historically been 
our principal rule of law of constitutional monarchy is being chal-
lenged by the new capitalist monopoly. . . . we the people will not 
reject the government as long as the government still represents the 
people, as long as the government holds on to dharma, as long as the 
government still keeps its promise, to you, your Majesty . . . but the 
current situation requires change.  .  .  . The new political structure 
has to have a royally appointed person to lead . . . of course we will 
have a referendum on this.
Then Sonthi asked the entire audience to say aloud the follow-
ing: “I, [name], Your Majesty, will fight to the best of my ability and 
through peaceful means and constitutionally, in order to return royal 
decree so that your majesty can appoint a new leader to embark 
on political reforms in order to sustain the system of constitutional 
monarchy . . . to provide happiness to all the people.” 4
In reflecting on why the civil society groups inside the PAD supported 
the antidemocratic turn, the PAD’s leaders admitted to being “strategically 
forced” to go in that direction. As Suriyasai reveals in a candid interview:
We [Committee for Popular Democracy] came to a breaking point 
in March [2006] when the situation was at a dead end. The majority 
of support for PAD already wanted Article 7 [the right for the king 
to appoint a leader]. We kept pressing on, hoping to break Thak-
sin . . . perhaps he would concede, but he did not. . . . I know some 
of the NGOs opposed this, a few even left PAD. . . . But there was a 
rumor that Pipob and I worked for the leftists inside Thaksin’s gov-
ernment . . . that we were anti- royalist, that’s why we were holding 
out on Article 7. . . . we needed to maintain our mass, our support 
and this would not be our last fight. We knew that if we didn’t go 
ahead with Article 7, we would need to back down and we would be 
accused of leaving our supporters. We couldn’t do it, so we finally 
agreed. (Katasila 2007, 229– 32)
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The PAD’s appeals to the monarchy— Thailand’s most powerful 
institution— and their instrumental use of it as their symbol both united 
the various groups inside the alliance and helped to propel popular sup-
port. The monarchy strikes a chord for many Thais, since the majority of 
Thais had only lived under the reign of one king. Royalism and national-
ism have become intertwined in the consciousness of many Thai people 
and the two concepts are inseparable. For example, when the opposition 
claims that Thaksin is selling out the nation due to his plans to privatize 
many state enterprises, such acts can just as equally be construed as an 
offense to the monarchy. “Today there’s a person who disrespected the 
king. He wants to sell off our nation. He wants to take this land which our 
ancestors have built, and give it to another country. . . . The King has never 
neglected his nation, so how could we neglect our King, our nation,” said a 
frequent PAD demonstrator.5
Thaksin understood the political importance of the military despite 
its weaker political role following the Black May uprising. As such, he 
sought to engage with the military through co- optation (McCargo and 
Pathmanand 2005). While a number of retired generals staffed Thaksin’s 
first administration, Thaksin also built up a loyal support base inside the 
military by placing within several officers, just as he was, who were Class 
10 graduates of the Armed Forces Academics Preparatory School. Despite 
this, the relationship between the military top brass and Thaksin began to 
sour in 2005 when former prime minister Prem Tinasulanond openly criti-
cized Thaksin’s government. Prem was one of the most respected individu-
als both in the army and within the palace circle. Prem served as president 
of the Privy Council, a position appointed by the king. His vast personal 
networks in key institutions ensured that he maintained significant politi-
cal clout despite not being actively involved in politics. In March 2006, 
just months before the coup, Prem told reporters that the situation had 
reached a complete deadlock and that a solution needed to be pursued.6 In 
the weeks following, Prem had been reportedly speaking at various mili-
tary establishments criticizing Thaksin and his government.7 Prem later 
emerged as the key figure behind the 2006 coup.
The PAD movement appealed to the military to “step in” on numer-
ous occasions, particularly as the situation escalated in 2006. Sonthi and 
Chamlong were the biggest proponents of military intervention among the 
PAD’s top leaders.8 For Sonthi, he always saw the military as the defender 
of the Thai nation and, most of all, the monarchy. On his account, it is the 
“duty” of the military to act to save the nation: “We need to rely on the 
military now to solve the crisis in our society.”9 Chamlong, who himself 
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had worked for Prem when Prem was prime minister, spoke out in support 
of “a coup for the people,” reportedly telling a number of military officers 
“not to be afraid.”10 “I’m happy the military staged a coup,” Sonthi said. 
“General Sonthi [Bonnyaratklin], I feel for him, he never thought he’d be 
a coup leader . . . but because he was surrounded by those who respected 
General Prem, he saw what was wrong with the Thaksin regime” (Sithisa-
man 2011, 285).
The height of the crisis and political deadlock that marked the months 
preceding the September coup were critical to shaping the strategies of 
both pro- and anti- Thaksin forces. Ultimately, my central claim here is 
that the coup was not inevitable. The coup was a choice made by the military 
elites based on the unfolding of events. There was a point in time dur-
ing this entire ordeal that room for “negotiation” between the opposition 
forces and Thaksin may have been conceivable. During the few months 
prior to the coup, the opposition forces, particularly the PAD, showed signs 
of fatigue and waning, while Thaksin was suffering a significant loss of 
political support, most notably from the TRT party itself. This “precari-
ous” phase of the tug- of- war between Thaksin and his “adversaries” gave 
out signals that some sort of compromise or deal between these forces 
might have been reached. In the end, however, neither side would make 
concessions that might be perceived as acceptable. Suriyasai discussed this 
period in detail:
I think the PAD did what they could to prevent the coup d’état. . . . 
Thaksin should have at least announced his resignation from power 
to preserve the system and the constitution. This [the coup] is what 
the PAD has always warned him about. I was absolutely certain 
that as long as Thaksin remained center stage in politics, we would 
reach a complete dead end. If Thaksin wouldn’t back down, the PAD 
couldn’t back down either. None of us could back down and we 
passed the point of any compromise or reconciliation, which means 
some sort of extra- constitutional power would have to intervene. . . . 
Thaksin essentially staged a “coup” on himself before the military 
launched another one.  .  .  . As such I’m not surprised 89– 90% of 
Thai people agreed with the coup and the subsequent Surayuth gov-
ernment. I don’t blame the coup leaders for doing what they did. 
They prevented bloodshed. (Katasila 2007, 211)
Thaksin was facing the greatest opposition from both the opposition 
forces and his own party: a situation inconceivable only a year earlier (2005) 
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when TRT won a landslide majority. The massive corruption scandals and 
endless antigovernment protests significantly weakened the authority and 
legitimacy of the embattled prime minister. It was at that point that Thak-
sin decided to break the political deadlock by dissolving parliament. Nota-
bly, he did not resign as the opposition party wished. This transpired just 
two days before a major protest planned for late February by the PAD. 
Thaksin offered the following reason on February 24, 2006: “As many of 
you know there were efforts to overthrow the government by some politi-
cal groups that the government has tolerated and provided explanations 
for the many accusations . . . but the majority of the people continued to 
support the government and asked us to fight. What the government has 
done has received much attention from the rest of the world, but it elicited 
political instability. . . . I cannot accept mob politics . . . so I figured that the 
best way out of this conflict is to return the power back to the people.”11
However, some critics argued that Thaksin took advantage of the situ-
ation knowing full well that an election would be a sure win for his party. 
Thaksin had dissolved parliament, the opposition insisted, to avoid the 
no confidence motion. Thaksin had earlier promised the opposition in 
the House and the Senate, as well as those on the streets, that he would 
“explain” all of the corruption allegations by allowing parliament to ques-
tion him over the most controversial issue of his administration: the tax 
evasion following the Shin Corporation sales. It would have been the first 
time that Thaksin “unblocked” channels for the opposition inside the for-
mal democratic institutions by allowing this no confidence motion. Thak-
sin even promised to allow ten days of questioning so that other issues such 
as political reforms could be discussed.12 The House– Senate joint session 
was scheduled to take place on March 6, 2006. The opposition’s dream 
shattered completely when Thaksin dissolved parliament on February 29, 
just days after promising a more transparent leadership.
The lower house dissolution allowed Thaksin to retract three key 
promises that, if followed through, would have, I argue, changed the course 
of opposition–government strategic interactions in ways that might pos-
sibly have prevented his downfall. First, he refused to be questioned by the 
National Assembly— an opportunity to not only engage with the growing 
opposition but also with his own supporters on the most controversial cor-
ruption scandal to date. Second, he broke his promise to the opposition 
and his own party that he would not dissolve parliament. Third, he had 
earlier stated that he would never step down from his role of prime min-
ister. But following an audience with the king, he did step down, remain-
ing only as caretaker prime minister. This last development should have 
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been good news for the opposition, but because a new election had been 
called for October 2006 following the Election Commission’s annulment 
of the April election, the opposition was more than convinced that Thak-
sin would be returned as prime minister and their “life would be over.” 
Thaksin had never, in the eyes of the opposition, provided them with any 
credible commitment.
When Thaksin dissolved parliament, he more than convinced the 
opposition, from both formal and informal institutions, that he lacked any 
form of credible commitment to make future deals with the opposition. In 
November 2005, Thaksin informed his own ministers that he would “never 
resign or dissolve parliament” as his government was facing daily escalating 
protest activities. “Don’t worry. I’m definitely not dissolving parliament or 
resigning. . . . We’ll have an election in April 2009. Now let’s do our job 
the best we can,” Thaksin reportedly told his cabinet ministers.13 Once he 
had dissolved parliament, effectively to avoid being questioned, the opposi-
tion was more than outraged. “Thaksin did not want to face the growing 
opposition who called for his resignation . . . ,” the Thai Post reported. “He 
has lost all credibility, ethics or any sort of legitimacy to govern. After five 
years of corruption, and this last one where his family made off with 73.3 
billion baht without paying any taxes, he completely broke all mechanisms 
for accountability and lost all credibility.”14
The historic election on April 2, 2006 was like none other in Thailand. 
Once announced, the election date allowed parties just thirty- seven days to 
prepare, which put smaller and less- established parties at a disadvantage. 
From the day Thaksin dissolved parliament, key opposition parties (the 
Democrats, Chart Thai, and Mahachon) met on several occasions to think 
over how best to deal with the sudden and short- notice election. Leaders 
of the parties then held a joint press conference to declare that the House 
dissolution and upcoming April election lacked legitimacy, that they unani-
mously sought a boycott, and that they would not be fielding candidates.15 
The Thai Rak Thai party was also hollowing out, with members beginning 
to abandon ship.16 Others in the cabinet, such as highly respected veteran 
politicians Bawornsak Uwanno and Wisanu Krue- Ngam, also left, causing 
internal rifts inside the TRT government.
P- Net, an important election watchdog, manifested its full support of 
the call for Thaksin’s resignation; it even resigned from its duty to observe 
the April 2006 election. The PAD also held major rallies to call for Thak-
sin’s resignation. Some sixty law academics from fourteen institutions wrote 
an open letter to the head of the Election Commission of Thailand calling 
for it to revoke Thaksin’s right to stand for election; they believed that on 
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several occasions he had violated electoral rules. Another network of some 
500 academics gave a press conference entitled “To the People who are the 
Sovereign, please vote on April 2 by selecting ‘Vote No.’” Parinya Thewana-
ruemitkul (2006), representative of the group and former Black May upris-
ing leader, saw Thaksin as the malaise of Thai politics whereby his resigna-
tion was the only way out of the current political deadlock. On March 11, 
2006, Premsak Piayura resigned as a party- list candidate of the TRT in the 
middle of the campaign; as a result, TRT no longer had the requisite 100 
candidates for the party list. Despite this, the election went ahead.
The April 2006 election was one of the most bizarre elections in con-
temporary democratic times. Out of the 400 constituencies available, only 
247 of them put forward TRT candidates; and in thirty- eight constitu-
encies, the candidates who received the most votes still did not attain 20 
percent of the votes. In Bangkok, twenty- six out of thirty- six constituencies 
had more “No Votes” than votes for listed candidates. Some polling sta-
tions saw more invalid ballots than the No Vote ones. A Bangkok exit poll 
also showed 42 percent of respondents in the capital chose purposefully 
not to vote.17 If an election was supposed to solve the political deadlock, 
or at least bring the heat down a notch, it would not be this election. More 
than 70 percent of respondents in the ABAC poll believed that the politi-
cal crisis would not improve after the election.18 “Even the most optimistic 
of Thais,” reported the BBC, “had to admit that Sunday’s elections were 
unlikely to resolve the ongoing political conflicts.”19
Thaksin took the much- boycotted election as a good sign for his party 
to secure an even stronger mandate. Irrespective that TRT was ostensibly 
the only party running in the election, of the unusually high invalid and No 
Vote ballots, and of the hundreds of thousands of protesters in the lead- up 
to the election, Thaksin remained undeterred. “I’ve passed the test to prove 
my popularity,” proclaimed Thaksin, upon announcing that his party had 
won over 50 percent of the vote, his self- declared benchmark for continu-
ing in power.20 While Thaksin was clearly buying time until he could plan 
his next moves, the opposition was more than convinced that he would 
not step down, nor commit to any effort for “reconciliation” as he claimed 
he would. Effectively, any “promise” made by Thaksin to the opposition 
forces could not be taken seriously.
Thaksin only conceded to some opposition demands following an 
audience with King Bhumibol. Just a day after the election results showed 
Thai Rak Thai to have received sixteen million votes nationwide, Thaksin 
refused to take up another term as a prime minister. In a televised press 
conference, he explained: “If we only fight each other then the country 
is the one that will lose. That is what the King said in 1992 [Black May 
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uprising]. . . . This year is a holy year. His Majesty’s 60 years on the throne 
will be celebrated. . . . I want to see us Thais united. . . . We need to work 
together for the country and for King Bhumibol.”21
The PAD movement received a major boost of legitimacy following 
King Bhumibol’s speech to members of the judiciary on April 25, criticiz-
ing the election results:
As for the [April 2, 2006] election, [Thaksin] who did not even get 
20 percent and that person was running for election by himself . . . 
this is not a legitimate election. .  .  . What Thai Rak Thai did was 
an act done to gain power to govern the country that was uncon-
stitutional— a danger to national stability and illegal or contradicts 
the moral ethics of the people, contradicts democratic principles, 
blatantly violates the law and thus should not be able to maintain its 
standing as a political party for the sake of Thailand’s overall politi-
cal system.22
The king’s speech prompted the courts and independent bodies to 
reconsider their actions toward the Thaksin government. The Election 
Commission declared the April 2006 election to be in violation of elec-
toral laws. Three members of the ECT were jailed for misconduct.23 Yet 
Thaksin balked at his own promise to stay on as caretaker prime minister 
only, and reassumed full leadership in May, just weeks after the election 
was annulled. At this stage, a clash between the opposition and govern-
ment forces now seemed inevitable. The opposition movement continued 
to press ahead as it held a nationwide assembly to find ways to “overthrow 
Thaksin” before Thailand could embark on any future reform. Thaksin 
stood his ground and vowed not to back down. Thaksin’s final remarks 
before his overthrow in September confirmed what the opposition has 
believed all along: he would neither resign, back down, compromise, nor 
reconcile: “Extraconstitutional institutions, and individuals who derive 
their barami from nonconstitutional sources are interfering in the work-
ing of independent bodies. . . . People don’t follow the [democratic] rules. 
They don’t like the outcome, so they try to use nondemocratic means to 
change the situation. This is totally unacceptable.”24
The Collapse of Democracy
The PAD was a unique movement for Thailand because it was the first 
time that a broad- based movement such as this contributed to the over-
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throw of a democratically elected regime. This raises two questions: (1) 
Why did the military have to engage a social movement to stage a coup? 
(2) Is the PAD, or more generally a popular movement, necessary for the 
success of the coup? This book advances the following claims in answering 
these questions. First, the military needed to involve a broad- based move-
ment to legitimize its action of overthrowing the Thaksin government. 
Second, while the 2006 coup was not the first coup to be launched against 
an elected government, it was the first time in history that the coup over-
threw a very popular elected government. This leads us to the second ques-
tion about the necessity of the movement in creating conditions favorable 
for such an extraconstitutional move. I argue that the PAD was necessary 
to the success of the 2006 coup because it lent public support and legiti-
macy to the coup plotters. The coup makers themselves admitted that the 
opposition forces against the Thaksin government signaled the need for 
some kind of extraordinary intervention.25
Supporters of the coup, many of whom were PAD members, would argue 
that the coup was necessary to restore democracy. For them, Thaksin was 
not a legitimate leader, despite being elected. They believed he had the capa-
bility to continue to fool millions of supporters to vote for him in every 
election, and that there was no other way to be rid of him but to overthrow 
his government. In the words of a PAD leader: “a military coup requires 
popular support to succeed. If we [PAD] are able to show the powers that 
be that we have a lot of supporters, then we hope the military would know 
what to do. The military are there to serve the people. They must stand by 
the people” (Sithisaman 2011, 69). In the very few interviews that General 
Sonthi Boonyaratkin accorded about the coup, he always emphasized the 
importance of “popular opposition” against Thaksin as the barometer for 
military intervention.26 “The people are cheering us [the military] on to stage 
a coup . . . what happened was what the people wanted,” said General Sonthi 
in a televised interview five years after the coup.27 The only people who were 
publicly calling for a military intervention were those in the PAD movement.
The 2006 coup was intended to break up Thaksin’s political and elec-
toral influence. A series of well- crafted plans to dismantle Thaksin’s finan-
cial and political dominance was immediately carried out as the junta 
dislodged him. The so- called 4- step- ladder plan called for (1) dislodging 
Thaksin from power; (2) confiscating his assets; (3) dissolving his party and 
eliminating his political influence; and (4) putting the opposition back in 
power.28 For the next several years, this plan was carried through to the 
letter. General Sonthi Boonyaratklin, a coup leader, outlined his reasons 
for the coup:
Democratic Breakdown 127
I received calls for the coup from many people. Soldiers are obliged 
to protect national security, safeguard the nation and uphold loyalty 
to the monarchy. The military cannot tolerate any leader who lacks 
or has limited loyalty to the king. Under the previous government, 
widespread corruption was evident. . . . Independent organizations 
failed to function; the administrative mechanisms as per the 1997 
Constitution were stalled. . . . There was no functioning legislative 
body, and the judiciary could not function. There appeared to be no 
way out. This was before factoring in the social divisions. The coun-
try could not survive under the circumstances, and the coup was 
deemed necessary. . . . I believe a little interruption is acceptable in 
order to enable everyone to move forward once again. . . . I suspect 
many Thais still lack a proper understanding of democracy.29
Wassana Nanuam, a well- known Thai journalist reporting exclusively 
on military affairs, writes in her best- selling book Lub Luang Prang [Secret, 
Deception and, Disguise], which reveals the story behind the September 
coup d’état, that this was a coup different from all others in the past. “It’s 
a strange coup because it’s not just the military officers alone . . . but also 
civilians, bureaucrats and social group like the People’s Alliance for Democ-
racy that made this coup.”30 One of the generals close to the military coup 
leaders, General Saprang Kallayanamit, had close relations with PAD’s top 
leaders Sonthi and Chamlong. It is widely believed that General Saprang 
was the source of the PAD’s intelligence that Chamlong often refers to as 
“sources from a general” when he spoke on the PAD stage.31 This rela-
tionship, the coup leaders claimed, may have influenced the course of the 
coup.32
TABLE 5.1. Poll data on the coup and coup government (2006)
Pollsters Questions
Suan Dusit poll (September 20, 2006) Do you agree with the coup?
 1. Yes 84%
 2. No 16%
ABAC poll (September 22, 2006) How do you feel after the coup?
 1. Politics will be calm again 83%
 2. Improved economy 67%
 3. Worried 37%
ABAC poll (September 23, 2006) How do you feel about the role of the military?
 1. The military are dependable 92%
 2. Unpleasant 8%
Source: ABAC poll and Suan Dusit poll.
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The coup of 2006 and the direct army rule over the country between 
2006 and 2007 marked a return of the army to politics in a way not seen for 
over a decade. The last coup launched by the army was in 1991, in which 
popular protest against the coup government led to its leader resigning 
from power less than a year after the putsch. Since then, the army appears 
to have retreated from politics, and rumors of a coup— usually a “constant” 
in Thai politics— were not taken seriously by either the public or politi-
cians. Thaksin himself brushed off numerous warnings by close aides of any 
possible extraconstitutional overthrow of his government. General Sonthi 
personally warned Thaksin that a coup would be launched against him. In 
retrospect, Thaksin admitted that he thought “no one would dare launch a 
coup in this twenty- first century” (Nanuam 2010, 41). The 2006 coup rein-
stated the military to the political arena after more than a decade of being 
sidelined. Having a politically powerful military significantly increases the 
risk of threats to the stability of government should the latter not toe the 
army line or seek to intervene with the army hierarchy, especially by dis-
placing its chief (Nanuam 2010, 48).
Another major implication of the 2006 coup was the partisanship of 
the army. The “4- stepped” ladder did not reach its ultimate objective: to 
rid Thaksin from political power. Thaksin- allied parties won the next two 
subsequent elections: in 2007 and 2011. Although the army continually 
claimed it respected the wishes of the people and likewise the election 
results, the fact that they tried to directly influence electoral outcomes or 
to openly reveal their political positions is testament to the lack of politi-
cal neutrality for an institution so powerful in both the political arena and 
society. During the 2011 national election campaign, poll after poll showed 
that the Thaksin- backed Peau Thai party would win. Army chief General 
Prayuth Chan O- cha made a televised announcement— something usually 
done only when the army declares a coup— that the Thai people should 
“choose only good people to run the country and people who would pro-
tect the monarchical institution.”33 His predecessor, General Anupong 
Paochinda, made similar statements.34
The escalating crisis prompted a number of key political figures to look 
for signaling from the palace. Under the active guidance of Prem, the coup 
leaders were able to garner the necessary legitimacy from within the military 
institution itself to launch the coup. The barami and power of Prem in shap-
ing the course of politics was made far more evident when he handpicked 
retired General Surayuth Chulanond, known widely as his favorite, to serve 
as the prime minister of the coup government. Surayuth would later become 
a member of the Privy Council— an institution that acts as a proxy for the 
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monarchy.35 As the king addressed the illegitimate nature of the April 2006 
elections, the Constitution Court immediately moved to annul the election 
results— throwing Thaksin and his TRT party completely off course. This 
was the first in a series of interventions by the courts to resolve the political 
deadlock that had occurred following the 2006 coup (Dressel 2010). Thak-
sin’s audience with the king prompted him to step down as prime minister 
following the April 2006 election, albeit temporarily.
The PAD’s antidemocratic and anti- incumbent mobilization was thus 
instrumental to the successful coup d’état on September 19, 2006. The 
PAD mass base provided what the coup plotters needed to launch a coup: 
political legitimacy. Although previous coups were carried out without 
consideration of the public’s response, the Black May uprising incident 
and subsequent political reforms in the 1990s to reduce the role of direct 
military intervention in politics made public support key to the success 
of a coup. The public’s overt support for the coup took many by surprise. 
Ordinary citizens and some organized Yellow Shirt groupings greeted the 
soldiers with flowers, food, and asked for photographs. Not only was this a 
bloodless coup, it was seemingly a popular one.36 Both the Suan Dusit and 
ABAC polls reported overwhelming support for the coup d’état. Eighty- 
four percent of respondents nationwide, according to the Suan Dusit 
poll, agreed with the military intervention, while the ABAC poll reported 
favorable views toward the role of the military (see table 5.2). As General 
Sonthi admitted, “I did not invite anyone to be part of the coup plotting, 
but many people volunteered on their own terms. It was not exactly like 
they were part of the plotting operation, but they were supporters who 
kept encouraging us to stage a coup finally” (Nanuam 2010, 48). “When it 
was all done,” General Sonthi added, “we were greeted with so much popu-
lar support— from the flowers they put on our guns and tanks, to chant-
ing me as their white knight and hero— I was so touched and relieved” 
(Nanuam 2010, 17).
TABLE 5.2. A survey of PAD attitudes
 Agree (%) Disagree (%)
Vote buying and selling is a problem of Thai democracy 84 14
Bringing in good people to govern will solve the 
problems of Thai democracy
89 7
Do you agree with having a royally appointed prime 
minister (Article 7)?
74 16
Thaksin regime is dangerous to Thailand’s constitutional 
monarchy
98 1
Source: Based on 503– 31 respondents and adapted from Chareonsin- olarn, 2008.
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There was much internal disagreement among even the top five lead-
ers of the PAD with regard to the coup. Collectively they issued an offi-
cial press statement that they did not endorse the September 2006 coup; 
individually, though, some leaders were very procoup. Sonthi was the 
biggest supporter of extraconstitutional channels to resolve political con-
flicts; these included military intervention, judicial intervention, and royal 
prerogative. Pipob, on the other hand, was the coup’s biggest opponent.37 
Suriyasai argued that a coup could be justified if an elected government 
had lost its political legitimacy (Katasila 2009): “True that Thaksin was 
legitimately elected, but once in power he lost his legitimacy through cor-
ruption, cronyism and abuse of power.”38 For Suriyasai, the mounting cases 
of corruption were not the key reason for why he so strongly opposed 
Thaksin. Rather, the prime minister’s patent refusal to be held account-
able either by the authorities or the people prompted him to support an 
alternative power transition mechanism. “Thaksin did not allow himself to 
be held accountable [by the people]. . . . The coup took place inevitably” 
(Katasila 2009, 86). Somsak initially showed ambivalence toward the coup, 
but later admitted a coup could be legitimate as long as it took place for 
the right reason. “The military top brass was opportunistic with the coup. 
I asked Sonthi [Boonyaratklin] why a coup? Why? We talked about politi-
cal reforms, what kind of democracy we wanted. If the coup could lead to 
important reforms, in a good direction, it would be fine. It had to be for the 
majority of the people. But if the military staged a coup and did nothing 
then it would be worse than bad quality democracy.”39
The PAD’s “New Politics”
To justify its support for antidemocratic solutions to Thai politics, the 
PAD movement constructed its new politics discourse, which rested on 
strong and politicized nondemocratic institutions, moral and ethical gov-
ernance, and elitism. The PAD envisioned a Thailand with a strong and 
politicized monarchy, and moral and ethical governance led by the (Bud-
dhist) enlightened elites. These enlightened elites would know what was 
right for the country instead of relying on what the PAD believed was the 
“rural, gullible mass.” When examining PAD’s discourse on new politics, 
it became increasingly clear how undemocratic some of its core notions 
of accountability, governance, and citizenship were— partially reflecting 
what the reformists of the moral ideologies sought to achieve in the 1990s 
during the decade of the great reforms. These latent ideas of moral and 
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ethical politics, which were intertwined with royalism and Buddhism, help 
to explain why there was vocal grassroots support among some sections of 
the PAD movement before the 2006 coup for antidemocratic actions. Of 
course, at the leadership level, the antidemocratic mobilization was a stra-
tegic move— one that had strong support from the base.
First, the PAD believed in the necessity of a politicized constitutional 
monarch who would continue to enjoy extraconstitutional power and the 
political legitimacy to intervene in politics in times of crisis. For the PAD, 
a constitutional monarch indicated a political system in which the monarch 
was “above” or “on top of” politics (Winichakul 2013). This suggests that, 
for the PAD, the monarch was the ultimate legitimacy in Thailand. The 
king remained the “Father” of the land— the original owner of the land, 
he who gives sovereignty to his people. In this, I agree with Winichakul 
(2008), who argues that the prominence of the monarchy was built upon 
its being superior to corrupt political institutions. The PAD’s version of 
constitutional monarchy preserved the royal institution as the pinnacle of 
the state. This conception of the constitutional monarchy meant that it 
remained far more powerful than any elected politician. Viewing a con-
stitutional monarchy in this light, it is not difficult to grasp why the PAD 
might easily transform itself into an antidemocratic movement. After all, 
the notion that the monarchy remains at the top of the political hierarchy 
is fundamentally antithetical to democratic ideals. Even as an arbiter of last 
resort, a powerful monarchical institution can weaken the actual formal 
democratic institutions. Such a perception of the monarchy in fact empow-
ers the institution in the minds of the people. A strong palace, in turn, 
empowers other nondemocratic institutions, such as the Privy Council and 
the military.
Second, good governance for the PAD meant greater moral and hori-
zontal accountability. The NGO side of the PAD had always fought for a 
more accountable leadership who would truly represent the people and 
allowed itself to be answerable. Thaksin’s intolerance toward opposition 
voices, his marginalization of NGO activities, and the crippled checks and 
balance system inside parliament convinced his critics that he and his gov-
ernment could not possibly govern Thailand justly or fairly. Thaksin’s oft- 
cited statement that “19 million people voted for me so I won’t let a mere 
thousands of protesters get in the way” was exactly why Thaksin had to 
go: for these PAD supporters, his majority mandate and leadership style 
prevented him from being fully accountable.
For the majority sections of the PAD— the royalists, Buddhists, and the 
conservatives— good governance was about morality and ethics. Drawing 
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on a popular discourse generated by King Bhumibol, Thailand needed to 
reform its political system so that it would attract only “good people.” The 
good people, for the PAD, who should be governing Thailand were indi-
viduals like Anand Panyarachoon who had spent their lives dedicated to 
the public good without wanting anything in return. According to Suwinai 
Pornwalai, a PAD intellectual and author of The PAD Party, “superhuman” 
are those who are not only good but who also have a good mind beyond 
being human.40 These superhumans, for Suwinai, can tell right from wrong 
and sacrifice themselves for the greater good. Suwinai depicts the PAD 
movement as a force full of good people who are fighting against the “evil 
forces” that seek to destroy them.41 A war, he further argues, is needed to 
safeguard Thailand’s constitutional monarchy from the forces of evil and 
to bring the entire nation “enlightenment.”42
Buddhism was a core element of the PAD’s conception of moral gov-
ernance, which its supporters referred to as “dharmic democracy.” Dhar-
mic democracy, or Thammatippatai (ธรรมาธิปตัย), is an “ideal” version of 
democracy, whereby the leader who is elected democratically by the people 
exercises truthfulness, ethics, and righteousness as a principle of rule.43 The 
elected leader must listen to the people and uphold utmost sincerity and 
honesty in serving the people. Anek Laothamtas adopted this idea when 
founding a new party, Mahachon, in 2005— a move that was supported by a 
number of NGO leaders. He indicated that to achieve dharmic democracy, 
the people who would elect their leader need wisdom and education and to 
use dharma to guide them when they vote. They ought to think about the 
interests of the public more than their own.44 Many PAD leaders drew on 
the teachings of Buddha when they spoke on stage, especially when refer-
ring to decisions on what is good or bad.
For the proponents of moral governance, Thaksin stood in stark con-
trast to a “good leader”: he was corrupt, immoral, selfish, and appeared 
to be disloyal to the monarchy. For the PAD, “good people” would need 
to campaign: their good deeds would be apparent to all such that there 
would be no need to advertise the fact. The PAD’s conception of good 
governance as “good people bringing about a just society” sounds, on the 
face of it, noble; but it is not only elitist, it is wholly antidemocratic. Who 
gets to decide who is a good person? Both Prem and Anand were regarded 
as “good people” who remained nonpartisan, impartial, and in some ways 
“above politics.” They are held in such high regard because both received 
the blessing of the palace. But neither of them had been elected when they 
served as prime ministers. Prem’s direct involvement in the 2006 coup 
through his privy councilorship also shows that these “good people” can be 
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detrimental to democratic politics. Anand, who was the biggest proponent 
of good governance during the reform period in the 1990s, also lent his 
support to the coup. It is also unrealistic to expect individuals with such 
“heavenly” qualities to emerge from an electoral process.
To explain the overwhelming electoral support for Thaksin and his Thai 
Rak Thai party, the PAD announced that his supporters were “gullible, 
stupid voters.” This elitist notion— the third pillar of PAD’s new politics 
in which those who voted for Thaksin and his clans were considered too 
dumb to understand their actions and were likely to sell their vote to the 
highest bidder— was pervasive within the PAD and PDRC rhetoric. Essen-
tially PAD believed that the majority of Thai electors were neither suffi-
ciently educated nor well informed, and thus were outsmarted as a result 
by self- serving politicians through money politics. While vote- buying was 
indeed an issue in Thai politics, the Yellow Shirts placed the blame squarely 
with crooked politicians, exemplified by Thaksin, his allies, and the naïve 
voters who supported them.45 Thaksin’s supporters, the PAD claimed, were 
duped by his handouts (populist policies) and seemingly limitless wealth to 
the extent that they turned a blind eye to his egregious corruption and dan-
ger to the nation (Paireerak 2006, 137). The movement often called Thak-
sin supporters “buffaloes” or “red buffaloes,” which in Thai are derogatory 
terms that indicate a stupid person. A frequent PAD protester, Chairoj, 
explained why he joined the PAD:
People who did not know who Thaksin truly was, is because they 
watched evening soap and not news or only watched government 
news. The government would privatize state enterprises and used 
populist policies to dupe people . . . people were not well- informed. 
It would be like if you had rented your house to someone and he 
turned around to sell it, how could you stand that? Politics was 
the affairs of the people; we must be able to hold our government 
accountable, not let them steal what belonged to us and then sell it 
for a profit.46
The Yellow Shirts saw themselves as the bulwark of progress and politi-
cal change in Thai society. As the “enlightened people,” the Yellow Shirts 
understood that a good democracy should be void of vote- buying and 
corrupt politicians.47 Unlike the Red Shirts, who supported Thaksin, the 
Yellow Shirts were more educated, had more access to information, and 
the moral high ground to adjudicate between right and wrong. “The Red 
Shirts were blind to the truth. . . . these people were not qualified to deter-
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mine the nation’s direction  .  .  . and elect the nation’s leader” (Pornwilai 
2010, 135). Kamnoon Sithisaman, a key PAD advisor and former senator, 
made the case in the Senate for why the Yellow Shirts should lead the way 
in saving Thailand’s democracy:
They [the Yellow Shirts] wanted to see more for their country. They 
were the progressive group, the tax- paying group, the middle class 
and upwards, the business owners, and professionals. They were 
intelligent— more than us here in the [National] Assembly. They 
knew what kind of politics would be good and bad; they could 
see right from wrong. They knew an election alone would not be 
enough to have good politics. . . . They knew we must get good lead-
ers to govern the country and establish the rule of law.48
There is also a practical reason why the middle class defines the PAD 
movement— cable TV. The PAD was largely mobilized through ASTV 
cable, which was owned and operated by Sonthi Limthongkul’s Manager 
Media Group. Cable TV was neither cheap nor widespread— cable lines 
were only available in Thailand’s urban areas, making it accessible only to 
the middle class in these areas. Later, the PAD sought to enlarge its support 
base to incorporate less well- off sections of the population by handing out 
ASTV satellite dishes free of charge, but that still would only reach urban 
pockets of the population. The middle class was also critical to the financ-
ing of the PAD movement. Worakul’s (2012) survey of the PAD’s 193- Day 
Protest reveals that the sources of PAD funding during its longest rally 
were derived 70 percent from donations, 20 percent from ASTV revenue 
streams, and 10 percent from the sale of goods.49
PAD leaders admitted, however, that the role of the middle class made 
the PAD less democratic. Suriyasai, reflecting on the “failure” of the PAD, 
gives a succinct explanation for why the PAD was antidemocratic:
The middle class understands democracy from the perspective of 
a group that has developed and grown from neoliberal economics 
and political liberalization during authoritarian times. They are very 
much selfish and are interested only in what would benefit their 
prosperity. They are self- centered. They don’t really care whether 
the regime is democratic or not. They hardly care about the poor. 
The biggest challenge for our country today is to figure out how we 
can create a political system that both the poor and the middle class 
can benefit from and co- exist. Right now, the poor are concerned 
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about access to resources, while the middle class are concerned 
about liberty and stability.50
Finally, the Yellow Shirts’ mobilization was a response to a failure of rep-
resentative democracy, one in which people felt excluded from the system 
and that politicians were not held accountable for their actions. “Wherever 
there was an election, there was money. And if a candidate spent 10,000 
million baht, that person could not represent you. This was a fake democ-
racy,” argued a leading public intellectual influential within the NGO com-
munity, Prawes Wasi (Pongpaibul 2004). Given that many of PAD’s top 
leaders were long- time activists, they preferred a consensus- based, partici-
patory, and open process of negotiation to a representative/delegative style 
of governance. “The process of conflict resolution had to be democratic,” 
according to Pipob. “We needed a round- table and representatives from 
all sections of society— both pro- and anti- Thaksin— but they had to come 
from the people, not Thaksin’s representatives or nominees.”51
Conclusion
When Thaksin and his Thai Rak Thai party won the 2005 election in a 
landslide victory, the PAD felt that the days of its anti- incumbent activities 
were numbered. While they pressed on with their allies to pressure Thak-
sin to resign from his leadership, the leader’s immense popularity rendered 
the opposition’s strategies ineffective. Eventually the PAD appealed to the 
institution of last resort— the monarchy— for a royal intervention in the 
political crisis. Simultaneously the movement also pleaded to other pow-
erful nondemocratic institutions— the military and the Privy Council— to 
step in and help “save the nation.” Their call was answered, and the coup 
d’état succeeded in overthrowing the most popularly elected prime minis-
ter in Thailand’s history.
This last stage of the process of institutional blockage— the antidemoc-
ratization of the PAD movement— was a key turning point in the political 
conflict. I demonstrate here the importance of an alliance between the PAD 
and nondemocratic institutions in the breakdown of Thailand’s democracy. 
I show how popular support for extraconstitutional intervention from the 
PAD was crucial to the timing and the success of the coup. Public opinion 
polls immediately following the coup were also used to demonstrate the 
strength of popular support. Ultimately, the coup was contingent upon suf-
ficient popular outrage against the incumbent leader as well as the PAD’s 
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call for nondemocratic institutions to step in. The coup was not purely an 
elite overthrow of an elected government. The PAD provided the basis for 
the coup’s legitimacy by signaling strong mass support for military inter-
vention that would overthrow the government. By motivating the military 
to intervene, the PAD directly reduced the cost of a coup and improved the 
probability of its success.
The last section examines in great detail the discourse and ideology of 
the Yellow Shirts, which included both the PAD and the PDRC. Both of 
these movements were similar in their ideological foundations, values, and 
aspirations for the future of Thailand’s politics. Their entrenched views 
regarding the necessity of righteous, ethical, inclusive, and elitist politics 
was shaped by the influences of both the monarchy and Buddhist thought, 
as well as their lived experiences of past failures of democratic govern-
ments. The Yellow Shirts, whose members were drawn largely from the 
urban middle class, saw themselves as the enlightened guiding force for a 
more progressive society. Their understanding of democracy was not only 
based on their righteousness and moral ethics but also on the value of a 
more consensus- based and participatory form of rule. Their strong opposi-
tion to electoral and representative democracy, as well as their firm belief 
in the gullibility of the rural masses, prompted them to accept nondemo-
cratic means of rule. The solution for the malaise of the Thai polity did 
not lie in the procedural form of democracy, but rather in the unwavering 
conviction of allowing “good people” to rule. Paying closer attention to the 
Yellow Shirts’ disposition toward antidemocratic attitudes brings us closer 





Social Media and the New Antidemocrats
The People’s Alliance for Democracy played a crucial role in the break-
down of democracy in Thailand in 2006. The postcoup period, between 
2008 and 2011, saw the weakening and radicalization of the PAD. I argue 
that the PAD weakened because the same conditions of institutional block-
age that gave rise to an antidemocratic mobilization in both formal and 
informal institutions were no longer present. The two key mechanisms 
that would have created the condition of institutional blockage— a percep-
tion of permanent exclusion of power and a relative change in access to 
power— were changed in the postcoup period. For the opposition, the per-
ception of being excluded significantly weakened while there was positive 
change in access to power. Key figures inside the PAD helped to write the 
2007 constitution1 and held powerful positions inside the military- installed 
government of Surayuth Chulanond.2 The new constitution was widely 
seen as an attempt at constitutional engineering to punish Thaksin and 
avoid creating conditions that would return him to power. Mechanisms 
that had enabled Thaksin to consolidate power, to avoid his being held 
to account, and had rendered the opposition ineffective were “corrected” 
in the 2007 constitution. Party mergers were no longer allowed during 
parliamentary sessions; family members of existing MPs were disallowed 
from running for the upper house; the Senate became partially appointed 
again, and the opposition needed only one- fifth of the votes to launch a no 
confidence motion against the prime minister. In effect, the 2007 Constitu-
tion was designed to check executive abuse of power by those in office and 
make it difficult for any political party to be elected to a majority— thereby 
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blocking other means for the executive to gain excessive power. The PAD 
continued to mobilize in the postcoup period, but it never regained the 
popularity and potency that it once held.
This chapter also examines the role of social media and the emergence 
of the PAD successor movement, the People’s Democratic Reform Com-
mittee. Social media was a central and defining feature of the PDRC that 
was absent from the PAD. Social media in Thailand, which included plat-
forms like Facebook, Twitter, LINE chat application (app), and YouTube, 
did not become widely available until the mid- 2010s— by which time the 
PAD had already disintegrated. What role did social media play in the anti-
democratic mobilization of the PDRC? Through a detailed examination 
of Facebook data— Thailand’s most popular social media platform— this 
chapter makes three arguments. First, social media facilitates the coor-
dination and mobilization of antidemocratic movements. Second, social 
media deepens political polarization. Third, social media amplifies anti-
democratic voices. Overall, social media has made coups cheaper and more 
likely by playing a critical role in entrenching political divisions, expanding 
the reach of nondemocratic voices, and helping to mass produce popular 
support for a military putsch. My analysis has also produced some positive 
outcomes for online political participation. Social media has been shown 
to help bridge the participatory gap by drawing mostly young and hitherto 
disengaged publics into the political realm through platform engagement. 
Unfortunately, while social media helped to democratize political partici-
pation, it did not fully result in prodemocratic participation.
Existing theories on the relationship between social media and democ-
racy have provided cause for both optimism and pessimism. Scholars argue 
that there are several mechanisms by which the internet can bring about 
positive political change (Benkler 2006; Trippi 2004; Shirky 2008). Inter-
net usage can potentially (a) increase political participation; (b) activate 
previously inactive citizens; (c) challenge the politically vested interests of 
leaders; (d) narrow the gap between political elites and the mass public; and 
(e) devolve power from traditionally centralized institutions to the periph-
ery. The internet can also flatten out existing social inequality through the 
creation of a horizontally networked society (Castells 2011). Information 
and communication technologies provide political opportunities in ways 
that sharply reduce barriers to civic engagement: if citizens can write their 
own news, create their own political commentary, and post their views 
before a worldwide audience, then making a political difference through 
content creation and online participation becomes relatively simple, cheap, 
and fast (Chadwick 2007). In a large multicountry survey, Loader, Vromen, 
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and Xenos (2014) find that there is a strong, positive relationship between 
social media use and political engagement among youths in Australia, the 
United States, and the United Kingdom. In a continent where voting and 
political party membership has long been in decline, social media tools 
provide optimism that more networked European youths can enhance 
more traditional forms of political participation. While the Arab Spring has 
spawned a growing scholarship on political participation and social media, 
debate continues within the fields of political science and communication 
on exactly what role social media plays in relation to political participation 
(Segerberg and Bennett 2012; Howard and Hussain 2011; Eltantawy and 
Wiest 2011). Some scholars argue that people utilizing social media help 
to drive political participation offline. Tufecki and Wilson (2012) find that 
protesters in Egypt’s Tahrir Square not only learned of the protests via 
social media, but their social media use made it more likely for them to 
engage in political protest. Survey data on Facebook users in Chile also 
shows a strong association between Facebook use and offline protest activ-
ity (de Zuniga, Jung and Valenzuela 2012). Similarly, Howard and Hussein 
(2013, 5) argue that the internet was so important to civil society actors in 
Arab states because they lacked other forms of political communication 
and because internet content could be hosted on servers that were beyond 
the reach of the state. In China, online activism, particularly political pro-
test, thrived online partly because offline political opposition was strongly 
restricted (Yang 2014).
Yet recent revelations of the extensive Russian interventions in the US 
2016 presidential election, and in the 2016 Brexit referendum, laid bare the 
pervasive and entrenched global networks of actors and firms implicated 
in manipulating elections through social media with a view to undermin-
ing democracy (Galante and Ee 2018). Social media— once believed to 
be a force for democracy— has directly contributed to flawed elections in 
nearly fifty countries and to fueling ethnic and religious conflict in dozens 
more around the world (Woolley and Howard 2017). False information 
proliferates through social media and is aided in this by machine learning 
tools such as bots and humans posing as social media influencers (Woolley 
2016; Ferrerra et al. 2016). Networked societies such as Thailand that are 
already polarized by years of political divisions are believed to be particu-
larly vulnerable to the dark side of the internet as fake news, bots, trolls, 
and influencers can all sow discord and worsen an already brittle politi-
cal situation. Furthermore, there is growing empirical evidence that social 
media can create filter bubbles: people selectively consume only infor-
mation that confirms their preexisting beliefs, thereby creating an echo 
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chamber effect (Iyengar and Hahn 2009; Adamic and Glance 2005). The 
early optimism that social media could advance democratic values has been 
seriously dampened and in question due to recent events and to emerging 
scholarly research on social media and politics.
This chapter is divided into two parts. The first section discusses the 
post- 2006 coup political environment and the decline of the PAD. It also 
charts the emergence of the People’s Democratic Reform Committee and 
provides a comparative analysis of the PDRC against the backdrop of the 
PAD. The second section examines the role of social media in propelling 
the PDRC movement. It investigates how social media contributes to 
political polarization and addresses its impact on existing regional and eco-
nomic cleavages. Finally, the chapter also discusses the role of social media 
in amplifying, as opposed to neutralizing, nondemocratic voices.
The Postcoup Resurgence and the Decline of the PAD
The PAD leadership declared a cessation of activities immediately follow-
ing the coup of September 19, 2006. After the coup and subsequent military 
installation of the government with army veteran Surayuth Chulanond at 
its helm, the PAD ceased its activities. By October of 2006, the PAD had 
changed its name to “the People’s Assembly for Political Reform” to work 
in parallel with the Council for Democratic Reforms as a shadow wing of 
the coup government composed of “representatives of the people.” The 
PAD’s main task during this postcoup period was to discuss the process of 
constitutional drafting to ensure that its voices would be heard. For many 
activists of the 1990s reform period who had subscribed to moral account-
ability ideologies, they saw the 2006 coup as an extension of a reform pro-
cess that was yet to be completed. Ironically, a new constitution would be 
needed to right the wrongs of the 1997 Constitution, particularly concern-
ing its articles that emboldened the power of the executive and provided 
insufficient checks on his power. Numerous PAD supporters and 1997 
constitutional drafters such as Jermsak Pinthong, Klannarong Jantik, and 
Jaras Suwannamala took part in drafting this second one. To increase the 
legitimacy of a new constitution put together at the behest of a military- 
backed government, a first- ever referendum was held despite many areas 
of the country being under emergency decree. Fifty- eight percent voted in 
favor of the new constitution and a new election was called. Unfortunately 
for the PAD and its allies, Thai Rak Thai’s successor party, Palang Pracha-
chon Party (PPP), won and formed a new government.
Social Media and the New Antidemocrats 143
The postcoup period, between 2008 and 2011, saw the weakening and 
radicalization of the PAD movement. I argue that the PAD weakened 
because the same conditions of institutional blockage both in the formal 
and informal institutions that gave rise to an antidemocratic mobilization 
were no longer present. Institutions were not blocked in the same ways 
they were in the lead- up to the 2006 coup due to much greater inclusion 
of the opposition both in the formal and informal democratic institutions. 
The perception among government critics of political exclusion was no 
longer strong nor viable. The PAD movement in the postcoup period was 
no longer shaped by existing institutional blockages, making it harder for 
the leaders to construct convincing discourse for mobilization. The result 
was a much harder point of mobilization to sell, a less convincing griev-
ance, and a weakening movement. This coupled with a lack of popular 
support for a military intervention made this extraconstitutional measure 
neither desirable nor possible.
Despite the PAD’s vehement opposition to the return of Thaksin’s polit-
ical dominance via a proxy party, PPP, formal institutions were not blocked. 
First, the new 2007 constitution was authored by some of the PAD’s stron-
gest supporters in an attempt to correct the mechanisms that overempha-
sized vertical accountability at the expense of horizontal or moral account-
ability.3 Specifically, these changed mechanisms include party mergers no 
longer being allowed during parliamentary sessions; family members of 
existing MPs no longer being permitted to run for the upper house; and 
the Senate becoming half elected, half appointed. Furthermore, opposition 
in parliament would only need one- fifth of the votes to launch a no con-
fidence motion against the prime minister. Second, the PPP did not have 
an absolute majority in parliament nor did it want one. The PPP managed 
to gain 233 out of 480 seats, which accounted for 48.5 percent of the seats. 
This was close to what TRT had obtained in the 2001 election. In contrast, 
the Democrat Party— the election runner- up— trailed by nearly 15 percent 
of the seat share with 164 seats. Samak Sundaravej immediately formed a 
six- party coalition with five other, mostly small, parties. This was meant 
to safeguard against any potential coup threat that might arise should the 
PPP go it alone as a minority government or form a small majority with 
only one other party. Essentially the PPP did not want a minimal winning 
coalition, but a maximal one instead. This six- party coalition translated 
into 316 out of 480 seats, accounting for more than 63 percent of parlia-
mentary seats.
The coalition government of Samak was very different from that of 
Thaksin. For one, Samak did not have the same control over coalition part-
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ners as Thaksin did. Samak called his own coalition makeup “ugly” and 
admitted that his coalition partners gave him little opportunity to lead.4 
“Nobody in the coalition government cares or listens to Samak,” academ-
ics argued. “They do whatever they want and they often give contradictory 
statements over government policies. . . . The biggest threat to the stability 
of this government comes from within.”5 There were also constant rumors 
of coalition parties defecting from the government. While the Democrats 
were the only official opposition party during the Samak government, it 
had no trouble getting one- fifth of the votes to launch a no confidence 
motion against the prime minister. Less than six months into the PPP- 
led coalition government (June 2008), Samak and seven ministers were 
subjected to a three- day grilling by the opposition before surviving a no 
confidence vote.
The clearest evidence that opposition forces were not blocked in the 
formal democratic institution is that Samak was eventually removed from 
power by one of the independent bodies: the Constitutional Court. It 
was not the case anymore that independent institutions were “crippled” 
by government interference. In September 2008, a group of twenty- nine 
senators and the Electoral Commission of Thailand (ECT) filed a petition 
against Samak for moonlighting as a chef on TV. He was then found guilty 
of violating Section 182 of the Constitution, which prohibits individuals 
in political office from being employed elsewhere. Once Samak had been 
removed from power through the Constitutional Court ruling, his party 
refused to bring him back as the prime minister.
Somchai Wongsawat, Thaksin’s brother- in- law, replaced Samak as the 
new prime minister; he too was facing an increasingly difficult situation. 
The seventy- two MPs who were members of the Newin Faction inside the 
coalition government would not support Somchai’s nomination without 
guarantees of ministerial portfolios.6 This is reminiscent of the old- style 
1990s politics, where coalition partners and factions within the main party 
would bargain for cabinet posts in exchange for loyalty. In fact, the PPP was 
growing so divisive on account of many factions wanting to go their own 
way that Somchai had, at one point, to plead with his fellow MPs not to be 
“cliquey” and to stay united as a party and not “faction” lest the PPP col-
lapsed.7 A soft- spoken person, whom Prawes describes a “mild- mannered,” 
Somchai was nothing like Thaksin nor his sharp- tongued predecessor, 
Samak. Somchai ensured that he maintained a conciliatory attitude toward 
the “powers that be”— whether that was Privy Councilor Prem, the army 
chief, the PAD leaders, or even his own party’s factional leaders. Somchai 
visited Prem at his residence to seek “help” and “guidance” in solving the 
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ongoing political conflict that seemed only to deepen n.8 Eventually PAD 
protesters encircled government buildings and eventually occupied them.
Following the coup, the Council for Democratic Reforms began plac-
ing its people into various independent bodies, beginning with the ECT, 
the courts, and the anticorruption commission. The 2007 Constitution, 
in comparison with its 1997 predecessor, gave specific enhanced powers 
to the judiciary. The Senate would be half elected and half appointed, in 
contrast to the previously fully elected Senate. This meant that the PAD- 
aligned elites could vie for seats in the Senate, thereby keeping checks on 
the PPP. Judges who supported the PAD or military were also appointed 
to search for committee members for other independent institutions. The 
new judiciary began to act partially in favor of the yellow- shirted opposi-
tion. Following the 2007 election, the ECT found electoral misconduct on 
the part of Monthien Songpracha, candidate and deputy secretary of the 
Chart Thai party, and Soonthorn Wilawan, candidate and deputy chief of 
the Matchimatipatai party. The ECT voted four to one in favor of dissolv-
ing Chart Thai and Matchimatipatai. Chart Thai, Matchimatipatai, and 
PPP were sued for electoral misconduct. Soon after, a PPP MP, Yongyuth 
Tiyapairat, was given a red card for electoral fraud. Things subsequently 
went downhill for the PPP when several ministers were stripped of their 
positions or pressured to resign.9 Then on December 2, 2008, the Consti-
tutional Court delivered its verdict to dissolve all three parties and revoke 
for five years the voting rights of the party committee members: PPP 
(thirty- seven members), Chart Thai (forty- three members), and Matchi-
matipatai (twenty- nine members).
The opposition party, the Democrats, emerged as the victor when gov-
erning coalition parties defected and supported the nomination of its party 
member, Abhisit Vejjajiva, as the replacement to Prime Minister Somchai. 
The coalition partners and PPP factions did not have to abandon the gov-
ernment since even after the bans, government MPs still maintained 271 
seats out of a possible 480— a total of over 50 percent. But the increasingly 
untenable situation in parliament prompted mass defections from the gov-
erning coalition to form an alliance with the Democrats. With defections 
from the Newin faction and other coalition partners, Abhisit received 235 
parliamentary votes to become prime minister. Many observers believe 
the new Democrat Party– led government was formed inside the military 
barracks, while the uniformed men held great sway over the makeup of 
Abhisit’s cabinet.10 The fall of both PPP- led coalitions were among the 
most significant victories of the PAD- aligned opposition forces.
While the opposition was gaining ground in various formal democratic 
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institutions, the PAD remobilized to exert even greater pressure against the 
PPP governments from out in the streets. The alliance between the PAD 
and key opposition groups from within formal democratic channels (the 
parliamentary opposition, the Senate, and independent bodies) solidified. 
This period witnessed both the decline in popularity and the growing vio-
lence of the PAD movement. This phase of PAD activities officially recom-
menced on February 25, 2008 when the movement’s leadership regrouped 
and called on its supporters to fight the newly elected Samak government, 
whom they considered “Thaksin’s nominee.” The PAD believed Samak 
was merely a puppet for Thaksin, and that the Palang Prachachon Party 
was still run by Thaksin from exile. The PAD leaders made a number of 
demands, all of which centered around their opposition to Thaksin. For 
instance, the PAD opposed any effort to amend Constitution Articles 237 
and 309, amendments that they believed were intended to afford Thak-
sin amnesty and bring back the banned members of the Thai Rak Thai 
party. Such claims by the PAD were not far- fetched given that the PPP 
campaigned on returning the TRT government and bringing “justice” to 
Thaksin. Moreover, PPP policy was very much that of the TRT, meaning 
a continuation of state projects that so many organizations within the PAD 
had fought hard against. The grievances of the PAD precoup seemed to 
have all but returned under the Samak government, infuriating their lead-
ership and much of their support base.
The first major rally took place in late March 2008 at Thammasat 
University and drew thousands of supporters from academics, students, 
media, artists, NGOs, and others nationwide (Katasila 2009, 125). It 
became clear during this period that the PAD was fighting what it saw 
as the “Thaksin regime”: a system of deep- rooted corruption instigated 
by the Thaksin administration for his and his allies’ benefit. This regime 
was a threat to the entire nation and the foundation of the Thai state, par-
ticularly its beloved monarchy. The PAD movement in this second phase 
focused on two issues: nationalism and royalism. More so than in the first 
phase, the identity of the PAD movement was constructed throughout 
this second period. The first phase of the PAD movement, the largest in 
size, was a coming together of people and groups who were united only in 
their opposition to Thaksin and shared little else in common. They came 
together in this first phase under the campaign of “Saving the Nation” (koo 
chart), most wearing T- shirts emblazoned with “We fight for the King” 
(rao soo peau Nai Luang).
In the second phase of mobilization that followed the ousting of Thak-
sin, the PAD lost some of its support from the labor movement and NGO 
Social Media and the New Antidemocrats 147
community but gained support from the public that had not mobilized 
the first time around. This led to the period of PAD’s longest sustained 
street mobilization, known as the “193- Day Protest”— the longest pro-
test in contemporary Thai history. In this round of mobilization, the PAD 
refocused on the issue of the monarchy all the while emphasizing other 
issues that evoked patriotism. As such, its campaign, entitled “Guarding the 
Nation” (yam fao pandin), indicated the PAD’s intention to act as guardians 
of the nation in protecting both the monarchy and the state from harm and 
evil, and in seeking to preserve the status quo. This focus on royalism and 
nationalism was a strategic move on the part of the PAD leaders. Admit-
tedly, claiming that the monarchy was under threat elicited a lot of emotion 
from the masses, enough to mobilize more people into the streets than 
any other issue.11 Prachatai (2008), a Thai online news outlet, reported a 
rare interview of Princess Sirindhorn with a US newspaper that the Yellow 
Shirts may have used the issue of the monarchy for their own benefit. “Do 
they [the leaders] really love the monarchy? I don’t know. . . . In fact, I don’t 
even think the monarchy likes the Yellow Shirts very much. The royal fam-
ily did say the Yellow Shirts cause problems for them.”12
The PAD and the Democrat Party unofficially united and facilitated 
one of the longest and most violent mass protests in contemporary Thai 
history. The 193- Day Protest began soon after Prime Minister Samak Sun-
daravej of the PPP announced he would seek to amend the 2007 Con-
stitution, which was considered by the PAD to be a “national crisis.”13 
After drawn- out rallies that among others included raiding Government 
House and occupying the country’s main airport, the PAD in December 
2008 declared its “victory” following the PPP’s dissolution by the Con-
stitutional Court. This paved the way for the Democrat Party to cobble 
together a coalition and ascend to power.14 This period saw the PAD and 
the Democrats in a united front: “We turned our eyes blind to the differ-
ences among us, and focused on our common goal: to rid Thailand of the 
Thaksin regime.”15 With their allied political party finally in power, the 
PAD’s popularity dramatically declined as there was no justifiable reason to 
continue its political crusade.
This period also saw a significant radicalization of the PAD movement, 
resulting in the occupation of Thailand’s Government House and interna-
tional airport, and subsequent and decline in donations and financial sup-
port. The top leaders of the PAD were also arrested on charges of terror-
ism. The “October 7 Incident” that occurred during the 193- Day Protest 
became a key turning point for the PAD. It equally marks a day of major 
casualties of PAD members due to escalating violence and the state’s use of 
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force. Today, the PAD commemorates the October 7 Incident as its D- Day 
or “the Day Police Killed Innocent People”; an annual remembrance day is 
held to pray for those who lost their lives. During that time the PAD con-
tinued to encircle Government House, and protesters occupied all major 
roads around it. The PAD leaders also announced that their supporters 
would likewise move to encircle the Parliament Building on October 7. 
By morning that day, the police had bombarded protesters with over 100 
tear gas canisters to carve out an access point for Prime Minister Somchai 
and his cabinet to enter the parliament. The protesters continued to push 
on, while another bomb exploded nearby. By the end of the day, the PAD 
suffered two deaths and 381 were injured; eleven police officers were also 
injured. At the end of the 193- Day Protest, the death toll had risen to 
eleven and the number of the injured was more than a thousand. General 
Chavalit Yongchaiyuth resigned as deputy prime minister and took respon-
sibility for the day’s events.
Despite successfully unblocking channels for opposition, the PAD 
movement displayed signs of weakening as it continued to lose popular 
support. This becomes even more evident in its third phase of mobilization, 
which began following the rise of the Democrat- led government. There 
are multiple factors that contributed to the weakening of the PAD move-
ment. One key factor are the successes of the PAD movement in opening 
up access to power that had been blocked or rendered ineffective by the 
Thaksin administration. As the above paragraphs have shown, a number 
of channels for opposition in both formal and informal institutions were 
no longer closed off. The perception that the opposition “had no choice” 
was rapidly dissipating. With the victory and rise to power of a long- time 
PAD ally, the Democrats, the future looked brighter than ever for those 
who loathed the Thaksin regime. The honeymoon period between the 
PAD and the Democrats was over soon after Abhisit came to power. The 
Democrat Party was, in PAD’s view, reneging on its promises made when 
both had fought together against the Thaksin regime. Resentment began 
to build up as the PAD felt it was not getting its share of what it wanted, 
even though it was responsible for Abhisit coming to power. The straw 
that broke the camel’s back, which became the key issue of the third wave 
of the PAD protest, was the one involving the Thai– Cambodia territorial 
dispute. The more the radical wing of the PAD (the Buddhist and royalist 
groups) began to hold antigovernment rallies during the Abhisit adminis-
tration, the more significantly the mass support of the PAD dwindled. One 
by one Democrat MPs, who in the past had vocally and proactively sup-
ported the PAD, now began to distance themselves from the movement. 
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When the PAD movement began to hold antigovernment rallies during 
the Abhisit administration, the mass support for the PAD dwindled. The 
Democrat–PAD feud weakened the movement and contributed to a num-
ber of defections, which branched out to form splinter groups. The Thai 
Patriot Network, for example, broke away from the PAD because they 
believed there was a serious situation of conflict of interest with ASTV and 
that it had sought to benefit from the PAD movement. At the beginning 
there were seventy- seven organizations in the Thai Patriot Network— all 
of them were disappointed with ASTV.
Parallel to the antidemocratic mobilization of the Yellow Shirts was the 
largely prodemocratic mobilization of the Red Shirts. The United Front 
for Democracy against Dictatorship (UDD), or the Red Shirts, was formed 
in response to the September 2006 coup and the dismantling of the Thai 
Rak Thai party. Much of what constituted the grievances of the Reds was 
political in nature, most notably political disparity and sociocultural inferi-
ority (Sathiniramai 2010, 34– 35). The UDD came together as a more orga-
nized movement in 2007 composed largely of two groups: pro- Thaksin 
supporters and anticoup civic groups. The latter was the first to mobi-
lize immediately following the September 2006 coup— protesting what 
it believed were the country’s unacceptable democratic reversal, blatant 
injustice, and unfairness.16 Members of the latter did not all favor Thaksin 
and his policies, but they shared the deep sense of injustice for Thaksin 
as a result of the coup.17 The former group, mobilizing chiefly TRT poli-
ticians and associates, was loyal to Thaksin and constituted his electoral 
support base with membership of no less than 5.5 million (Phongpaichit 
and Baker 2010). The grassroots supporters of Thaksin were mobilized 
initially by the Veera Muksikapong– Nathawut Saikua– Jatuporn Prompan 
trio through People’s Television talk shows and subsequently through a 
series of Truth Today rallies between 2008 and 2009. The trigger for the 
2010 protest, the largest ever mass protest in contemporary Thai history, 
came after the Supreme Court seized $1.4 billion of Thaksin’s assets. With 
more than a million Red Shirts on the streets, what was planned as a seven- 
day rally18 turned into sixty- four days of protracted protest that ended with 
a violent crackdown and the deaths of ninety- one people and over 2,000 
injured. This was Thailand’s worst episode of mass violence in contempo-
rary times. The beleaguered Yellow Shirt– backed Democrat- led govern-
ment eventually called for a new election. In the 2011 election, the PAD 
split from the Democrats and among themselves: one faction boycotted 
the election through its “Vote No” campaign, while the other contested 
the election under a newly founded political party, the New Politics Party. 
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The result was disastrous for the Yellow Shirts across the board: both the 
Democrats and the New Politics Party were decimated at the polls, and the 
boycott itself garnered less than 3 percent support from the electorate.19 
This was the end of the People’s Alliance for Democracy.
The Emergence of the PDRC
As the PAD movement died down, in 2013 the People’s Democratic 
Reform Committee (PDRC) emerged on the back of two years of low- 
level discontent against Yingluck Shinawatra and what her opponents 
deemed a continuation of her brother’s regime. Since the collapse of the 
PAD movement, there was an opposition vacuum in desperate need of a 
justifiable cause and strong leadership. But the anti- Thaksin groups that 
had emerged between 2011 and 2013 were small and their leaders lacked 
the charisma and skill needed to mobilize the masses. The opposition in the 
early days of the Yingluck government was also neither disadvantaged nor 
desperate: the 2007 Constitution was penned by key figures inside the Yel-
low Shirts; half of the Senate was staffed with the more conservative Yellow 
forces; and Yingluck was conciliatory toward the military and opposition 
forces. The few opposition mobilizations that had appeared, such as Pitak 
Siam Organization and the Multi- Colored Shirts led by Dr. Tul Sithisom-
wongsa, were very small, weak, and disunited. Both Sonthi Limthongkul 
(former PAD leader) and Suthep Taugsuban (future PDRC leader) were 
asked to lead the opposition but had refused on the basis that the time was 
not right.20 It was not until late 2013 that the PDRC would officially come 
together after foreseeing again no alternative exit route from the opposi-
tion’s political exclusion. Ironically, Suthep, the PDRC de facto leader, and 
his Democrat Party would be the last to join the most powerful unit of the 
entire movement.
The PDRC and the PAD shared important similarities and differences. 
First, key networks of the PDRC all constituted part of the PAD networks, 
but under different names and organizations. The dissolution of the PAD 
had produced four large networks led by four former PAD leaders: (1) the 
Student and People Network Thailand Reform; (2) Santi Asoke and the 
Dharma Forces; (3) the Green Group; and (4) the People’s Networks from 
the 77 Provinces. The Student and People Network Thailand Reform (Koh 
Poh Toh— STR), known locally as the “Urupong protesters,” united some 
of the smaller opposition groups together and built momentum toward 
what would become the PDRC. The STR was the newly reformed PAD 
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with a close connection to Sonthi and his ASTV networks. The STR’s top 
leaders were Nithithorn Lamleua, PAD’s legal advisor, and Uthai Yodma-
nee, who was Ramkamhaeng University’s student leader and had protested 
against Thaksin with the PAD. Both leaders revealed a very close relation-
ship to former PAD leaders, particularly Suriyasai and Sonthi, and had bor-
rowed money from PAD figures as well as utilized their kitchen and mobile 
toilets to cater for staff and protesters present at Urupong junction— their 
main protest stage.21 All former PAD leaders appeared multiple times on 
their stage and publicly endorsed them as opposed to the Democrat- led 
protests.22 Chamlong and his Santi Asoke crew were already staging their 
protests at the Makawan Rangsan Bridge, although their numbers were 
small. Somkiat Pongpaibul, who led the People’s Networks from the 77 
Provinces, joined forces with the STR early on, followed closely by Suriya-
sai’s Green Group. The STR staged its first protest on October 10, 2013, 
with the mass base composed largely of university students, former PAD 
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core supporters, and local residents in the Urupong area. Over the next six 
weeks, various former PAD networks and their respective leaders officially 
joined forces with the STR and Sonthi’s ASTV media networks, which 
were helping to popularize the Urupong protests, resulting in greater pop-
ular support.23 However, these early protests against the government pro-
test remained limited and small in number until Suthep and his networks 
burst onto the scene.
Ideologically, the PDRC was more radical and antidemocratic than the 
PAD. The PAD’s most antidemocratic stance was to endorse the military 
coup as well as support a stronger and politically involved monarchy. The 
PDRC went further by mobilizing its supporters to completely boycott the 
February 2014 election through their “no vote” campaign or to prevent 
polling stations from effectively operating on election day. In its infamous 
Reform Before Election campaigns, the PDRC demanded an end to elec-
tions in order to set in motion a reform process. Reforms would be put 
forth by the People’s Assembly largely comprising nominated representa-
tives from key occupational associations.24 This People’s Assembly would 
rewrite electoral and party laws to ensure that only moral and uncorrupted 
politicians would stand for election, and thus the National Assembly would 
work only in the people’s interests.25 While various PDRC leaders called 
for a coup during their speeches,26 the most telling evidence of the PDRC’s 
support for the military’s putsch from 2010 was Suthep’s collaboration with 
General Prayuth Chan o- cha, an army chief during Yingluck’s government 
who went on to became a coup leader and prime minister. In his interview 
with the Post Today, Suthep admitted:
Before the declaration of martial law, General Prayuth told me that 
I had worked so hard for so long and now it would be the military’s 
turn to take over. . . . Now that the NCPO [National Council for 
Peace and Order, the military junta] had taken over the work, mobi-
lization and proposals of the PDRC, they were open to listening to 
all of our suggestions.27
The PDRC protesters celebrated the May 22 announcement that the coup 
was staged by the military, while a number of ordinary people took to hand-
ing out flowers to soldiers standing in key intersections across Bangkok to 
express their solidarity.28
The key trigger for the large- scale antigovernment mobilization and 
subsequent establishment of the PDRC came in mid- 2013 following the 
government’s attempt to pass an amnesty bill regarded by opponents as a 
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ploy to vindicate Thaksin, who was in self- imposed exile since the 2006 
coup. More than 100,000 protesters poured onto the streets of Bangkok, 
some of whom occupied key government agencies, Government House, 
and telecommunication centers even though the bill had been defeated 
in the Senate.29 Demands for Yingluck’s resignation failed to subside and 
break the deadlock; Yingluck dissolved parliament at the end of 2013. All 
opposition MPs by that time had resigned, with most planning to boycott 
the subsequent election, an election that Yingluck hoped would break the 
political deadlock. The PDRC launched a reform effort ahead of the elec-
tion campaign outlining its demands to indefinitely end electoral democ-
racy to first give the country a chance to rid itself of corrupt politicians. 
The PDRC soon staged six- month- long protests and rallies throughout 
the Bangkok area, sabotaging the February 2014 election. When election 
day finally rolled around, nine provinces in southern Thailand, the Demo-
crats’ heartland, had no voting at all, while the overall turnout was 47 per-
cent, the lowest in decades and a far cry from the turnout of 75 percent in 
the previous two elections. The No Vote movement was believed to have 
succeeded in keeping ten million Thais at home on election day. Combined 
with the unusually high number of invalid and No Vote ballots, the PDRC 
declared its antielection campaign a victory and was quickly followed by a 
military putsch in May.
Social Media and the Mobilization of the PDRC
The PDRC became the first mass digitally mediated movement in Thai-
land. Prior to the advent of social media in the 2010s, the Thai media land-
scape was highly partisan along the Yellow and Red division, the former 
reflecting the conservative royalist antidemocratic sentiments, while the 
latter represented prodemocratic and pro- Thaksin forces. These political 
divisions persisted as social media came on the scene. Both the PAD and 
the PDRC were media savvy in their own way: the PAD was effectively run 
by a print media mogul while the PDRC’s main mobilization machine was 
the online sphere. The PAD was reliant on the media networks of Sonthi, 
owner of the Manager Media Group, which operated cable TV, (print and 
online) newspapers, magazines, and radio stations. The PDRC took advan-
tage of the growing availability and accessibility of the internet and the 
popularity of social media to build, run, and mobilize supporters online. 
Similarly, Thaksin himself was an extremely media- savvy person who used 
his media business networks to boost his and the UDD’s popularity. Yet the 
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PDRC was able to leverage social media for political mobilization far more 
effectively than its UDD rival. Part of this success was structural: Thailand 
was a digitally divided country in the early 2010s when internet access was 
expanding. According to the 2015 ICT Household Survey, the divide ran 
along urban–rural and socioeconomic lines: Thais who were urbanized, 
more educated, and more wealthy were more likely to be active users of 
social media.30 These socioeconomic and demographic divides mapped 
onto the Red Shirt versus Yellow Shirt division: the Yellow Shirts were 
generally better off and more urbanized than their Red Shirt counterparts. 
This digital divide partially accounted for why the PDRC was better placed 
than the UDD to take advantage of social media mobilization.
Social media was important to the PDRC movement generally and to 
its leader, Suthep Taugsuban, in particular. Social media helped to signif-
icantly raise the profile of Suthep as a legitimate contender against the 
incumbent, Yingluck Shinawatra, who was backed by the red- shirted grass-
roots support. Suthep became a viable opposition leader because of his 
sudden popularity online. Here he completely rebranded and resurrected 
himself in the (new) image of a populist opposition leader. Suthep’s rapidly 
growing online popularity provided ammunition to the beleaguered and 
disparate antigovernment groups that the opposition could lend forces to 
after the decline of the PAD. When Suthep, a member of the Democrat 
Party and the official opposition in the Thai parliament, announced that 
he, along with eight other MPs, would walk away from formal politics to 
start a grassroots movement, his Facebook popularity exploded.31 Within 
weeks Suthep went from a rather unpopular politician to a beloved “uncle” 
or kamnan32— championing the cause of many Thais disenchanted with 
the incumbent (figure 6.2). His transformation had its beginnings online, 
through his personal Facebook page,33 where he diligently documented 
his meteoric rise as leader of the PDRC.34 Through it all, Suthep’s Face-
book profile was akin to that of a rock star: he garnered more than a 5,000 
percent increase in “likes” in less than a year. For an “old- timer” who was 
first elected to office in 1979— decades before the internet became widely 
available in Thailand— Suthep’s resurgence in popularity in cyberspace was 
both astounding and unprecedented.
Suthep’s popularity on Facebook shifted the battle to gain the hearts 
and minds of Thais from the streets to the online world. Yingluck, whose 
Facebook profile was similarly popular, also witnessed the sharpest rise in 
her online activity at a time when she faced the greatest challenge from 
her opposition, the PDRC. Unlike her adversary, Suthep, social media 
presence was an integral part of her public profile preceding her political 
TABLE 6.2. Timeline of PDRC key protests and events
October 31, 2013 Suthep led the first amnesty bill protest, Samsen train station
November 24, 2013 First mass antigovernment protests led by Suthep
November 25, 2013 Closure of 13 government buildings
November 27, 2013 Closure of government agencies and 14 other ministries
November 29, 2013 Official launch of the People’s Democratic Reform Committee
November 30, 2013 Closure of main telecommunication centers and violent clash with 
the UDD
December 1, 2013 “D Day” 3- day attempt to take over the Government House
December 4, 2013 Lawyers Council of Thailand announced support for the PDRC
December 7, 2013 Multiple university groups joined PDRC protests
December 9 2013 Major protests to take over the Government House
Thai Airways Union joined the PDRC protests
Yingluck Shinawatra dissolved parliament
December 14, 2013 Academics formed the PDRC Assembly
December 21, 2013 The Democrat Party announced its boycott of the next election
PDRC protesters en route to Bangkok from provincial chapters in 
Krabi, Phuket, Satun, Nakorn Sri Thammarat
December 22, 2013 Professor Seri Wongmontha and associates joined the PDRC
Chulalongkorn University academics and students joined PDRC 
protests
December 23, 2013 Local protest in Udon Thani
December 25, 2013 Deadly clashes between STR protesters and government at the Thai- 
Japanese Sports Stadium
Election Commission asked for election postponement
December 27, 2013 Press Conference: Bangkok Shutdown Plan
January 13, 2014 Bangkok Shutdown began at 7 major intersections in Bangkok 
(Ratchaprasong, Patumwan, Lumphini, Silom, Jaengwattana, Lad 
Phrao, Asoke)
January 17, 2014 PDRC chapters in Nakorn Sri Thammarat and Satun closed down 
local governments
January 19, 2014 Thai celebrities began to join PDRC protests in large numbers
January 21, 2014 Doctor and nurse groups joined PDRC protests
January 22, 2014 Yingluck government issued an emergency decree
January 26, 2014 Protesters blocked access to 49/50 advanced polling stations in 
Bangkok and across 10 other provinces in Thailand, mostly in the 
South
February 1, 2014 Violent preelection protests began at Laksi
February 2, 2014 Election day; election could not be held in 9 southern provinces
February 5, 2014 Court issued warrants for 19 PDRC leaders
February 7, 2014 4- day fundraising rallies for farmers
February 17, 2014 PDRC took over Government House
February 23, 2014 Attacks against PDRC protesters in Bangkok and Trat
February 28, 2014 All protests ceased except for Lumpini Park
March 21, 2014 February election results annulled by the Constitutional Court
May 2, 2014 PDRC- aligned senator became president of the Senate
May 7, 2014 Yingluck ordered removed from office by the Constitutional Court
May 9, 2014 Major protests organized in 6 rounds
May 18, 2014 Suthep announced mass protests beginning on May 19– 22
May 20, 2014 Army chief Prayuth Chan o- cha announced marshal law
May 22, 2014 Coup d’état
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career. After her party, Pheu Thai, secured a landslide victory in the 2011 
election, winning 48 percent of the vote (Nelson 2013), Yingluck became 
the first female prime minister of Thailand. This generated a fervor on 
social media, with new “fan pages” being created on Facebook along the 
likes of “Ruam kan chia khun ying lak phuea thai” (Let’s cheer for Yingluck 
Pheu Thai).35 Her Facebook popularity, however, was starting to wane as 
Suthep gained ground on social media.
Suthep’s interactions with his supporters via his Facebook pages between 
November 2013 and May 2014 suggest that it was not event driven because 
his online popularity occurred during both protest and nonprotest times. 
Each of Suthep’s Facebook posts garnered on average more than 100,000 
interactions from other net users; on his best day that figure rose to three 
million.
Interactivity online is a measure of virality: the more one’s content 
is shared, “liked,” and commented on, the more popular that content 
becomes.36 Further, interactivity also helps to drive web and social media 
traffic, making Suthep’s content more likely to appear on other users’ Face-
book feeds irrespective of whether that person has “liked” his page or not. 
The fact that Suthep’s Facebook had millions of followers who interacted 
daily with his content, and in numbers approximating hundreds of thou-
sands, indicated a strong online presence above all other opposition lead-
ers, including the very popular incumbent herself. Suthep, in effect, outdid 
everyone on social media.
Suthep’s social media networks also helped to at once unite the opposi-
tion and catapult him to its leadership. The antigovernment rallies were 
disparate and loosely aligned before Suthep’s group emerged.37 Some of 
the large opposition groups were drawn from previous PAD networks and 
were natural allies, such as the Dharma Forces, the People’s Networks from 
the 77 Provinces, and the Green Group. But others were strange bedfellows 
such as the more right- wing People’s Army Against the Thaksin Regime, 
led largely by former military generals, and the more left- wing Student 
and People Network Thailand Reform composed mostly of student lead-
ers and activists. Initially, the former PAD networks, which had organized 
most of the antigovernment protests, renounced the possibility of allying 
with the Democrats for fear of being seen as partisan.38 By late November, 
the STR recognized the strength and expansive reach of Suthep and the 
Democrat mobilization capacity, which had helped grow and amass signifi-
cant support. On November 23, all the leaders appeared together on the 
Urupong stage— officially uniting their forces as one. And on November 
29, the PDRC was born with Suthep chosen as the top leader. Suriyasai 
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Katasila, a former PAD leader and head of the Green Group, revealed that 
Suthep’s resources and social media profile factored into the decision to 
concede the movement’s leadership to him.39
Supporters of the PDRC were also more likely to be mobilized to 
engage in offline activities because of social media than their rival, the 
UDD. According to the Asia Foundation, which surveyed PDRC and 
UDD protesters in November 2013, PDRC supporters were much more 
frequent users of social media than their UDD counterparts in consuming 
political news and organizing themselves to join offline rallies.40 To bet-
ter understand the characteristics and dynamics of PDRC and UDD sup-
porters online and off, I compare results from the Asia Foundation survey 
with a Facebook analysis of Suthep Taugsuban’s and Yingluck Shinawatra’s 
pages from November 2013 to March 2014.41 The field survey interviewed 
315 respondents— 154 were PDRC protest participants in five different 
locations— and the other 161 were UDD supporters who were interviewed 
at the Rajamangkla Stadium where the UDD held a large rally to counter 
the PDRC rallies. Yingluck’s and Suthep’s Facebook pages, respectively, 
were chosen as the closest proxies to UDD and PDRC support because 
the movements were most mobilized on Facebook via their leaders (de 
facto or otherwise) and not on organizational pages, and both pages were 
of equal size.
The highly polarized media ecosystem, noted by the Red- and Yellow- 
divided media outlets in figure 6.1, did not dissipate with the advent of 
social media. Instead of providing “neutral” spaces for public discussions 
where people of different political beliefs could exchange ideas, social 
media is shown to have entrenched and contributed to a deepening of the 
polarization. This chapter is particularly concerned not just with political 
polarization but also with other societal and economic cleavages that were 
present in the offline world. Figure 6.2 shows a list of some of the most 
popular political groups on Facebook in 2015, excluding the PDRC. The 
social media space was divided largely along the red- shirted and yellow- 
shirted camps: much of the former were concentrated on the UDD Thai-
land official page while the Yellow Shirts were more spread out across 
groups. Moreover, the Yellow Shirts were more numerous than the Red 
Shirts, both in the number of Yellow Shirt– affiliated groups and in the size 
of their online support base. Finally, the “Blue” groups, which were neither 
Red nor Yellow, were the least popular and attracted the smallest support 
base online. These observations of political groups on Facebook provide 
some indication of a politically divided social media in Thailand.
To demonstrate how polarization occurs on social media in the Thai 
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case, new data from Facebook was collected and analyzed. I performed a 
“data dump” by extracting all Facebook activities from both pages during 
the specified time period, a total of over six million data points. I calculated 
the interaction rates (Facebook shares, likes, and comments) of the public 
pages of Yingluck Shinawatra and Suthep Taugsuban, and then chose the 
five busiest days of each page to analyze. I then randomly selected 300 ano-
nymized comments, which were computed using the software Quintly, for 
each page for a total of 600 comments. Third, I manually analyzed the pro-
files of individuals who had posted comments on Suthep’s and Yingluck’s 
pages. I consider “comments” to be an active form of political participation, 
unlike “sharing” or “liking,” which merely requires the unconscious click 
of a button. Commenting requires the user to actively read the comments 
Figure 6.1. Interaction rate of Suthep and Yingluck’s Facebook pages
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above and form a cogent response, and thus represents a more robust indi-
cator of political participation online.
Profile analysis of the randomly selected comments was performed 
anonymously using both the software Quintly and manual searches of key 
profile information voluntarily provided by individuals who commented 
on these pages. Key profile information included (1) gender; (2) current 
location; (3) birthplace; (4) occupation; and (5) education level. For gen-
der, I note male and female (self- declared gender). Location and birth-
place were indicated by province, which were then categorized into five 
regions: Greater Bangkok, North, Northeast, Central, and South. Taking 
into account the fact that a large number of Thai people live outside their 
hometown (and many return to vote on election day), it is imperative that 
we can analyze the differences in Facebook engagement based on both 
types of location. For example, a person living in Bangkok whose birthplace 
is Surat Thani (southern Thailand) may comment positively on Suthep’s 
page because Surat Thani is a PDRC stronghold. Occupation and edu-
cation levels are important socioeconomic indicators, which I also use as 
proxies for income, since there is no available income data on a Facebook 
profile. Occupations are divided into five major categories: (1) high skilled; 
(2) low skilled; (3) government; (4) entrepreneur/business owner; and (5) 
other. Educational attainment is divided into three levels: (1) high school; 
(2) diploma and bachelor’s degree; and (3) master’s degree and above.
The above analysis also gets to the issue of social cleavages particularly 
based on regional identities and economic status. The PAD–UDD divi-
sions, as discussed in previous chapters, have been shaped by partisan-
ship, regional identities, and class. Supporters of the PAD and the PDRC 
were largely from the upper rungs of the middle class, largely urban and 
more educated, and drawn primarily from the Democrat Party’s support 
base in Bangkok, eastern Thailand, and southern Thailand. The UDD, 
on the other hand, drew from the lower rungs of the middle class, were 
less educated, and reflected Thaksin’s strongholds in parts of Bangkok, 
the North, and the Northeast. In terms of demographics, social media 
users should tend to be from younger age groups given that young adults 
in general are the primary users of social media; this should be reflected 
in our survey regardless of political affiliation. If social media could break 
the regional, political, social, and economic cleavages, we should not see 
the same divisions reflected online. However, if social media entrenches 
existing cleavages, then we should see the same patterns observed offline 
in the online world.
Why do socioeconomic profiles of social media users matter? Under-
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standing the demographic, social, and economic backgrounds, and those 
online in comparison of those offline, helps to indicate whether social 
media can reduce or entrench participatory inequality— the unequal level 
of political participation due to entrenched socioeconomic cleavages. Nor-
ris (2001) framed this debate close to two decades ago between two sets 
of arguments. The mobilization thesis posits that the growing ubiquity of 
the internet in general invites new groups into politics that were previ-
ously disengaged, excluded, or underrepresented. By lowering the costs 
of participation and offering self- actualizing platforms for engagement, 
social media motivates previously inactive groups like young people to 
become involved in politics. The reinforcement thesis, on the contrary, 
sees the growth in information availability and social media use as having 
little meaningful impact on the patterns of online political participation. 
While the political opportunities to engage in politics may widen more 
than ever, long- standing patterns of inequalities can still persist in domains 
such as income and education given that engaging in political life online 
requires additional resources to mobilize individuals beyond simply access 
(Hargittai and Hsieh 2013). Schlozman, Verba, and Brady (2010) call the 
internet “weapons of the strong” based on their finding of a powerful and 
durable association between socioeconomic status and political participa-
tion online in their extensive analysis of the 2008 Pew Internet and Ameri-
can Life survey. Thus, internet use only closes the political knowledge and 
participation gaps among lower socioeconomic status individuals.
The comparison of socioeconomic profiles of political participants 
online and offline during the 2013– 14 large- scale protests in Thailand 
provides a strong indicator that the participants on Facebook were dis-
tinct from protesters on the streets regardless of their political affiliation. 
Social media, Sinpeng (2017) argues, has the potential to equalize existing 
structural inequalities in a polity by providing space for political engage-
ment to those who might not be able to participate otherwise. The profile 
comparison shows that there are remarkable similarities between PDRC 
and UDD fans online. This, compared with a much wider gap that existed 
between their street- level participants, shows that the online avenue of 
political engagement helps to reduce socioeconomic gaps between partici-
pants regardless of political affiliation. Sixty percent of PDRC fans and 56 
percent of UDD fans on Facebook had completed postsecondary educa-
tion compared to 86 percent and 50 percent, respectively, for the street 
protesters, shows that the gap in levels of education in the supporters of the 
two movements significantly narrows in cyberspace. Similarly, the largest 
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share of online supporters in both camps had low- skilled occupations— a 
stark contrast from their street protesters where 30 percent of the UDD 
were low skilled as opposed to a mere 6 percent of the PDRC. Facebook 
is thus not an arena for the political engagement of the privileged. Rather, 
in some cases it offers opportunities for participation for the less educated 
and less skilled in comparison to street protests.
Do the same socioeconomic inequalities observed among the PDRC 
and UDD street protesters carry over into cyberspace? The findings sug-
gest that the socioeconomic differentials were greater within group than 
across group in the case of the PDRC. While the Facebook political par-
ticipants in the two movements generally had higher levels of socioeco-
nomic status than the overall population and the control group, the same 
cannot be concluded between the street- level and online participants. For 
the UDD, the hypothesis seems to hold: its Facebook fans were slightly 
more educated and held more skilled occupations than those surveyed at 
the protest site. In contrast, the opposite is true for the PDRC whose street 
protesters were significantly more endowed socioeconomically than their 
supporters on Facebook. A question might arise whether it would be possi-
ble that more PDRC participants at protest rallies used social media, which 
might then lead to a higher proportion of the online participants being 
better off. The Asia Foundation survey reveals that to be true: 32 percent 
the PDRC supporters heard about the rallies via smartphone or the inter-
Figure 6.2. Political pages/groups and their number of likes on Facebook (2015)
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net, while only 5 percent of the UDD supporters did so. Yet, even though 
more PDRC street protesters used social media than the Red Shirts, it still 
does not explain why they were better off than their peers on Facebook. 
Why is this the case? While this chapter cannot provide a more definite 
answer to this question given the lack of additional empirical data, some 
tentative arguments can be made. One explanation for the wide margins 
within the PDRC movement itself is that the locations of the rallies were 
in central business districts in Bangkok; this may indicate that the street 
participants were likely to be professionals (i.e., office workers). Moreover, 
the PDRC rallies might be more resource- intensive, given the six- month 
protest period across multiple locations in the city. This could mean that 
those who physically attended protests also helped contribute to the move-
ment’s activities at rally sites, potentially meaning they would be wealthier 
than the PDRC participants on Facebook.
The regional divisions among the support base of the PDRC and UDD 
do carry forward to the online world. The field survey data shows that sup-
porters of Yingluck Shinawatra approximate her party’s electoral strong-
holds wherein Bangkok, the North, and the Northeast of Thailand are the 
most important. Similarly, Suthep’s electoral base included areas where 
the Democrat Party was strongest: Bangkok, the Central region, and the 
Southern region. The Facebook analysis notes a significant overrepresen-
tation of the Bangkokian fan base, with each group comprising more than 
50 percent of total fan numbers in this study. Nonetheless, the North and 
Northeastern regions and the South and Central regions accounted for the 
second and third source regions, respectively, for the UDD and PDRC. 
This suggests that regional divides cut across into the online world even 
though the means of engagement vary. Moreover, the fact that street par-
ticipants derived from the provinces more than from Bangkok, despite all 
rallies being held in Bangkok, indicates that the dynamics of mobilization 
by the two political movements were different in the offline and online 
spaces. On the streets, movement leaders were likely to depend more on 
their networks in stronghold areas to recruit and mobilize supporters who 
would then go to Bangkok and rally. Online, however, it matters far less 
where their fans came from, and the overrepresentation of Bangkok- based 
supporters was likely because the protests were in the capital city and peo-
ple felt more emotionally engaged than if they were from further away.
To measure a degree of polarization, I performed a network analy-
sis of Suthep’s and Yingluck’s Facebook pages. This inquiry was specifi-
cally designed to address the question of whether or not social media can 
Social Media and the New Antidemocrats 163
entrench political divisions. The Facebook posts on December 25, 2013 
from each leader’s pages were chosen for analysis as a sample of a key post 
during the 2013– 14 protests.42 Given the large networks of both pages, 
with in excess of 3,000,000 “likes,” it was not feasible to perform a network 
analysis over the same time frame as the socioeconomic profile data. I used 
“R” to extract raw data from Facebook posts and conduct an analysis on 
the networks of “likes,” “co- likes” (liking of both pages), comments, and 
co- comments (commenting on both pages) to infer the extent to which 
the networks of both pages have cross- over membership. If deep political 
divisions between the PDRC and UDD exist online as much as offline, 
we should observe few co- comments and co- likes between members of 
Figure 6.3. Current residence, by region, of PDRC and UDD protesters (street) and 
Suthep and Yingluck supporters (online)
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the two networks. Content analyses of comments on both Suthep’s and 
Yingluck’s pages were performed, drawing on the same data as the profile 
analysis. Comments were manually analyzed and separated into two large 
categories: (1) praise/attack; and (2) policy issue. The results are then com-
pared to the motivations of protesters at rally sites from the Asia Founda-
tion Survey. If Facebook represented a mere echo chamber for individu-
als, we would expect the comments to remain partisan and align with the 
offline protest movement.
Figure 6.4. Network visualization of commenters on Suthep’s and Yingluck’s 
Facebook pages
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The Facebook network analysis confirms a deep political division 
between supporters of the PDRC and UDD online. Out of the 41,704 likes 
on Yingluck’s post and the corresponding 48,891 on Suthep’s, there were 
only 236 “co- likes,” representing a mere 0.3 percent. Co- likes constitute a 
measure for Facebook users who like both Suthep’s and Yingluck’s posts. 
Similarly, there were 1,163 comments on Yingluck’s post and 4,216 on 
Suthep’s but only 28 co- comments. The very low number of co- likes and 
co- comments indicate how little PDRC and UDD supporters on Facebook 
interact with each other’s networks. These findings suggest that the PDRC 
and UDD communities act as online “echo chambers”— polarized politi-
cal groupings that communicate almost exclusively within their respective 
groups with little crossover to other groups. There is a rich literature in 
media studies and psychology that notes the prevalence of confirmation 
bias and selective news exposure on social media that entrenches preex-
isting views of the political world, thereby creating “filter bubbles” and 
echo chambers (Knobloch- Westerwick and Johnson 2014; Nikolov et al. 
2015). People selectively consume information that conforms to their prior 
beliefs, and they especially trust information from authoritative sources 
like politicians and established media outlets that align with their views 
(Del Vicario et al. 2016). Suthep and Yingluck were both hugely popular on 
social media and as such attracted a large number of followers who engaged 
with their content in order to perpetuate these leaders’ views as opposed to 
creating their own. The network visualization in figure 6.4 demonstrates 
well how PDRC and UDD supporters alike constituted polarized echo 
chambers, contributing to the further entrenchment of the political divi-
sions in Thai politics.
Additional content analysis of comments from PDRC supporters shows 
that 90 percent of comments on Suthep’s Facebook page during the Bang-
kok Shutdown protests were supportive of Suthep’s posts. This means that 
the vast majority of Suthep’s 2.7 million Facebook “likes” went in tandem 
with the PDRC ethos, amplifying antidemocratic support for a movement 
that demanded an end to electoral democracy. Among the issues most 
prevalent in the comment sections of Suthep’s page, praise for his efforts 
in fighting preelection reforms was the most prominent. Other issues in 
support of Suthep and the PDRC included (1) opposition to Thaksin and 
his family; (2) opposition to the amnesty bill; and (3) protection of the 
monarchy.43 Moreover, the Facebook comments were highly polarized, 
as more than 90 percent of comments either supported or opposed the 
movements— very few were neutral. Such results confirm previous find-
ings in Groemping’s (2014) study of partisanship in the Thai 2014 elec-
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tion. Facebook, he argues, played the role of echo chamber rather than a 
neutral space for deliberation (Groemping 2014). Perhaps such outcomes 
should have been expected given that these were the public pages of popu-
lar movement leaders. But the idea, nonetheless, that social media can cre-
ate spaces for exchanging ideas, creating new meaning, and regenerating 
new discourses was not at all evident in these political pages.
The findings in this chapter provide empirical evidence that social 
media use of political engagement may help narrow the existing socioeco-
nomic structural inequalities in a society by providing the less privileged 
a space for activism. Despite a significant degree of digital inequality in 
Thailand, given the mere 40 percent of the population that have access to 
the internet and the fact that those “wired” tend to be socioeconomically 
better off than the wider population, we cannot observe a selective bias in 
the participants of the two political movements on Facebook. Instead, we 
see that the socioeconomic gap narrows in terms of the profiles of those 
engaged in online politics from what was observed on the streets. The 
online political participants of the PDRC and UDD were more similar 
to one another than were their street protesters. The UDD supporters, 
generally of lower socioeconomic status than their PDRC counterparts, 
had similar profiles among street- level and Facebook participants: the larg-
est share had secondary education but low- skilled occupations. Most came 
from Bangkok, the North, or the Northeast, although a majority of online 
fans were Bangkok- based. The PDRC supporters were exactly the oppo-
site: a vast majority of their street protesters were highly educated and 
held high- skilled or government jobs, while their online peers were less 
educated, and many held low- skilled occupations. For both the PDRC and 
UDD, online political engagement offers opportunities for political activ-
ism to those with some education but not skilled jobs.
Moreover, the partisanship of the online UDD and PDRC networks 
indicates that Facebook would not help to ameliorate the deep polariza-
tion in Thailand as a result of a decade long political crisis. Instead, as the 
content analysis of comments show, Facebook can act to exacerbate the 
conflict by, on the one hand, bringing a new section of society into politi-
cal engagement while, on the other, providing an echo chamber for like- 
minded users rather than constructing a space for deliberation of opposing 
views. The implication for Thai politics going forward, as Facebook pen-
etration continues to expand, is that the political conflict in Thailand will 
enlarge rather than dissipate due to a low likelihood of cross- over commu-
nication and deliberation of thoughts and ideas.
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Conclusion
Social media became a game changer for antidemocratic mobilization in 
Thailand. After the opening of channels for opposition politics in the post- 
2006 coup period, the PAD began to suffer a continuous loss of popular 
support; it was further weakened by the movement’s internal squabbles. 
When another Thaksin- aligned party, Pheu Thai, was elected in 2011, the 
PAD’s decline accelerated, leaving an opposition vacuum in the Thai pol-
ity that no viable political opposition movement could fill. The mid- 2010s 
were also marked by a period of heightened connectivity in Thai society 
in which the number of internet and social media users exploded, particu-
larly in the country’s urban and economically advantageous areas where 
telecommunications infrastructure was available, and whose residents 
were sufficiently well off to afford smartphones and tablets. The PDRC 
emerged at this critical juncture: increased marginalization of opposition 
voices under the Yingluck government, on the one hand, and increased 
social media connectivity, on the other. However, the dissolution of the 
PAD had resulted in many small and largely ineffective opposition groups, 
unable to either unite or mount any kind of credible mobilization. It was 
not until Suthep Taugsuban, along with several former Democrat Party 
members, had left parliamentary politics to pursue grassroots street poli-
tics that the PDRC was eventually born under his helm. And it was social 
media that played a critical role in transforming Suthep from an unpopular 
politician to a beloved protest leader and ultimate leader of an opposition 
movement that mass- produced millions of supporters online and hundreds 
of thousands more on the streets. Suthep’s transformation into one of the 
most popular political figures in Thailand took place on Facebook; here, 
his popularity skyrocketed, despite his having no experience in grassroots 
protest politics and being a career politician since the 1970s. His online 
popularity helped unite the disparate and disunited opposition groups and 
win him its ultimate leadership. The PDRC began its life based on Suthep’s 
social media popularity, and its supporters continued to rely heavily on 
social media to mobilize online and offline protest campaigns that led 
eventually to another coup d’état in May 2014.
Findings from an analysis of the social media profile of the PDRC dem-
onstrates equally that social media entrenches social and regional cleav-
ages, deepens political polarization, and amplifies antidemocratic voices. 
More importantly is that the antidemocratic contributions social media 
made to the PDRC movement were possible for the sole reason that 
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Suthep was skilled at social media marketing. Other opposition figures, 
never having experienced success in garnering online popular support, did 
not contribute to the movement in the same way due to their lack of reach 
and depth in online networks and in online popularity to spread their mes-
sages. Suthep was the case of a social media “top influencer,” making his 
online impact all the more powerful. Contrary to earlier optimism that 
social media could be democracy’s savior by empowering ordinary people 
to fight against elites’ autocratic tendencies, the PDRC has shown that it 
was the masses themselves who were propelling the antidemocratic move-
ment. When social media became a tool for public communication, that 
gap widened, rather than narrowing, existing divisions in society be they 
social, demographic, regional, or economic. Existing societal cleavages 
became entrenched because conversations online became polarized and 
siloed, thereby giving prominence to antidemocratizing voices rather than 
neutralizing them. On social media, the PDRC became an online echo 
chamber, where only yellow- shirted supporters communicated, alienating 
those with differing opinions. Much of the content shared on PDRC pages, 
numbering in a million data points, over the course of their protest activities 
of late 2013 to early 2014 showed that the majority of supporters endorsed 
Suthep’s antidemocratic principles of calling a halt to electoral democracy 
and enhancing the political power of nondemocratic institutions.
This social- media- centric analysis of the PDRC mobilization does not 
mean that other avenues of mobilization are not important components of 
a social movement. Suthep became the most powerful opposition leader 
not only because of his social media popularity but also because he had 
the networks and resources from the Democrat Party and was himself a 
wealthy individual. But it was his popularity online that allowed him to 
gain popular support, grow his support base extensively in a very short 
period of time, and unite the opposition groups into one formidable move-
ment that eventually paved the way for a military putsch. His large online 
following also helped fund the PDRC itself, which helped to crowdfund 
the movement’s protest activities.44 The PDRC better leveraged social 
media than its UDD counterpart: its fans were more “wired,” relied more 
on social media for news and activities of the movement, and turned out in 
much higher numbers in offline protests due to what they had seen com-
municated online. The profile differentiation between the PDRC online 
and street protesters also shows how distinct the online crowd was from 
its street- level one, suggesting that those supporting the PDRC online 
were unlikely to be those who might have been mobilized offline without 
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prior engagement with social media. Social media made it possible for the 
PDRC’s antidemocratic agenda to gain ground with millions of people in 
a matter of weeks through its online networks. A second military coup in 
less than a decade, once considered unviable, became plausible and less 





Who supports military dictatorship and why? This chapter uses social 
media data to analyze support for the antidemocratic mobilization of the 
People’s Democratic Reform Committee (PDRC) and the subsequent 
military dictatorship, which lasted from 2014 to 2019. Following the 2014 
military putsch, which the PDRC saw as a success, the movement had to 
find a new identity and purpose postcoup. This chapter seeks to under-
stand why people supported the PDRC not just before the coup but also 
after the military government had been installed. This fills a gap in the lit-
erature on regime change, which tends to be focused on explaining support 
for democratic collapse and remains silent on this support in its aftermath. 
How do people justify military dictatorships once they have been installed, 
and why do they support such a regime? The empirical findings from this 
chapter may present the first- ever evidence of prodictatorship support fol-
lowing a collapse of democracy.
This chapter constructs an original dataset based on fifteen million Face-
book data points on all the activities of the five most popular procoup pages 
in Thailand for a three- year period following the May 2014 coup. I refer 
to them in this study as the “procoup groups” as they mobilized largely in 
opposition to an elected government and demanded military intervention 
to topple such a government. We know less about their online behavior after 
the coup and whether one could assume their support for the subsequent 
military government. Social media is not solely a platform for political par-
ticipation and mobilization. It is a new way to gather political preferences. 
Recent studies examining the accuracy of data extracted from social media 
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in comparison to traditional public opinion polls reveal social media data to 
closely approximate polling data (Ceron et al. 2014; Skoric, Liu and Jaidka 
2020). Mining social media data is also increasingly being used to measure 
mass preferences in authoritarian regimes where accurate mechanisms for 
detecting public opinion are largely absent or seriously flawed (Qiang 2011; 
Gunitsky 2015). Based on the use of Latent Dirichlet Allocation topic mod-
eling, the findings suggest that the procoup networks of supporters varied 
greatly in both motivations and support for the dictatorship they had fought 
for. Contrary to the prevailing notion that a military government would be 
necessary to “protect the monarchy,” royalism was neither the driving force 
of support across groups nor what united them. Instead, some groups were 
motivated by their desire for particular policies; others were promilitary for 
ideological reasons. It was clear that there was a genuine decline in support 
for the military among the majority of the PDRC supporters with much of 
their discontent stemming from economic and policy issues. However, pro-
dictatorship support was maintained among the most staunch promilitary 
groups within the PDRC networks.
By comparing social media data among PDRC key groups during the 
PDRC mobilization one year prior to the May 2014 coup, the findings 
suggest important differences in preferences before and after the military 
putsch. Anti– Red Shirt and antigovernment sentiment, to speak generally, 
was the most important uniting factor for PDRC’s antidemocratic mobi-
lization across all key support groups, not royalism. Other motivating fac-
tors varied across groups; but again, royalism was the least prominent fea-
ture of all groups’ preferences.
The social network analysis of procoup groups during the military dic-
tatorship also demonstrates significant divides across groups. First, the low 
interaction rate within the prodictatorship networks implies a vertically 
strong but horizontally weak base in support of the regime. Second, the 
promilitary supporters were motivated by ideological and not material- 
based preferences. Third, the mapping of anti- and promilitary commu-
nities suggests polarization during the dictatorship period and very little 
evidence of national reconciliation, this being the primary objective of 
the military junta. Further, the decline in support of the PDRC under the 
junta’s government instead boded badly for political parties aligned with 
PDRC leaders in the subsequent March 2019 election: the result was an 
embarrassing defeat of the PAD/PDRC successor parties.
The chapter is divided into four parts. The first part explains the meth-
odology, outlining justification for the social media data mining tools used. 
The second part discusses the results from the precoup sentiment analysis 
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of the PDRC. The third part discusses findings from the postcoup analysis 
of the same groups within the PDRC that were behind the 2014 coup. 
Social network analysis of procoup networks during the military dictator-
ship is also analyzed. Lastly, implications of the social media data analysis 
of PDRC networks before and after the coup are outlined.
Mining Public Opinion Data on Facebook
Thailand serves as a crucial case to examine online sentiment toward a 
dictatorship not only because it recently experienced a transition from a 
democracy to a military government. It is significant also because the pro-
coup supporters were largely networked on Facebook through the PDRC 
movement. Findings from chapter 6 and additional research on the mobi-
lization of the broad procoup PDRC movement demonstrate the central 
role played by Facebook in expanding and mobilizing popular support for 
the military putsch (Sinpeng 2017; Groemping and Sinpeng 2018). There 
is a focus here on the postcoup authoritarian regime precisely because so 
little is known about the motivations and sentiment among these supposed 
supporters of the regime. This chapter is especially interested in groups 
that have been in favor of such regime change for the simple reason that 
in the climate of an authoritarian regime they are more likely to express 
their sentiment online than are opposition groups. Facebook is an appro-
priate site of inquiry especially in cases where the procoup groups are net-
worked online for engagement and mobilization. It means that this social 
media platform already plays a key role in inducing regime change and 
should thus remain as an important and relevant site of support for the new 
authoritarian regime following democratic breakdown.
The key questions addressed in this chapter are the following:
 1. What type of discourses are present within the procoup networks 
before and after the coup?
 2. Do the motivations for supporting military dictatorship vary, and 
if so, how?
 3. Are the motivations for supporting military dictatorship follow-
ing a coup different from or similar to procoup support? If differ-
ent, how?
Data was collected in two tranches. The first constitutes the precoup 
data, which includes the top 200 comments of all Facebook posts on the 
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pages of the five most popular procoup groups during the period of May 22, 
2013 to May 22, 2014— one year preceding the coup. The second tranche 
of data was collected between May 23, 2014 and May 23, 2017, constituting 
a period of three years following the military coup. There is an assump-
tion here that groups that were supportive of military intervention would 
also be supportive of the successive authoritarian regime. The popularity 
of these pages was measured by the overall number of “likes” on Face-
book (figure 7.1). The public pages of Suthep Thaugsuban, the People’s 
Democratic Reform Committee, V for Thailand, Thailand Informed, and 
Army Supporter were thus selected.1 All five of these groups formed part 
of the PDRC that helped bring down the elected government of Yingluck 
Shinawatra in the May 2014 coup. Note that groups that were part of the 
offline PDRC mobilization, such as the STR, are not included here— not 
because they were insignificant to the procoup networks, but because their 
pages online were not popular in comparison to others. Again, the main 
emphasis here is on online sentiment via Facebook, which means that some 
groups that were crucial offline but not popular online are thus excluded.
Facebook data were extracted directly from Facebook using R, Graph 
API, and specifically the Rfacebook package developed by Pablo Bar-
bera.2 The entire dataset contained approximately fifteen million data 
points, which included all posts by the page administrators, page “likes,” 
comments, replies to comments, “likes” of comments, and shares for the 
postcoup period. Together these pages generated 3,488 posts, 13.3 mil-
lion “likes,” 585,579 shares, and 718,069 comments. An additional 246,288 
comments drawn from the top 200 from the precoup period were also 
collected to render a comparative analysis between the pre- and postcoup 
periods. Comments became the focus of the text analysis as “comments” 
























Posts 459 525 504 1,000 1,000
Likes 11,575,624 286,767 241,395 697,602 449,016
Comments 616,461 8,511 3,905 58,180 31,012
Shares 274,189 16,204 16,339 128,695 150,152
Note: “Likes” are the number of “likes” of posts, comments, and replies, not the page likes; English names of 
pages are based on the translated names on their Facebook pages and do not reflect the author’s own translation
Time frame: May 23, 2014 to May 23, 2017
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are considered the most active and nuanced expression of a user’s senti-
ment on Facebook. Unlike “liking” or sharing, comments included texts 
that could be further analyzed. Following this, a database of the top 200 
comments for each post for all five pages was created in a separate file 
for manual text analysis. Although R was used to extract this data, Python 
had to be used to analyze the Thai text because the only natural language 
processing algorithm for Thai is available in Python. The biggest problem 
with the Thai language in any kind of computational text analysis is word 
segmentation because the language does not have natural spaces between 
words like Romance or Germanic languages. The ThaiNLP package offers 
six algorithms for word segmentation and all six were run to manually 
examine its accuracy. Algorithms with the highest accuracy were chosen. 
Stop words were also then removed from the data.
Text analysis was performed both quantitatively and qualitatively in 
three stages. First, to get a rough sense of important words in the com-
ments section of the Facebook pages, a keyword count package was run 
on Python. Words were counted by their frequency and then ranked from 
high to low. A list of the top ten most frequently used words was pro-
duced for each page (figure 7.2). The results provide some indicator of 
potential issues that were heavily discussed in each of the pages. For both 
Suthep and the PDRC, discussion about Suthep personally— with refer-
ence to kamnan and “uncle”— dominated. This likely related to his being 
ordained as a Buddhist monk immediately following the coup. As for V for 
Thailand, it was difficult to discern exactly what may have dominated the 
page’s discussion, but it could be inferred that it was antigovernment. For 
Thailand Informed, many of the comments seemed to refer to its follow-
ers’ nationalistic pride, and for Army Supporter, their love for the army 
and the monarchy. This keyword count method can inform us on the fre-
quency of term usage, and gives a very rough idea— at times, vaguely so— 
about the issues that might dominate the page comments. On their own, 
the word frequencies are insufficient evidence of what might be discussed 
as they does not compute which certain terms are likely to occur with what 
others— it merely ranks terms and their frequencies.
To better understand what users of these procoup pages were talking 
about, including what might be driving the discourse for coup support (pre-
coup) and dictatorship support (postcoup) on Facebook, a more in- depth 
analysis of comments was needed. To achieve this, I performed topic mod-
eling on the complete set of comment text across the five Facebook pages 
to examine which “topics” might be fueling the discourse. Topic modeling 
is a prevalent machine learning method in the natural language processing 
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area. The topic modeling algorithms statistically analyze a big collection 
of documents (corpus) in order to extract a number of “topics” that repre-
sent the document in an abstract way. Each topic is a probability distribu-
tion over all words in the vocabulary that shows how likely the words will 
be used together in a document. Therefore, the “topics” generated by the 
topic modeling algorithm show words that often occur together, although 
these may or may not be interpreted as meaningful word clusters by a 
human reviewer. In this study, the Thai Facebook comments form a corpus 
for the topic modeling, where each individual comment is treated as a doc-
ument, and ten topics are extracted using the Latent Dirichlet Allocation 
topic modeling algorithm3 using the open source Python machine learning 
library— Scikit- Learn.4 Through this approach, the top- thirty most salient 
terms were computed and the relevance matrix computed to form the ten 
most likely topics and their probability for term co- occurrence for each 
page. A list of the top ten topics per page was then produced.
To improve the quality and saliency of topics further, a manual text anal-
ysis was performed to make sense of the topics identified through Latent 
Dirichlet Allocation. For each of the posts made by the page administrator, 
the 200 most popular comments were extracted using R. The most popu-
lar comments were those receiving the highest level of interaction (lik-
ing, sharing, commenting, replies). The manual checking allows for more 
accurate interpretation of topics that are grounded in possible contexts and 
specific events surrounding the use of certain words. For instance, on the 
topic of “democracy,” there can be a number of different interpretations 
as to what each page discussion inferred about democracy. The associated 
TABLE 7.2. Ten most frequently used words, May 23, 2014 to May 23, 2017
Suthep amen (สาธุ), uncle (ลุง), kamnan (กำานัน) fight (สู้), together (ด้วยกัน) 
express gratitude (อนุโมทนา), people (พวกเรา), sir (ท่าน), merit  
(บุญ), good (ดี)
PDRC uncle (ลุง), amen (สาธุ), give (ให้), kamnan (กำานัน), may Buddha (ขอ
พระ), benevolence (พระคุณ), fight (สู้), recover (หาย), prosper (เจริญ), 
express gratitude (อนุโมทนา)
V for Thailand มัน (they— vulgar), people (พวกเรา), มึง (you— vulgar) good (ดี), die  
(ตาย), no way (ไม่ได้), our country (ประเทศเรา), Thai (ไทย) culprit  
(ตัวการ), this way (แบบนี)้
Thailand Informed Thai people (คนไทย), thank you (ขอบคุณ), ultimate (สุดยอด), support 
(กำาลังใจ), nation (ชาติ), for what (เพื่ออะไร), protect (คุ้มครอง), 
country (ประเทศ), citizens (ประชาชน), all/everyone (ทุกคน)
Army Supporter long live (ทรงพระเจริญ), army (ทหาร), king (พระองค์), lasting (ยิ่งๆ), 
long live (ยืนนาน), Thai people (คนไทย), only do (ทำาแต)่, love (รัก), 
wishing (ขอให้), live well (อยู่ดี)
Note: Excludes stop words.
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terms for this topic include “politicians,” “election,” “vested interests,” and 
“bad.” Without manually checking the top comments, one could perhaps 
infer that V for Thailand, an antidemocratic movement, views elections as 
illegitimate in Thailand because of corrupt politicians. Through manual 
verification, one can assign a positive or negative sentiment toward the 
topic and confirm or unconfirm the topic interpretation. In the case of V, 
the majority of comments that discussed the issue of democracy referred to 
the opinion that elections do not equate with democracy— especially in the 
Thai case where they considered politicians to be bad and not legitimate 
even when elected.
Understanding PDRC Support for the 2014 Coup
What can millions of Facebook data points tell us about motivations to 
support the PDRC movement? Opposing the Red Shirts, which the PDRC 
saw as represented by the incumbent, Yingluck Shinawatra, was the single 
most important reason for supporting the PDRC. Anti– Red Shirt senti-
ment was also the only common category of topics, other than royalism, 
shared by all five pages (figure 7.3). Topic modeling analysis shows that 
60 percent of comments posted on Suthep’s page could be categorized as 
anti– Red Shirt, with 52 percent for Army Supporter, 31 percent for Thai-
land Informed, and 8 percent for the PDRC. Suthep’s page was the most 
popular of all pages, amassing 2.5 million likes just before the coup, and the 
fact that more than half of all of the top comments on his page were about 
opposing the Red Shirts speaks volumes to how much hatred the PDRC 
supporters had toward their adversaries.
Examining more deeply the choice of words most frequently used 
within the anti– Red Shirt topic, the analysis shows that most of the terms 
associated with the “Reds” were derogatory and personal. Terms such as 
“buffalo,” “stupid,” “no brain,” “dog,” and “evil” were used to describe the 
Red Shirts. These keywords have long been used throughout both PAD 
and PDRC rallies and protests, and corresponded well with the Yellow- 
Shirt elitist notions outlined in chapter 5 in which they considered them-
selves as superior, more educated, more moral, and more worthy of being 
citizens of Thailand and the rightful group to have a say in who should 
govern. The Red Shirts are, on the other hand, “subhuman,” and neither 
sufficiently educated nor good enough to matter in Thai society. The Red 
Shirts are immoral and ungrateful and therefore undeserving of being 
treated as members of Thai society. The PDRC anti– Red Shirts sentiment 
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represents a continuation of the sentiment expressed by the PAD, both at 
the leadership and grassroot levels.
Royalism is another topic that is shared by all support groups of the 
PDRC, albeit at a much lower level than anti– Red Shirt topics. This is 
the most surprising result of the precoup PDRC sentiment analysis since 
royalism is the very banner that was used to unite all groups opposing the 
government to form the PDRC. If relying solely on speeches made by the 
leaders as evidence of what the PDRC support base looked like, we would 
have likely overestimated the royalist sentiment among PDRC support-
ers. This content analysis shows that royalism did not feature prominently 













Figure 7.1. Results of topic probability by page during one year preceding the 
2014 coup (May 22, 2013 to May 22, 2014)
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Figure 7.1 clearly shows that discussion on royalism featured in less than 
10 percent of all the top comments on Suthep’s and PDRC’s pages, as those 
which constituted the majority of Facebook conversations on the PDRC 
at the time. A manual check of keywords associated with royalism sug-
gest that most words were associated with King Bhumibol’s birthday on 
December 5, with people posting their happy birthday wishes to the king 
via Facebook. The manual investigation of keywords also suggests that cit-
ing their love for the monarch as a reason for mobilizing with the PDRC 
was not at all prevalent across any of the popular online PDRC networks.
There is clear divergence across the five Facebook groups on other top-
ics discussed by their supporters. One- third of the comments on Suthep’s 
page and one- quarter on the PDRC Facebook page were about glorifying 
the leadership of Suthep. This is of no surprise since the PDRC page is 
administered by the same team that also managed Suthep’s page and com-
ments tended to be in response to page posts. But the comments of both 
pages did not exactly align: the PDRC’s comments were heavily slanted 
toward nationalism topics, with keywords such as “our land,” “our nation,” 
“country,” “Thai nation,” “Thailand,” and “nation” being very prevalent.
The fact that the promilitary sentiment is only concentrated among the 
comments of the Army Supporter and Thailand Informed suggests that 
popular support for the military as an institution important to Thai politics 
is not widespread even among the supporters of the movement demanding 
a coup. Promilitary sentiment is instead highly prevalent only in Thailand 
Informed, which constitutes the smallest number of “likes” across all five 
groups. A manual verification of promilitary comments also reveals that the 
sentiment tends to be general toward the military institution and not nec-
essarily directly related to its role in politics. Nonetheless, the key terms 
associated with support for the military were well aligned with how Thais 
were brought up to believe in the military institution: “army,” “protect,” 
“safeguard,” “sacrifice,” and “survival.” The military has long been under-
stood as the protector of the Thai nation and these very words captured 
well the justification given by the military leaders for the May 2014 coup.
Crowdsourcing Support for Dictatorship
Did the sentiment among PDRC key groups on Facebook change after the 
coup? Are they still supportive of the military government whose takeover 
of power they facilitated? I conducted a similar analysis of all the comments 
on the five Facebook pages discussed in the earlier section with the addi-
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tion of V for Thailand as a sixth page for analysis. The time frame of this 
postcoup analysis ran from May 23, 2014 to May 23, 2017— constituting 
a period of three years since the military coup. Online content and text 
analysis are an excellent way to uncover popular sentiment in a dictatorship 
like Thailand because there is no other reliable alternative to measure the 
pulse of the populace on political issues. Moreover, because these groups, 




Anti– Red Shirts cheating, government, red 
shirt, burn, buffalo, red, 
stupid, die, dog, no brain, 
evil, bad mouth, hell, 
ungrateful, get out, very 
bad (vulgar), feeling sorry 
(vulgar), thief
Suthep (60%) negative
Leadership kamnan’s fan, Thai people, 
heart, good wish, fight, 
our children, citizens, well 
wishes, Suthep, democracy, 
winning, PDRC, drive 
away, Ratchadamnoen 
stage, thank you, family, 
success, sacrifice
Suthep (33%) positive
Promilitary Citizens, army, nation, well 
wishes, thank you, sacrifice, 
Thailand, safeguard, 
protect, good people, 






Royalism Wishing you (royal), the 
best, good people, protect, 
safety, king, monarch, 
Thai people, the royal 
institution, healthy, always 






Nationalism Nation, bureaucracy, country, 
good wishes (Buddhist), 
Thai, reform, well wishes, 
sacrifice, winning for sure, 
come out, tyrant, army, 








Royalism king, beloved, salute, barami, 
bow down, Thai people, happy, 
good wish, monarchy, long live, 




Nationalism for the nation, patriotic, Thai, 
Thailand, Thai people, land, 
sovereignty, good living, sacrifice, 





Promilitary soldiers, supportive, thank you, 
citizens, Thai, beautiful, protect, 
good wish, safe, bravery, tranquility, 





Policy Issue (Rubber) rubber, price, low, clarity, 
children, southerners, bad, baht, 
money, rural people, help, die
PDRC (12%) negative
(Constitution) constitution, 
Thailand, disaster, Thai people, 
cheated, suffer, nation
Suthep (20%) negative
(Sugar) sugar, damage, Thailand, 
Malaysia, role, unsuccessful, 
government
PDRC (15%) negative
(Corruption) cheating, corrupt, sell, 
nation, bad deeds (karma), nation, 
power, rebels, too bad, very bad 
(vulgar)
PDRC (8%) negative
Leadership congratulations, Suthep, kamnan, 
Thai people, country, thank you, 
support, accolade, happiness, 
recover, goodness, protect
PDRC (25%) positive
Anti– Red Shirts stupid, buffalo, dog, no brain, 
intellect, red, Thailand, 
embarrassed, bad character, duped
V for Thailand 
(20%)
negative
Democracy democracy, election, politics, vested 





Buddhism prayer, welcome (religious), good 
people, Buddhist monk, dharma, 
religion, protect, follow
Suthep (9%) positive
Discontent PDRC, power grab, lies, misbehave, 




Note: Excludes stop words.
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in theory, are most likely to support the military government, there is less 
concern that the people would be too afraid to comment.
The results show a serious break from the precoup sentiment patterns 
across all five pages. There is no longer a unifying theme across the pages as 
both anti– Red Shirt and royalism sentiments were not prevalent in any of 
these pages. Indeed, anti– Red Shirt sentiment as a defining feature of pre-
coup PDRC sentiment dropped off altogether for most pages, except for 
a small portion of the conversation on Suthep’s page and a larger portion 
on V for Thailand’s page. The disappearance of the anti– Red Shirt related 
conversations in most pages of the PDRC network suggests that Yingluck’s 
removal from power eliminated the biggest threat to the nation— the Red 
Shirts— from the PDRC perspective. While the Red Shirt supporters were 
still around, the government in place would no longer be the de facto 
leader of the Red Shirt movement.
The findings from the topic modeling and manual comment analysis 
show a great variation across five pages in their emphasis on each topic dis-
cussion (figure 7.2). There were six salient topics overall: royalism, nation-
alism, promilitary, policy issues (rubber, sugar, constitution, and corrup-
tion), leadership, and anti– Red Shirts. Out of these six, no single topic had 
a high enough probability of saliency and relevancy for all pages. Royal-
ism and promilitary sentiment seemed to be shared across four pages. The 
saliency of these two topics also varied widely across the five pages, with 
royalism being highly salient for Army Supporter but far less so for V for 
Thailand. Some topics, such as policy issues, were relevant to some pages 
but not to others.
The seemingly united PDRC- led opposition movement that successfully 
called for a military intervention to end democracy back in 2014 has shown 
considerable cracks since the coup. This chapter provides methodologically 
innovative empirical evidence for such cracks by mapping the motivations, 
sentiments, and networks of the most popular procoup groups in the first 
three years following military rule. The online population is targeted in this 
study not only because the online networks of supporters on Facebook were 
instrumental to the PDRC opposition movement prior to the coup but also 
because the offline environment made it hostile for the public display of 
dissent. While the online environment is not friendly for most antijunta or 
antimonarchy remarks, this study specifically examines groups that are most 
likely to be junta- friendly, monarchy- loving, and supportive of the military- 
backed authoritarian government. Thus, the key questions this chapter is 
concerned with are those regarding the motivations, sentiments, and net-
works of the procoup networks after the coup and whether or not there has 
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been much variation across groups. The fragmentation of sentiment within 
the PDRC networks also indicates the diversity of the PDRC movement. 
Without the ultimate unifying theme of being anti– Red Shirt, as that which 
predominated in much of the PDRC conversations before the coup, the 
PDRC movement diverged in both the content of its conversations and in 
sentiment toward the PDRC movement itself.
The final analysis performed with the Facebook data is social network 
analysis. This approach allows us to better understand the qualities of 
the procoup networks over the course of the three years following the 
2014 coup. Given what we know about the nature of the opposition forces 














Figure 7.2. Results of topic probabilities by page during the Prayuth Chan O- cha 
government (May 23, 2014 to May 23, 2017)
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erately united with some degree of community overlap. The generation 
of networks from the Facebook data resulted in five networks, variously 
colored, corresponding to the number of pages. I then created the one- 
mode “user co- comment” networks as previous analyses over the same 
three- year period. These networks depict users (nodes) and comment 
activity (edges), whereby an edge between two users means that they both 
commented at least once on any post within a given network over the 
three- year period. The clustering of nodes can suggest that there is a lot 
of within- page commenting by the same users. The overlapping of nodes 
can however suggest a high occurrence of co- commenting across pages. 
These one- mode projections of the networks provide a different picture 
of the procoup movement on Facebook, because the focus is on users and 
their comment activity rather than “likes.” As discussed previously, com-
menting requires more effort and is more involved than simply “liking” 
a post. Comments also contribute differently to the spread of dictator-
ship support discourse in the postcoup environment, given that users can 
read each other’s comments, interpret and learn from them, and engage 
in discourse by adding their own comments. Therefore, these networks 
provide specifically interesting perspectives on user (co)participation and 
discourse dynamics within each page and across the entire movement- 
level network (Smith and Graham 2017).
The social network analysis of the co- commenting across five pages 
shows the greatest overlap between the pages of Suthep and the PDRC 
(figure 7.3). This is hardly surprising given that Suthep is the leader of the 
PDRC and there are several cross- postings between the two pages, with 
the sharing of page administrators. The clustering patterns of commenters 
on other pages, however, seem separate from one another, suggesting a low 
degree of cross- page commenting. V for Thailand, Thailand Informed, and 
Suthep commenters are well clustered together, which means a high occur-
rence of within- page commenting— an indicator of a close community. 
The clustering of commenters on the PDRC page was moderate, while 
for Army Supporter it was sparse. This indicates that the latter’s network 
was far from being a close- knit community in comparison to other groups.
The findings of the text and social network analysis produces three key 
results. First, the discourse and sentiment of those supporting the procoup 
groups vary widely in the postcoup environment. Contrary to popular 
belief, there is no single unifying motivation that is shared equally across the 
procoup movement. Royalism was used as a convenient ideology to unite 
the fragmented networks of the opposition prior to the coup. This has cre-
ated an illusion that opposition forces were largely motivated by loyalty to 
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the monarchy. This study has shown that some groups, such as Army Sup-
porter and Thailand Informed, were far more overt in their support of the 
monarchy than others. Data from Suthep’s and the PDRC’s pages, which 
cumulatively represent the bulk of the coup supporters online, were far less 
engaged in discussion of the monarchy. The topic of royalism did not even 
register as significant among the networks of Suthep— the leader of the 
procoup opposition. V for Thailand, one of the first opposition groups to 
publicly exhibit its discontent toward the Yingluck government, was barely 
motivated out of a concern for the monarchy. Such low levels of discussion 
about the monarchy for some of these groups were most surprising, espe-
cially because the much- revered and beloved King Bhumibol Adulyadej 
died in October 2016 and the entire nation was in mourning mode for 
the following twelve months. One would expect much of the discussion 
on any of the procoup groups, if they were indeed motivated by royalism, 
to be about their monarch. But the text analysis paints a different picture. 
Moreover, the discussion over their support of the military— and by exten-
sion their overall sentiment toward the then military government— also 
varies widely. The two groups that were most royalist were also the most 
promilitary, and by the same token groups that were least royalist were also 
the least promilitary. The same goes for nationalism among both Thailand 
Informed and Army Supporter, as the two groups mostly likely to express 
their national pride and be concerned about sovereignty.
The most surprising finding related to the emergence of policy issues 
as focal points of discussion for those in the Suthep and PDRC supporter 
groups. The fact that the text analysis brings to the fore the importance of 
public policy and constitutional issues involving rubber, sugar, combatting 
corruption, and the constitutional drafting process is a strong indicator 
that PDRC and Suthep supporters may have been largely motivated by 
specific sets of policies rather than more amorphous ideological stances like 
royalism or nationalism. In retrospect, however, looking at how the Demo-
crats had helped mobilize grassroots support for the PDRC and for Suthep 
personally, it was clear that Democrat- voting southerners were massively 
mobilized, especially offline, to support the opposition movement prior to 
the coup. Particularistic policies on rubber and sugar disproportionately 
affect southern Thai economies more than elsewhere. Beyond the regional 
issue, the constitutional drafting comments were highly aligned with the 
discontent toward Suthep and the broader PDRC movement— suggesting 
that there was growing unhappiness with Suthep as the leader as well as the 
broader PDRC movement generally.
The postcoup social media analysis suggests that there are three broad 
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categories of procoup supporters in postcoup Thailand: (1) royalists- 
nationalists; (2) identity- driven protagonists; and (3) policy- driven contin-
gent supporters. The most conservative and ideologically driven groups 
are the royalists- nationalists, represented by the networks of Thailand 
Informed and Army Supporter. Supporters in this group are the most 
loyal to the military dictatorship— having justified the pivotal role of the 
military in safeguarding the monarchy and the nation. Their overwhelm-
ing gratitude toward the military— even three years on— is noted in their 
comments regarding the military being “brave,” “selfless,” “smart,” and 
“good.” Their communication patterns associate their promilitary senti-
ment strongly with their love of the monarchy and the nation. The second 
group, driven by identity politics, is represented by V for Thailand. Much 
of their comments on Facebook were about their identity being in opposi-
tion to the Red Shirts, the Thaksin regime, and majoritarian politics. Their 
Figure 7.3. Co- commenting across five networks
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sentiment toward “the other” was overwhelmingly elitist— labeling them 
as “stupid,” “buffalo,” “dog,” and “easily duped.” Electoral politics, to them, 
was merely a way for otherwise very corrupt politicians to lure support 
from uneducated country bumpkins (the Red Shirts) to sell their votes. V 
was not at all promilitary and its positive sentiment toward the institution 
held only insofar as the military was the only institution able to rid the 
country of its “evil doers” (the Shinawatras). They rarely discussed policy 
issues, which means that their support of the current military dictatorship 
was likely shaped by their overarching concern over the loss of political 
power and influence to the enfranchised and mobilized Red Shirts. The 
third group— the largest one of all— was largely policy- driven. Their sup-
port for the coup and subsequent military- installed government is contin-
gent upon certain policies or agendas being activated in their favor. They 
are the least committed to the military and are not particularly royalist. 
Their discussion about their disappointment toward Suthep, their regret 
for supporting the PDRC, and their overall dissatisfaction with the 2017 
Constitution indicates what may be a withdrawal of support for the causes 
of the coup and the military as a legitimate government on the whole.
The social network analysis demonstrates the fragmentation and the 
insularity of the procoup networks. Not only were the networks of these 
groups largely separate, cross- group communication was low. The one 
exception were the PDRC and Suthep networks, which were very simi-
lar. The insularity of their communication patterns meant that the benefit 
of communicating with other groups— even those likely to be similarly 
minded— was very limited. Users in these groups preferred to comment 
within their own pages and not on networks of similar groups. This poten-
tial echo- chamber effect across these Facebook pages of similar- minded 
groups means there was a lost opportunity to build a stronger and more 
frequent cross- group communication that might have helped to strengthen 
horizontal connections across networks.
PDRC Post- 2014 Coup Politics
The precoup and postcoup sentiment comparative analysis reveals three 
key features about the PDRC online networks. First, royalism was not a 
prominent sentiment among PDRC online supporters— both before and 
after the coup. If at all, royalist sentiment is strongest among the royalist- 
nationalists, exemplified in the Thailand Informed and Army Supporter 
groups, which constituted a minority of the PDRC online support base. 
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This suggests that while leaders of both the PAD and the PDRC had long 
exploited the promonarchy agenda to gain popular support, royalism was 
not the main driving force for why people supported the PDRC online, bar 
for a minority few. But these staunch royalist groups were vocal and thus 
crucial to pushing the royalist agenda within the broader PAD and PDRC 
movements. Even after the passing of the much beloved and revered King 
Bhumibol, the constellation of conversation regarding the king on most 
PDRC pages was related only to his passing or his birthday and evoked 
little engagement with the PDRC movement beyond those explicit events.
Second, PDRC mass support for the military coup was largely con-
centrated around their anti– Red Shirt dissent; this masked other reasons 
for wanting to drive out Yingluck through whatever means necessary. The 
postcoup analysis demonstrated some aspects of what the PDRC wanted 
once the Red Shirts were no longer in charge, and these reflected different 
support bases within the PDRC. Groups that were royalist and nation-
alist were supporting the military government from an ideological per-
spective, while others continued to demand that measures be implemented 
so that once an election was called, a Red Shirt– aligned party could not 
return to dominate Thai politics. But most comments were policy- related 
and largely negative, indicating that support for the PDRC and the coup 
more generally was contingent upon the new government’s performance in 
delivering public goods.
Third, the growing discontent within large sections of the PDRC Face-
book conversation reflected the disappointment in both the PDRC as a 
movement and Suthep as its leader, on following through with reforms 
as per their campaign “reform before election.” The conversation labeled 
under the “discontent” category, which occupied 25 percent of comments 
on Suthep’s Facebook page, shows how unhappy the supporters were that 
Suthep had, in their view, turned out to be just like any other politician: 
lying, badly behaving, power grabbing, and disappointing. Such negative 
sentiment toward Suthep was again visible in policy- related conversa-
tions that demonstrated deep disappointment with the PDRC and Suthep 
as its leader. Further analysis would be required to investigate whether 
the growing discontent would be observable on Facebook conversations 
relating to Prime Minister Prayuth Chan o- cha. Promilitary sentiment, 
however, did not seem to waver, and in some cases grew, in the postcoup 
environment. The more conservative hardline groups, such as Army Sup-
porter and Thailand Informed, had more positive conversations about the 
military after the coup, with keywords such as “bravery,” “sacrifice,” and 
“protect,” than in the precoup period. This undercurrent of promilitary 
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sentiment within the PDRC, even if among the less popular groups, still 
signified military support despite growing discontent with the military’s 
policies and governance.
The divergent and contradictory identity of the PDRC in the postcoup 
period underscored how disunited and fragmented the PDRC support 
online was, even among those who seemed to be the “core” supporters of 
the PDRC. Before the coup, opposition to the Red Shirts served unify the 
movement. But once removed, it became clear how loosely organized the 
PDRC really was, with a negligible unifying theme and growing internal 
discontent and disunity. Unlike for the PAD, a new election was not held 
until five years after the 2014 coup; this left a vacuum for the PDRC in 
terms of having to establish a new direction for the movement after the 
coup. In the case of the PAD, after the 2006 coup, the 2007 election that 
followed immediately after ushered in another Thaksin- aligned party and 
give ammunition and cause for the PAD to regroup again. This was not 
the case for the PDRC as it had to scramble to find new meaning for the 
movement.
Suthep’s Facebook page continued to act as the leading force of the 
PDRC postcoup, documenting his personal journey into monkhood and 
eventually as head of the PDRC and a nonprofit organization. The PDRC 
Foundation, established following the military takeover, operated largely 
out of Samui in Suthep’s home province of Surat Thani. The foundation 
relied largely on key members of the former Democrat Party who became 
the engine of the PDRC protests prior to the coup, without reconnecting 
with leaders of other groups within the PDRC networks. In essence, the 
PDRC Foundation became a personal organization of Suthep’s postcoup 
TABLE 7.5. PAD/PDRC key figures across political parties in the 2019 election
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Note: This is not an exhaustive list, but includes only known politicians who were actively engaged with either 
the PAD or the PDRC.
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that allowed him to maintain relevance while he contemplated his reen-
try into politics— notwithstanding his avowal to have permanently walked 
away from it.
While Suthep and the top echelons of the PDRC leadership that came 
from the Democrat Party vowed to not return to formal politics under the 
junta, other prominent members of the PDRC took positions inside vari-
ous committees of the National Reform Council that was set up following 
the coup. Sombat Thamrongtanyawong became the head of the Political 
Reform Committee. PDRC supporters inside the constitutional drafting 
committee included Banjeod Singhanethi, Pakorn Preeyakorn, Preecha 
Watcharapai, Nareewan Jintanakanon, Jaras Suwannamala, Paiboon Nithi-
tawan, Supatra Nacapew, Choochai Supawongsa, and Kamnoon Sithisa-
man, for example.5 Some of these individuals were also active during the 
PAD rallies prior to the 2006 coup and had served in the subsequent mili-
tary government. It is notable, however, that the PDRC did not become 
the watchdog of the junta government as the PAD did following the 2006 
coup. The PDRC focused on carrying out civic work through its foun-
dation; projects ranged from building a vocational college to organizing 
sufficient economy communities.6 The PDRC Foundation ceased much 
of its activities by mid- 2018 as it became clear that an election would soon 
be called.
The thin thread that held the PDRC and former PAD forces together 
broke apart and completely dispersed in the run- up to the March 2019 
election. Key figures inside both the PAD and the PDRC could be found 
in at least four parties vying for positions scattered across Palang Pracharat, 
Ruam Palang Prachachat Thai (ACP), the Democrat Party, and the Thai 
Social Democrat Party. The faction of the PAD leadership that founded 
the New Politics Party continued on but under the revamped name of 
the Thai Social Democrat Party. Suthep Taugsuban founded a new party, 
the ACP, while allowing other former Democrat Party members who had 
left the party earlier to join the PDRC full- time to return. Palang Pra-
charat, the junta’s new political party, took two of the most important and 
well- resourced PDRC leaders, Natthapol Teepsuwan and Puttipong Pun-
nakanta. The splintering of the PAD/PDRC forces in this latest election 
vividly shows how little these yellow- shirted movement leaders had in 
common and that they were brought together only by an emergency crisis 
to resolve a political deadlock that had marred Thailand for a decade. The 
decline in support of the PDRC movement, evidenced by the social media 
data analysis of this chapter, presented a prelude to the electoral defeats 
of all successor parties to the PAD and the PDRC. The unofficial elec-
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tion results show that the Democrats came in fourth with 3,947,726 votes, 
Suthep’s ACP came in eleventh with 416,324 votes, and the Thai Social 
Democrats came in fifty- seventh with 5,334 votes.7 Palang Pracharat, while 
co- opting two top PDRC figures, could hardly be called a PDRC succes-
sor party given that it was a mix of key politicians from key political parties 
right across the Red–Yellow divide. But it was clear that Palang Pracharat 
had emerged as a winner in this election, not only because it exceeded most 
observers’ expectations in garnering the largest number of popular votes, 
but also because of its clever tactic of co- optation.
Conclusion
While social media played a key role in uniting popular support for the 
PDRC’s antidemocratic mobilization, it also helps make visible the cracks 
in popular support for the movement. Through a comparison of precoup 
and postcoup Facebook conversations of the PDRC’s largest groups, the 
analysis shows a real divergence in the issues that mattered to different 
groups of supporters. While promilitary sentiment was driving the con-
versation of some PDRC groups, policy concerns were top priorities 
for others. The PDRC as a movement began to decline in popularity as 
discontent toward government policies and Suthep grew. Suthep’s and 
PDRC’s Facebook pages, totaling nearly three million “likes,” constituted 
the largest majority support groups of the PDRC online. They ran on high 
popular support before the coup, with one- third of the conversations on 
those pages praising Suthep. After the coup, and noticeably after mid- 2017, 
conversations on both pages turned drastically negative, with over half of 
the conversations expressing either discontent toward Suthep personally 
as the PDRC movement leader or toward the overall movement itself in 
venting that policy demands had gone unmet. The policy- driven discon-
tent did not, however, correlate with precoup conversations about notable 
policy demands. Instead, in the precoup period PDRC conversations were 
overwhelmed with hatred toward their adversary— the Red Shirts— to the 
extent that their genuine reasons for supporting the PDRC were never 
actually articulated or made clear.
The return of all political parties and politicians associated with both 
the PAD and the PDRC to the electoral race in 2019 also shows that their 
support for the military coup was temporary and contingent upon their 
return to electoral politics. While demanding that the military “step in” 
and that elections cease, these yellow- shirted politicians never intended to 
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permanently turn their back on democracy. The military coup was seen as a 
means to an end: they wanted the rules of the game to be rewritten to facil-
itate their electoral victories. Their gamble paid off in the short term: both 
the PAD and the PDRC helped to successfully engineer two annulled elec-
tions and the military coup d’états of 2006 and 2014. But the leaders of the 
PDRC were naïve if they thought they had brokered a win- win deal with 
the military. General Prayuth Chan o- cha decided to set up a party, Palang 
Pracharat, to run for election instead and, crucially, to use the same strat-
egy that Thaksin had used to mobilize key political figures across multiple 
political parties, including two prominent PDRC leaders, into his orbit. 
Prayuth’s political consolidation strategy worked: he was able to amass an 
influential team bent on continuing the work that was started by the junta 
following the 2014 coup. The Democrats, wanting to hedge against Pra-
yuth, declared that they would not support Prayuth and the Palang Pra-
charat Party while Suthep was ready to support the junta, despite staying 
separate from him politically. The Democrats were the biggest losers in 
this election as the electoral base of the party had been frittered away by 
several parties that should have been their natural allies. What the social 
media data might also suggest is that the groups most promilitary during 
the dictatorship period likely became the electoral support base of Palang 




After the 1991 coup d’état and the bloody popular uprising the follow-
ing year, Thais were hopeful that would be the last: no more coups and 
no more military repression. The reformists worked hard to design a new 
constitution and pushed for a number of political and economic reforms 
to liberalize the political system, reduce the influence of the military in 
politics, and hamper the abuse of state power by politicians. A decade later 
many of the same reformists found themselves supporting and actively 
mobilizing antidemocratic movements to save democracy from itself. How 
did this happen?
In this book, I have advanced the argument that institutional block-
age in Thai democracy drove the prodemocracy reformists into mobilizing 
against the democratic system. This antidemocratic mobilization, which 
drew largely on networks of civil society organizations and the urban mid-
dle class, was in response to what they perceived as an unacceptable “illib-
eralization” of a democratic regime. Ironically, the PAD and PDRC move-
ments sought to reverse the tide of the growing “authoritarian democracy” 
by appealing for extraconstitutional interventions by nondemocratic insti-
tutions. The end results were military coups and repeated returns to the 
“real” authoritarian regime. Two democratic collapses in fifteen years in a 
moderately well- off middle- income country were not only catastrophic to 
the democratic development of Thailand but for other countries around 
the world.
Recently a growing number of Third Wave democracies have become 
more unstable and less free. Some of these democracies have reverted 
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back to authoritarian rule, while others have remained in perpetual politi-
cal instability. Scholars of comparative politics, particularly in the study 
of democratic consolidation, have provided a variety of explanations as to 
why young democracies face these challenges. This book presents a theo-
retical contribution to the understanding of how, why, and when democra-
cies break down. I propose a novel approach to understanding democratic 
collapse through an examination of “antidemocratic mobilization.” I fill 
a gap in the literature of democratization and regime study by bringing 
“ordinary people” back in to the debate when explaining the failure of a 
democratic regime.
My theory of institutional blockage offers a theoretical framework for 
understanding movement- induced democratic breakdowns in developing 
democracies. I argue that when a highly mobilized society perceives its 
access to channels of influence permanently blocked, we may see a rise 
of an antidemocratic movement. The role of popular mobilization takes 
center stage in my theoretical framework as a crucial factor in creating 
conditions for democratic collapse. I see institutional blockage as a process 
that is contingent on actors, institutions, and the interaction among them.
This book provides a typology of opposition movements: proreform, 
anti- incumbent, and antidemocratic. Popular movements in democra-
cies often start out as being proreform or anti- incumbent (or both). They 
mobilize to voice their grievances and make their demands heard by the 
incumbent. Antidemocratic mobilization is only an available option in 
cases where there exist nondemocratic institutions. In my definition of 
antidemocratic movement, it must be able to appeal to nondemocratic 
bodies to extraconstitutionally intervene on its behalf. Ultimately, the 
actual collapse of democracy necessarily involves intervention from these 
nondemocratic bodies.
I provide an original contribution to the study of democracy and regime 
type by bringing “the people” back in to the debate. Political movements 
can bring a democratic regime down by creating conditions for extracon-
stitutional intervention by nondemocratic actors. Ordinary people in a 
democracy mobilize against the system because they feel “cornered” and 
“powerless” in a system that should, in theory, empower them. Their loss 
of access to power and the perception of permanent exclusion from power 
drive them to mobilize against the very system that is supposed to give 
them voice.
Media also play a central role in the rise of antidemocratic move-
ments. In Thailand, both traditional and social media were crucial to the 
emergence of the PAD and the PDRC movements as they helped to unite 
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opposition groups and advance an antidemocratic agenda. For both the 
PAD and the PDRC, leadership of the movement was decided based on 
which individual leader had the most access to the media. In the case of 
the PAD, Sonthi Limthongkul became the main leader of the movement 
because of his ownership of the Manager Media Group, which included 
print and online news, magazines, satellite TV, and radio. Sonthi was also 
the most antidemocratic PAD leader. His ownership of the media meant 
he had access to multiple platforms to push his antidemocratic agenda. 
Similarly, in the case of Suthep Taugsuban, leader of the PDRC, he won his 
leadership of the movement against other opposition leaders because of his 
access to a wide range of media platforms and his social media popularity.
My research on the People’s Alliance for Democracy provides con-
firmation of the argument of institutional blockage as a central factor in 
antidemocratic mobilization in Thailand. It finds that the PAD initially 
emerged as a broad- based alliance of opposition against the government 
of Thaksin Shinawatra. Drawn largely from civil society organizations 
and the urban middle class, PAD supporters felt that channels for opposi-
tion voice in both formal and informal institutions were purposely closed 
off or rendered ineffective by the government. The growing authoritar-
ian and illiberal rule of the Thaksin- led government appeared to threaten 
some of the basic democratic rights of the opposition. As such, the PAD 
began mobilizing and forming an opposition alliance to pressure for gov-
ernment change.
The emergence of the PAD had its seeds in the reformist politics fol-
lowing the Black May uprising. Reformers sought to make Thailand more 
democratic, open, and less dependent on the military. The political reforms 
in the postcoup period exemplify contestation over both the meaning of 
democracy and the way in which the current political system in Thailand 
ought to be changed. The compromise between the middle class, civil soci-
ety, and elite conceptions of “democracy” resulted in the 1997 constitution 
(chapter 4). Reformists hailed the constitution as a major milestone in the 
country’s political development for they believed it was the first time the 
constitution was written by the people and for the people. The 1997 con-
stitution, however, provided grounds for both the rise of the Thai Rak Thai 
party and eventually the formation of the PAD.
The Thaksin government turned out to be the opposite of what the 
reformists had hoped. The 1997 constitution gave Thailand the first 
majority government, one that over time sought to consolidate its power 
through incorporating other parties. Newly created constitutional mea-
sures further strengthened the executive, while significantly weakening 
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the opposition in formal democratic institutions. The growing power of 
Thaksin and his party alienated those who disagreed with them. Opposi-
tion forces began to emerge to protest against what they saw as the margin-
alization of opposition voices and encroachment on democratic rights. The 
biggest trigger to the opposition came when TRT won another landslide 
election in 2005. This brought with it the realization that the loss of power 
would become permanent. Facing a cohesive absolute majority in govern-
ment, the opposition was losing both political space and access to power. 
To enhance bargaining leverage with the government, various opposition 
groups from both formal and informal realms banded together and formed 
the PAD movement.
The antidemocratization of the PAD occurred when the opposition 
perceived that their exclusion from power and marginalization likely would 
become permanent and that other strategies would not work. This percep-
tion was triggered by the fact that elections were no longer competitive 
and that there was “no way” electorally to get rid of the Thaksin govern-
ment and his Thai Rak Thai party. As elections no longer seemed to be an 
option for punishing the incumbent, the PAD appealed to nondemocratic 
institutions— the military, the monarchy, and the courts. By appealing 
directly to these nondemocratic bodies and demanding extraconstitutional 
intervention, the movement effectively became antidemocratic.
In tracing the development of the PAD movement and its evolution 
into the PDRC, I also showed why the movement was necessary to the col-
lapse of democracy in Thailand. While some sections of the political elites 
were not happy with the rule of the Thaksin government, there was no 
concerted effort to overthrow the regime until there was strong and clear 
signal from the PAD that any regime change would be legitimized and sup-
ported by “the people.” Given the large support base of the PAD, measured 
in terms of both active (protesters) and passive (PAD media consumers) 
supporters, the opposition elites felt that any move against the Thaksin 
government would be successful. Extensive interviewing and discussion 
with key actors confirmed that the 2006 coup d’état was a response to the 
antidemocratic mobilization of the PAD.
The PDRC emerged as a successor movement to the PAD that was 
more firmly antidemocratic and wired online. Leveraging the affordances 
of social media in one of the world’s most social media active countries, 
the online PDRC movement was vast, networked, and formidable. Social 
media have been shown to expand the reach of PDRC’s antidemocratic 
voices and further deepen the Red–Yellow divide. It was also social media 
that helped forge the PDRC’s agenda to oppose democracy not only by 
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supporting military interventions in politics but also by changing the con-
stitution to pave the way for more power for nondemocratic institutions.
Placing both the PAD and the PDRC movements in historical perspec-
tive, it is clear that Thailand possesses certain structural conditions that 
make a democratic collapse more likely (chapter 3). The country’s political 
development was littered by long periods of authoritarian rule, frequent 
coups d’état, and a powerful military and monarchy. There was popular 
support for unelected leaders as well as for right- wing movements. While 
these factors matter to our overall understanding of the state of democracy 
in Thailand, they fail to account for why the PAD emerged when it did.
Given the conventional wisdom that democracy is the “best” political 
system that exists, why would ordinary people mobilize against democracy? 
A detailed analysis of the PAD’s and the PDRC’s discourse (chapters 4 and 
7), coupled with participant- observation of the movement and social media 
analysis, reveals that different conceptions of “democracy” represent an 
underlying grievance of the movement supporters. In general, the move-
ment was opposed to the idea of “majoritarianism” that was embedded in 
the democratic system. Civil society actors inside the PAD viewed democ-
racy as an “inclusive,” “participatory,” and “consultative” political system 
where everyone’s voice matters beyond election day. For many activists and 
NGOs, the true meaning of democracy is the power of the people and this 
can only occur in a grassroots democracy. As such, the current system of 
representative and electoral democracy is not the desired type of political 
system they see as empowering the people.
The middle class inside the yellow- shirted movements saw themselves 
as the enlightened group of citizens who believed democracy could only 
work if it were governed by the right people. They viewed moral authority, 
good governance, and traditional power holders (nondemocratic institu-
tions) as being important to the political system. “Good” people, who are 
educated and righteous, should govern the uneducated masses until the 
latter becomes enlightened. The PAD’s large support base in the middle 
class is both conservative and royalist in the sense that they believe that the 
monarchy should have veto power in the political system. The monarchi-
cal institution remains the pinnacle of the nation. Any attempt to under-
mine the power and authority of the monarchy (and to a lesser extent, the 
military) constitutes a threat to national sovereignty. Such a conception of 
“democracy” contradicts most basic definitions of democracy, as the for-
mer emphasizes strong roles played by nondemocratic institutions in the 
political arena.
The key point of this book, that mass political movements can play the 
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central role in the collapse of democratic regimes, is underrepresented in 
both the popular and scholarly literature. Previous scholarship on anti-
system/antidemocratic mobilization focuses largely on economic, elite- 
centric, and institutional explanations. Economic approaches typically 
argue that when new democracies face severe economic crisis, the public 
react negatively toward the regime by supporting antidemocratic/antisys-
tem movements or political parties. I show in chapter 2 that such an eco-
nomic explanation is unsuitable for the Thai case because the PAD move-
ment emerged during a period of economic boom. While the growth was 
no match for the level experienced in the pre- 1997 Asian Financial Crisis 
period, the economic conditions in which the PAD movement emerged 
were by most accounts good.
Some scholars believe the extent to which a democratic regime survives 
depends most critically on elite choices (Linz and Stepan 1978; O’Donnell, 
Schmitter, and Whitehead 1986; Ake 1991). It is the elites, not the people, 
who make or break regimes. Elites mobilize the masses to oppose demo-
cratic regimes for their own gains. This research does not disagree with 
the notion that elites matter in any regime change, but it challenges the 
centrality of elites in understanding antidemocratic mobilization and in 
democratic breakdown more generally. While elite action clearly matters 
in any regime change, this research suggests that social movements may 
have more agency than is typically assumed in such theories. Antidemo-
cratic mobilization may rise not simply due to elite manipulation, but from 
mass movements that see no alternative to getting their voices heard.
To provide support for my argument, I ask whether the coup d’état in 
2006 was contingent on the PAD movement. I show in chapter 6 that the 
coup would neither have been launched nor succeeded without mass sup-
port. Not only did the coup leaders admit that a popular opposition move-
ment was crucial to their decision to overthrow an elected government, 
the PAD itself was calling for a military intervention. How do we know 
whether the opposition elites did not misconstrue or misinterpret public 
opposition toward the government as a signal for a military intervention? 
I provide public opinion support for antidemocratic mobilization through 
the use of both surveys and polling. Immediately following the 2006 coup 
d’état, two major pollsters reported more than 80 percent of the respon-
dents nationwide agreed with the coup. Follow- up polls showed strong 
public support for the coup government in the rest of 2006. Moreover, the 
PAD was actively calling for extraconstitutional interventions, which gar-
nered them much support from their members. It was not the case that the 
PAD was somehow “duped” into supporting nondemocratic elites.
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The intraelite competition framework sees elite unity as crucial to 
regime stability. When elites are not unified, democratic breakdowns 
become more likely (Higley and Burton 1990; López- Pintor 1987). An 
antidemocratic movement is thus a reflection of the power struggle among 
rival elites. In the Thai case, scholars argue that the rise of the PAD move-
ment and the eventual coup was a manifestation of the conflict between 
traditional elites— the military, the monarchy, and the bureaucracy— and 
new business elites led by Thaksin (McCargo 2008; Ockey 2008; Nelson 
2007). The traditional power brokers were threatened by the new elites, 
most of whom were career politicians, over access to power and spoils. 
The traditional elites thus mobilized people to help them legitimize their 
seizure of power from a democratically elected government.
In chapters 4 and 5 I illustrate the importance of the masses in the PAD 
as driving the movement. The intraelite competition approach overlooks 
the very foundation of the PAD movement: its members. Indeed, the fact 
that so many PAD leaders took up political positions during the coup gov-
ernment signifies the importance the traditional elites placed on the PAD. 
This alliance was crucial to the coup being successful. Furthermore, elite- 
centric approaches fail to adequately capture how and why ordinary people 
joined the PAD in the first place. Clearly, they are not risking their lives 
to protect some self- interested, narrow- minded elites. Any elite- focused 
explanation for the PAD movement insufficiently captures the movement 
as a whole.
The class- conflict approach sees the conflict between the PAD and the 
incumbent government as a demonstration of deep- seated tension between 
the rural poor and the urban elites. Fearful of the rising political influence 
of the rural poor, the rich mobilize against them by seeking to subvert the 
democratic system that gives the former the power in the first place. The 
antidemocratic movement is thus an upper- and middle- class reaction to 
the threat imposed from below (Phongpaichit and Baker 2008; Pongsudhi-
rak 2008; Funston 2009). An implicit assumption in this class- based frame-
work is that economic positions shape groups in society along class lines 
and motivate their behavior. Yet I show that elites’ preferences changed 
over the course of the PAD movement’s development, which conflicts with 
key underlying assumptions of this revolutionary- threat hypothesis. If the 
PAD were to be made up of all the elites then they should always maintain 
their preferences and never leave the PAD.
This book fits most closely with the institutionalist approach, which 
sees institutions as critical to the success and failure of democracy. The 
weak political institutionalization argument (Huntington 1968; Berman 
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1997; Fiorina 1997; Armony 2004) sees democracies as most vulnera-
ble when faced with a highly mobilized society and weak institutions. 
Poorly designed institutions are unable to cope with increasing societal 
demands, prompting society to mobilize against the democratic system as 
a whole (Berman 1997). While I agree with the focus on institutions, my 
approach addresses the flaws of the weak institutionalization framework 
in two key ways.
Antidemocratic mobilization emerges because institutional channels 
for the opposition are blocked, not because institutions are not sufficiently 
institutionalized to respond to the people. Indeed, the Thai case illustrates 
that the Thaksin government was responding to the people, largely through 
his propoor populist policies. His Thai Rak Thai party successfully enfran-
chised the majority of Thais, whose prior engagement in politics was lim-
ited to mere voting, by bringing them in to be an active part of the Thai 
political arena. But Thaksin was not responsive to the opposition. In fact, 
consistent with my argument, he was shutting the opposition out and tak-
ing their political space and access to power away, which resulted in them 
mobilizing to overthrow his administration. Furthermore, the weak politi-
cal institution argument does not tell us what triggers democratic collapse. 
Under what conditions do states that are weakly institutionalized experi-
ence a breakdown? My institutional blockage theory addresses specifically 
the process, sequence, and conditions under which we can observe the 
emergence of an antidemocratic movement. The reemergence of antidem-
ocratic forces, which culminated in the birth of the PDRC a couple of years 
after the PAD ended as a movement, reinforces the institutional blockage 
predicament. The PAD became less potent when democratic institutions 
were seen as more open to opposition grievances. Yet, as soon as there were 
signs the executive might be abusing his/her power again to the detriment 
of the opposition, antidemocratic mobilization restarted, even more deter-
mined to bring down a democratically elected government.
My research on antidemocratic movements contributes to the study 
of democratization and democratic consolidation in three major ways. 
First, by focusing on movements that oppose democratic regimes, I fill 
in the gap in the existing literature that focuses largely on prodemocratic 
movements. Understanding the process of antidemocratic mobilization 
is important to explaining the failures of democratization in developing 
democracies. Given that the majority of the countries in the world today 
has electoral democracy, it becomes especially important to understand the 
internal workings of democratic regimes that make them conducive to col-
lapse. Political movements have been given little regard in contributing 
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to democratic collapse in contrast to other factors, such as economic cri-
sis, intraelite conflict, and class conflict. As such, my work in institutional 
blockage theory fills in the gap in our understanding of why democracies 
fall generally but also specifically how political mobilization plays a central 
role in regime breakdowns.
Second, this book illustrates how institutional engineering can have 
unintended consequences for a country’s democratic development. Some 
of the scholarship on political institutions emphasizes the importance of 
crafting the “right” institutions in order to create a stronger and more 
institutionalized democracy. Yet the Thai case provides a warning to politi-
cal reformers that perhaps devising new institutions to shape the behavior 
of political elites can have negative effects on democratic development as a 
whole. Perhaps it is not a question of crafting new institutions, but rather 
for whom these institutions are created. If political elites continue to find 
loopholes to get around the new institutions created to constraint them or, 
worse, create institutions to serve their vested interests, then institutional 
design alone simply cannot make democracy work better.
The PAD and PDRC movements also provide a valuable empirical 
contribution to the study of social movements by highlighting the impor-
tance of agency. Structural approaches dominate the existing literature 
on social movements due largely to the oft- cited political opportunity 
structure (McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald 1996; Tarrow 1994). Too much 
focus on structure, however, leads to theories that fail to explain the pro-
cess and the timing of movement development. My theory on institutional 
blockage offers a more nuanced approach for understanding the dynam-
ics of mobilization, by prioritizing the roles played by movement leaders 
and groups inside the movement. As such, my work helps to bridge the 
structure- agency divide that has characterized some works in the study of 
social movements.
Third, this book also contributes to the regime transition literature by 
providing a media- centric account of democratic breakdowns. Media is 
central to understanding not just how democracy collapses but also when. 
Instead of countering antidemocratic ideas, both the PAD and the PDRC 
leadership cleverly used a variety of media to galvanize support to over-
throw democratically elected regimes. The irony of it all was that these 
opposition movements formed in retaliation against the incumbent’s abuse 
of power and the marginalization of opposition media. By fighting what 
opposition supporters believed to be tyrannical governments, they in turn 
used the media to propagate their antidemocratic agenda. An opposition 
movement that has its own access to media outlets has in turn made mili-
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tary coups easier as they reduce the cost of elite- mass coordination and 
mobilization as well as establishing legitimacy for military interventions. 
Not only is media crucial to broadcasting antidemocratic ideas, its also 
provides new means to mobilize around them.
The focus on the use of social media in the case of the PDRC demon-
strates the fundamental differences between social media and traditional 
media. Social media are the only media that truly give ordinary people the 
power to create content and mobilize around new ideas. Elites still matter 
a lot in the world of social media as tech- savvy elites can become influ-
encers in the online world— amassing millions of followers and shaping 
behavior and discourse. But social media users also have the power to share 
and shape discourse online in their own right— even becoming influencers 
themselves without the networks and resources that elites normally pos-
sess. The content and social networking analysis of the PDRC networks 
both before and after the 2014 coup shows that the conversations among 
supporters did not always match what the leaders were propagating and 
that these conversations provide an important way to measure the pulse of 
the movement.
Future Research
Since 2000, more than half a dozen countries have witnessed a collapse of 
their democracy. Factors such as economic crisis, weak institutions, and 
social cleavages have been cited as explanations for these breakdowns, yet 
few have paid attention to the role of political movements and how they 
contribute to the fall of democratic governments. This book brings politi-
cal movements back to the debate on the causes of democratic collapse. 
Specifically I focus on the phenomenon of antidemocratic mobilization. 
Democratic breakdowns have occurred in important countries like Egypt, 
Bangladesh, and Thailand in recent times. Why do people in democracies 
oppose their democratic regimes? How does antidemocratic mobilization 
contribute to our overall understanding of the state of democracy in the 
world today?
Institutional design is seen as a key factor in providing democratic sta-
bility in developing democracies. The main idea is that if institutions are 
properly crafted, democracies have a better chance of surviving (Power and 
Gasiorowski 1997; Robinson and White 1998; Lijphart 1999; Taagepera 
2003). This conviction has spawned a vast research on electoral, party, and 
constitutional design that can contribute to the strengthening of demo-
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cratic foundations. Efforts have been made to “engineer” democratic insti-
tutions in ways that would facilitate democratic success. The Thai elites 
have been obsessed with designing these institutions: from changing con-
stitutions and electoral systems to creating new bodies to increase political 
participation. While there is no denying that efforts have been made to 
craft democratic institutions, the question remains: For whom? If institu-
tions are designed to allow elites to ignore the voice of the people, why 
should we be surprised when people mobilize against democratic regimes?
The Thai case is one that has experienced both an antidemocratic move-
ment and a collapse of democracy. The theory of institutional blockage 
should be able to “travel” and explain similar antidemocratic mobilizations 
in Egypt, Bangladesh, and Honduras, for instance. It should also shed light 
on cases of anti- incumbent mobilization that led to democratic collapse. In 
Venezuela, there was a civil society mobilization against the democratically 
elected Hugo Chávez, which created support for an eventual coup d’état in 
2002. Encarnacion (2002) calls this a “civil society coup.”
Table 8.1 provides recent examples of Third Wave countries that have 
faced either a democratic breakdown or a major mass political movement. 
A major extension of my future research should involve, first, the testing of 
my institutional blockage theory in countries that experienced both anti-
democratic mobilization and democratic collapse, such as Egypt. Was the 
anti- Morsi movement in Egypt mobilized because of institutional block-
age? If so, how?
Then I could test whether my theory would hold in cases where there 
is an antidemocratic movement but where democracy survives. The Phil-
ippines in 2001 witnessed a protest movement that called for extracon-
stitutional intervention, but its democracy ultimately survived. The anti- 
Estrada movement, or “EDSA 2,” had some antidemocratic elements as 
the armed forces withdrew support from Estrada to join the movement, 
which was calling for a presidential impeachment. Yet their democratic sys-
TABLE 8.1. Classification of cases by regime and type of opposition movement
 Democratic Collapse Democratic Survival










* Venezuela notes a short- lived democratic collapse
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tem survived a major political crisis as President Joseph Estrada eventually 
stepped down. Why?
Theoretically, the book is concerned with antidemocratic mobilization 
in developing democracies. Practically, this work is interested in the issue 
of democratic breakdown and survival in Third Wave democracies. What 
makes new democracies endure? Do measures aimed at strengthening 
young democracies have unintended consequences? If so, what? How do 
ordinary people play a role in the demise of the democratic system? To this 
end, I outline six key policy implications from my book.
First, the case of Thailand illustrates a sober reality: civil society is not 
always prodemocracy. Conventional wisdom seems to imply that civil soci-
ety is a “good” thing and that the more of it, the better. What the PAD 
movement in Thailand has shown is the “dark side” of civil society. Civil 
society, under certain conditions, can be an illiberal force. As such we can-
not assume that civil society is inherently democratic or liberal. Indeed, 
authoritarian rule is not antithetical to civil society; in some countries, 
authoritarian regimes support an expansion of civic life. Moreover, civil 
society is neither apolitical nor static. Just like interest groups, civil society 
organizations have their vested interests in maximizing their goals. For this 
reason, they can become political when their interests are threatened. Such 
interests can also change over time, making civil society organizations 
dynamic actors in the social and political arena. Given the key role played 
by civil society in recent cases of antidemocratic mobilization, policymak-
ers of Western nations ought to be wary of blindly supporting “civil soci-
ety development” in developing democracies as a matter of foreign policy. 
Civil society should not automatically be seen as “apolitical,” “democratic,” 
or “liberal.” The key question foreign donors should address should no 
longer be about building civil society, but rather about building a “partici-
patory” and “inclusive” civil society that will help a country’s democratic 
development.
Second, a healthy democracy gives space for opposition voices. Demo-
cratic governments ought to ensure that regardless of the kind of govern-
ment formation, there is space for the opposition both in the formal and 
informal spheres. Majoritarian governments are the most at risk of alienat-
ing opposition voices simply because their power is the most concentrated. 
Consequently, any attempt by a majority incumbent to further marginalize 
opposition voices can give rise to antidemocratic mobilization. To guard 
against this, opposition groups must be given appropriate space and chan-
nels to voice their concerns and grievances. There is merit to respecting 
opposition “rights” and giving them “voice” even if they are not able to 
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affect any outcome. Respecting their space and the “right to oppose” and 
providing them with some form of power will result in a healthier and 
stronger democracy.
Third, the existence of powerful nondemocratic institutions makes 
democratic consolidation more difficult, but not impossible. These non-
democratic bodies are powerful because they provide alternatives to demo-
cratic institutions. In cases such as Thailand, where citizens accord more 
legitimacy to nondemocratic institutions as opposed to their democratic 
counterparts, consolidating democracy becomes especially hard. From a 
policy standpoint, one remedy to the problem of competing powerful insti-
tutions in a democratic polity is some form of power- sharing arrangement 
that sets out clear boundaries for each powerful entity in a democracy in 
the short term. Any attempt to undermine the power of one institution by 
the other will result in political conflict in the short term (as witnessed in 
the Thai case). In the long run, however, incremental steps can be taken to 
empower formal democratic institutions vis- à- vis nondemocratic ones, as 
has been the history in many “classic” cases of gradual democratization like 
the United Kingdom.
Fourth, building a strong party system weakens elite cohesion in the 
short term and can cause political conflict. While generally there is a con-
sensus among scholars of party politics that a well- institutionalized party 
system strengthens democracy as a whole (Mainwaring and Scully 1995; 
Randall and Svasand 2002), the issue of short- term implications of party 
system institutionalization on the democratic polity has been largely 
neglected. What my book shows is that measures to better institutional-
ize the party system can have unintended negative consequences for the 
democratic regime. In cases where political elites are not fully commit-
ted to democratic ideas, party system institutionalization can weaken elite 
cohesion. A weakly institutionalized party system, in other words, produces 
elite cohesion. Political elites view the “democratic rules of the game” as a 
way to access power and rents. When the party system is weak (i.e., it has 
many patronage- based parties), there is no incentive for elites to subvert 
the system. However, strengthening party system institutionalization can 
prompt some elites to abandon the democratic system if they feel they will 
lose access to power and rents in the foreseeable future.
Fifth, the findings of my research suggest that the low quality of democ-
racy can lead to a complete regime breakdown. In the democratization and 
democratic consolidation literature, there is an implicit assumption that 
there is a linear progression from a minimal/procedural level of democracy 
to a well- established democracy. Once elections are institutionalized then 
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new democracies can work toward becoming more “mature” by devel-
oping democratic qualities such as responsiveness and accountability, so 
that eventually these countries will become “high quality” (Diamond and 
Morlino 2004). Yet, the Thai case shows that institutionalized elections do not 
necessarily prevent regime breakdown. Countries with routinized and insti-
tutionalized elections can still face democratic collapse if their quality of 
democracy is poor. Consequently, we need to break free from the order 
of “items” that democratizing states need to get right in order to become 
consolidated. O’Donnell (1996) is correct to point out the “illusion” about 
democratic consolidation as we prioritize formal rules of democracies 
before informal ones. Both ought to work hand in hand because a poor 
quality of democracy may be as much a threat to regime survival as not 
having routinized elections.
Finally, social media have shown to be a real bane to democracy. 
Instead of neutralizing radical voices online, they are forceful in embold-
ening them to the detriment of democracy itself. Once touted as a tool to 
democratize society, social media is also a potent platform for the anti-
democrats to propagate, spread, and mobilize antidemocratic agenda. Yet 
to build a thriving democratic society, these radical voices online need to 
be accommodated and made public, not sidelined. Shutting down radi-
cal content would only drive it to encrypted platforms, such as LINE or 
WhatsApp, or worse to the dark net. By keeping these antidemocratic 
conversations alive on publicly accessible social media platforms like 
Facebook and Twitter, these radical thoughts can provide useful cues to 
understanding public opinion in general and identify organizations that 
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